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The notion of literalness in linguistics is based on the following assumptions: 
Linguistic expressions are vehicle-meaning pairs (since literal meaning has 
to be the meaning ofsomething). 
Linguistic expressions have to be cognised and used (especially uttered) in 
order for their meanings to be regarded as literally theirs. 
"Linguistie, vehicle-meaning relations are fixed and autonomous -- rather 
than having particular meanings in virtue of being used to express those 
meanings, "linguistie' vehicle-meaning pairs are used to express certain 
meanings in virtue of having the meanings that they have. 
This thesis criticises Chomsky's and Sperber and Wilson's attempts to establish the 
autonomy of "linguistie'vehicle-meaning pairs. I argue that 
" Both Chomsky and Sperber and Wilson fail to di stinguish "linguistie' 
semantics from the "real" semantics of what "linguistic" vehicle-meaning 
pairs are used to express. 
" They persist in the idea that "linguistic" vehicles are specifically for being 
uttered (physically instantiated), thus defeating their own purpose of 
setting the linguistic absolutely apart from what it is used for. 
" Neither Chomsky's internalist conception of language nor Sperber and 
Wilson's relevance framework is able to account for the phenomenon of 
"language misuse", i. e. the use of a "linguistic" vehicle to express the 
"wrong" meaning. 
Burton-Roberts' representational conjecture is applied and developed in the 
presentation of an alternative non/ extra-linguistic account of "literal meaning" and 
"language use/ misuse". This account has it that neither "linguistic" vehicles nor 
"linguistic" vehicle-meaning relations are actually linguistic. It avoids the problems 
attending the notion of linguistic expressions as objects with sortally disjoint and 
arbitrarily conjoint properties (i. e. physically instantiable "vehicle" and mentally 
constituted "meaning"), and resolves the unease within Chomsky's Minimalist 
Program about the inclusion of phonology in I-language. Finally, by way of this 
resolution, I address some seemingly unrelated issues concerning vehicle-less 
"meanings" and the relations between language, thought and consciousness. 
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Literalness and the problem of "language use" 
This thesis was originally intended as an investigation of the phenomenon of metaphor. 
However, it soon became clear to me that folk concepts as well as theoretical 
definitions of metaphor rest upon assumptions about things which are equally (if not 
more) difficult to pin down, and in need of elucidation: language and meaning, 
thought and consciousness, and, most particularly, the notion of literalness. It is my 
belief that literalness requires as much discussion as metaphor, if only because the 
concept of metaphor only makes sense, or has any substance at all, in relation to that of 
literalness. Certainly it seems very difficult to talk about metaphor without making any 
reference to literalness, and (possibly) vice versa. It is as if one was inextricably linked 
with, because conceived in terms of, the other. 
This is true even of those theories which Ortony (1993: 2) calls "constructivist" -- 
i. e. accounts of metaphor based on the hypothesis that "meaning has to be constructed 
rather than directly perceived". Ortony (ibid) maintains that "constructivist" theorists 
like Lakoff (1987,1979/93, Lakoff and Johnson 1980), in claiming that metaphor is an 
essential feature of language and thought, tend to undermine the distinction between 
the metaphorical and the literal. Trivially, any account or discussion of metaphor might 
include some notion of literalness, if only to deny or reject it, or to proclaim it as 
inferior to metaphor as a means of communication or expression. For example, the 
"constructivist" n-dght describe an apparently unworkable and impossible "literal 
language" which precisely and unambiguously depicts the world, as a way of 
illustrating what he considers to be the contrasting (and contrastingly plausible and 
pervasive) nature of metaphor. 
In my view, the notion of literalness has another more fundamental and substantial 
role in "constructivist" accounts of metaphor. Lakoff is a case in point. Briefly, his 
theory is that metaphor is a mechanism that plays a very central role in the workings of 
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the mind: it maps concepts on to other concepts, and in doing so enables us to grasp 
yet more concepts. But, contrary to Ortony's assertion, Lakoffs account of metaphor 
does require a separate notion of literalness. According to Lakoff, it is from "literal 
concepts" (1979/93: 205) or "emergent concepts" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 60) that 
the mapping process begins and builds in complexity (and, presumably, in non- 
literalness). There is no sense in which the concepts which arise from the metaphorical 
mapping mechanism are less "normal" or important than those that do not, or vice 
versa. But there is no doubt that Lakoff s notion of literalness is pre-metaphorical. As 
he puts it: "Metaphorical understanding is grounded in non-metaphorical 
understanding. " (1979/93: 244). 1 
Similarly, I. A. Richards argues that metaphor is "the omnipresent principle" of 
language's "normal mode of working" (1936: 90), but nevertheless distinguishes 
between the two conceptual "halves" of a metaphor: the tenor, the "underlying idea" 
which the other idea, the vehicle, can be used to "mean", or "describe or qualify" (ibid: 
99). This unavoidably implies that the metaphorical combining and reacting of vehicle 
with tenor, while assumed to be the "normal" way in which language works, is made 
possible only by the presence of literal or at least pre-metaphorical meanings, 
expressed in non-metaphorical ways, which function as the vehicles. For instance, 
Richards' analysis of 'crawling! in Hamlet's utterance "What should such fellows as I do 
crawling between earth and heaven? " as a metaphorically used vehicle presupposes that 
'crawl' does have an original, literal meaning which constitutes the vehicle: 
Hamlet... may crawl literally -- as babies and big-game hunters 
undoubtedly do at times -- but... there is an unmistakeable 
reference to other things that crawl, to the motions of foul 
insects, to vermin, and this reference is the vehicle as Hamlet... 
[is] the tenor. (ibid: 119, my italics) 
1 Actually it is not clear why Ortony cites Lakoff 1979/93 as a "constructivist" account, or at 
least an entirely constructivist account, since Lakoff does have a very clear distinction between 
concepts which are "constructed" by the metaphorical mapping process, and "literal concepts" 
which arc not. 
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Thus I argue that there is a paradoxical side to theories which hold that metaphor 
is the norm in language and thought, and that language and thought are essentially 
metaphorical in nature. If the difference between metaphor and literalness is a matter of 
degree rather than of quality, then any meaning, and perhaps the means of expressing 
any meaning, ought to be ever shifting and provisional (though probably far from 
arbitrary). In other words, there should be no distinction between literal meaning and 
meaning which arises from metaphor, because the assumption would be that ALL 
meaning arises from some ongoing metaphorical process. 
But is this assumption consistent or compatible with what is inarguably the main 
purpose of any theory of metaphor -- to define what metaphor is? Whereas Ortony 
claims thatl the "constructivist" approach tends to blur the literal-metaphorical 
distinction, my view is that such a distinction is created or presupposed by any attempt 
to circumscribe the phenomenon or process of metaphor, or even to single out specific 
"examples" of metaphor. It seems that the mere existence of metaphor cannot be 
affirmed unless one invokes (directly or indirectly) some concept of literalness, or at 
least the idea that there are meanings other than those which arise from metaphor 
itself. Take Richards, who assumes that 'crawl' has a literal meaning to do with the 
motions of babies and insects, and whose test for metaphor is that we should be able to 
detect at least two "ideas" when presented with a metaphorical expression (i. e. that we 
should be able to distinguish tenor from original vehicle). Without the literal meaning 
to serve as the vehicle, there would be nothing for the tenor (the idea of Han-Jet and 
his actions and concerns) to interact with, no "borrowing between and intercourse of 
thoughts" (Richards 1936: 94) -- and no resulting metaphorical meaning. In short, 
without the concept of literal meaning, it would be impossible for Richards to say how 
he recognised the metaphorical nature of 'crawl' in the Hamlet quote, let alone explain 
how it came about. 
To reiterate and expand on what may appear to be a rather trivial and obvious 
point: if a theory proceeds from the premise that metaphor has to do with meaning 
and/ or the expressing or constructing of meaning, then that theory must include some 
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notion of literalness or literal meaning. And not just any notion of literalness - 
needless to say, there is more to the literal than that which is separate from and prior to 
the metaphorical. 
/ý, , 
To begin with, the notion of literalness obviously presupposes the notion of 
certain objects or units -- specifically E(xtemally)-physical or E-instantiable objects/ 
units2 - having meaning or being the vehicles of meaning. Generally, these objects or 
units are thought of as expressions, in the sense of being in themselves expressive of 
certain meanings. It is the meaning of a particular vehicle or expression which is 
assumed to be literal. Metaphorical meaning, on the other hand, is never unequivocally 
described as the meaning of anything (except "metaphors", of course, whatever 
metaphors are). Perhaps metaphorical meaning might be conveyed or expressed by, 
say, the uttering of an utterance. But, when it comes to the meaning of that utterance, 
it is more often the case that only the literal would be taken into account. 
Vehicles of meaning tend to be regarded as being USED (by agents) to express 
certain meanings, but the important point is that the vehicles in themselves -- as 
vehicles of meanings - are supposed to express whatever meanings they carry, rather 
than what they are used to express. Thus the notion of literalness also involves a 
pretheoretical opposition to Humpty-Dumpty's insistence that, when he uses a word, it 
means what he chooses it to mean. However, it has to be pointed out that meaning M 
is regarded as the literal meaning of vehicle U, not only in virtue of being the meaning 
of U, but also in virtue of being recognised or regarded as the meaning of U. So, on 
the one hand, the literalness of meaning M of vehicle U presupposes a vehicle-meaning 
relation that is independent of what humans think or do. But, on the other hand, M can 
be said to be literal only in virtue of the U-M relation! s place or role in human thought 
and activity. 
21 am following Chomsky in my use of "E" to stand for "external". See the following chapter 
on Chomsky and his problematic (1986) concept of "E-language". 
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It is LANGUAGE which is usually assumed to be the primary, and possibl most 
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natural, vehicle of meaning. In fact the term "language" has become almost 
synonymous with "vehicle of meaning", for "language" not only has its more specific 
(including the strictly theoretical) definitions, by which only certain entities are 
regarded as linguistic, but is also used to refer to anything which is considered to be 
expressive of meaning (e. g. "a musical language", "a language of cinema"). 
Furthermore, the vehicle-meaning pairs which supposedly constitute linguistic 
expressions are generally assumed to be determined by sets of principles which are 
somehow fixed -- which pre-exist, which do not need to be constructed, which humans 
simply have. I have argued that assumptions of and about literalness are integral to 
theories of metaphor, and therefore tend to be made in respect of how metaphor is 
conceived. But while meaning is considered metaphorical in origin only if it is arrived 
at through the interaction of literal meaning with metaphorical process, it is common 
for literal meaning to be considered independently of metaphor, and in relation to 
language instead. My point, which may again seem trivial and obvious, is this. 
Meaning which is said to be literal is in most cases associated with linguistic meaning, 
in virtue of the latter's being paired with particular phonetic vehicles. In other words, it 
is linguistic meaning that is most often associated with the property of literalness, 
mainly because linguistic meaning seems to be characteristically and undeniably the 
meaning OF certain vehicles. 
As I pointed out above, however, literalness involves more than vehicle-meaning 
pairs - it also involves an individual's awareness and application of those vehicle- 
meaning relations in the process of expressing or accessing meaning. In short, 
literalness (as well as non-literalness) also involves the USE of the vehicle-meaning 
pairs which linguistic expressions are generally assumed to be. 
This thesis is mainly concerned with the problems surrounding: 
31 am using "natural" here in the vague and gradable sense of not exceptional, rather thari the 
non-gradable and more specific sense which Chomsky (e. g. in Chomsky 1995a) uses to indicate 
that his I-language is a part of the natural world, and an object of naturalistic inquiry. 
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(1) the autonomous vehicle-meaning pairs which linguistic expressions are 
assumed to be, 
(2) the use of such vehicle-meaning pairs, and 
(3) the two loci of meaning which follows from the distinction between (1) and 
(2). 
Note that there would be two loci of meaning even if we assumed that linguistic 
expressions are used to convey only the meaning which they possess in themselves. 
Take a speaker who uses the linguistic expression, L, to convey propositional meaning 
M. Even if L was used to convey M in virtue of L having a semantics which consists of 
propositional K the speaker could still have entertained M independently of L before 
picking out L to use to convey M. 
In fact, in both of the theoretical frameworks within which I consider the notion of 
literalness, an absolute distinction is made between the meaning of L and propositional 
M expressed through the use of L. The first is Chornsky's internalist theory of language 
(chapter 2), according to which the linguistic semantics of linguistic expressions 
generated by I-language is distinct from the propositional meaning which the 
performance systems are concerned with. The second is Sperber and Wilsods 
relevance theory (chapter 3), which distinguishes between the linguistic semantics of 
the linguistic codes over which language modules compute, and the truth-theoretic 
(or "real") semantics which the central processes deal in. In both cases, the 
propositional meaning or truth-theoretic semantics appears to be regarded as the 
semantics, not of language as such, but of some language of thought (to use Fodor's 
expression). Its relation to language is that it may be expressed or cognised through 
the USE of some linguistic expression, as effected by the performance systems or 
central processes. 
However, while making such distinctions between language and thought, neither 
Chomsky nor Sperber and Wilson manage to provide an independent account of how 
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the two are related. The notion of literalness is central to my argument. Whereas the 
phenomenon of metaphor highlights the distinction between language and language 
use, the concept of literalness -- based as it is on the notion of vehicles being used in 
virtue of what they mean - highlights the problem of how we might bridge the 
empirical and conceptual gap between autonomous linguistic expressions and the 
mental processes which effect the use of linguistic expressions. This problem may be 
formulated in terms of the distinction/ relation between linguistic semantics and what 
the relevance theorists refer to as truth-theoretic or "real" semantics: how exactly is the 
linguistic semantics of some linguistic expression used to express a particular "real" 
propositional meaning which may be regarded, if not as "the literal meaning of that 
linguistic expression", then at least as "the meaning expressed by the literal use of the 
linguistic expression"? 
The idea that a- linguistic expression may be used literally -- to express a meaning 
which is, if not identical to, then at least constrained by, its linguistic semantic 
properties -- also raises questions about the nature of a linguistic semantics which is 
closely related to, yet distinct from, the propositional meaning expressed through its 
literal use. It seems to me that both Chomsky and the relevance theorists conceive of 
linguistic semantics in terms of what it is used for, and in doing so defeat their original 
purpose of distinguishing linguistic semantics from truth-theoretic propositional 
meaning. Although it is usually the case that an object is used for a particular purpose 
in virtue of inherently possessing particular properties, it is also true that certain 
characteristics tend to be attributed to that object as a result of its being used. For a 
start, the object would be thought of as "usable for that particular purpose". Chomsky 
seems to be carefully separating language from what language is used for, when he 
remarks: 
In general, it is not the case that language is readily usable or 
"designed for use. " The subparts that are used are usable, 
trivially... (1995b: 18) 
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Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, claim that language is specificallyfor verbal 
communication (1986a/ 95: 1734). In chapters 2 and 31 argue that neither Chomsky 
nor Sperber and Wilson manage to avoid the implication that, instead of being used to 
express propositional M in virtue of having a particular semantics, a "linguistic 
expression" has a particular semantics - i. e. is regarded as an expression -- in virtue of 
being used to express M. This confusion of "linguistic (semantic) properties" with 
"what the linguistic is used to express" is compounded by the suggestion, made by 
Chomsky (e. g. in 1992a: 115-6) as well as Carston (e. g. in 1988: 177,1998: 64-5), 
that the mental resources involved in the use of linguistic expressions to express truth- 
theoretic meaning also constitute the basis for (or the source oo the semantics of those 
linguistic expressions. 
Rather than contrasting the literal use of language with the metaphorical use, I 
discuss in chapter 4 the apparently straightforward but in fact highly problematic 
concept of the so-called "misuse" of language. The concept of language misuse 
appears to follow from the notions of language and language use described above. 
However, rather than developing those notions, it reveals some of their fundamental 
deficiencies and contradictions. As it is generally understood (e. g. in Chomsky 1992a 
and 1995a, and in Carston 1998), the concept of language misuse presupposes that 
there is a particular use of a particular linguistic expression which is the correct use, 
and which is the correct use in virtue of being in some way constrained by the semantic 
properties of the linguistic expression. For example, the misuse of the linguistic 
expression 'flaunt' in an utterance 
(4) She always flaunts the rules. 
4 Note that by "language" here I mean the "external languages" which constitute relevance- 
theoretic "linguistic codes". Sperber and Wilson distinguish such "external languages" from the 
"internal languages" which are "an essential tool for the processing and memorising of 
information" (1986a/ 95: 173). 
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is usually taken to consist in the (mis)use of the E-physical (phonetic) vehicle of the 
expression to express some truth-theoretic propositional meaning (i. e. the concept 
flout) which is at odds with the linguistic semantics carried by the vehicle. On the one 
hand, this presupposes that there is a truth-theoretic meaning, namelyflaunt, which is 
consistent with the semantic properties of linguistic expression 'flaunt', and expressed 
through the (correct, literal) use of that linguistic expression. On the other hand, note 
that, in failing to (intend to) express the truth-theoretic meaningflaunt, the speaker has 
actually failed to make use of the linguistic semantics of the linguistic expression 
'flaunt'. Nevertheless, his production of the phonetic vehicle of the linguistic expression 
is considered (at least by Chomsky (1992a, 1995a) and Carston (1998)) as sufficient 
(and obviously necessary) for the linguistic expression Taunt! to have been (mis)used. 
What this underlines, in my view, is that the misuse -- and therefore the use -- of a 
linguistic expression is generally regarded as consisting primarily in the production of 
its E-physical vehicle rather than the deploying of its semantic properties. This notion 
of language use/ misuse seems to be inextricably bound up with the view of linguistic 
expressions as having E-instantiable vehicles, in virtue of which linguistic expressions 
are to all intents and purposes inherently E-produceable for the purpose of conveying/ 
carrying meaning. Furthermore, it is unable to accommodate cases of so-called 
"misuse" in which the person who utters, say, (4) not only intended to express the 
conceptflout, but intended to do so via the specific and (for him) literal use of [flo: nt], 
regardless of the "linguistic" convention which states that the phonetic form is the 
vehicle of the semantics which corresponds to the conceptflaunt. 
At this point I feel it is only fair to warn the reader that my discussion and 
criticism of (1)-(3) is informed by Burton-Roberts' 1994 representational conjecture 
(outlined in chapter 5), which in my view provides a far more coherent account of so- 
called "linguistic" vehicle-meaning pairs and their use. The conjecture is that E-physical 
utterance phenomena are non-natural and intentional representations of linguistic 
expressions, in (much but not exactly) the same way that a drawing of a square in a 
map is a representation of a building. Burton-Roberts stresses that the "representation" 
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of the representational conjecture (henceforth RC) is not the "representation" of 
Chomskys (1995a, 1995b) "linguistic levels of representation". "Representation" in 
Chomskys sense is not relational but constitutive. For example, a "phonological 
representation" of a Chomskian linguistic expression simply is the phonology of the 
linguistic expression. For the RC, it is crucial that a representation "is distinct from, 
and is not constitutive of, what is represented" (Burton-Roberts 1994: 192). BR 
distinguishes his "representation" from Chomskys by labelling it with an "M" -- hence 
M-representation. "M" stands for Magritte, alluding to Magritte's La Trahison des 
Images and its reminder that Ced West pas une pipe -- i. e. that the painting contains 
only a representation of a pipe, and not the pipe itself 
Thus BR posits that E-physical utterance phenomena are produced by speakers, 
writers, etc in aid of E-physically representing linguistic expressions. This means that, 
on the representational conjecture, the E-phonetic is clearly not linguistic. However, it 
has to be stressed that the arguments of chapters 5 and 6 follow on from my claim that 
it is not just the E-phonetic, but phonoloSy as well, which is M-representational and 
therefore not linguistic. There are accounts and applications of the RC which address 
specific issues in syntax, semantics and pragmatics -- e. g. linear precedence (BR 
1999a), so-called "semantic ambiguity" (BR 1994,1999b), quotational mention (BR 
1993,1999b), the Grelling paradox (BR 1999b) and utterance accent (Chapman 
1998). All these (especially the earlier BR 1994) seem to take it for granted that the 
phonological is linguistic, radically internalist, and conventionally M-represented by the 
(non-linguistic) E-phonetic. But recent work within the representational framework 
(BR 1998, BR and Carr 1999, BR 2000, Carr 2000) has focused specifically on the 
nature and status of phonology. Burton-Roberts and Carr (1999: 399) remark: "The 
conjecture does not, of itself, deliver a decision on [the nature and status of the 
phonological]. " Nevertheless, they point out that the tensions in phonological theory 
are connected to the longstanding dispute over whether the linguistic is a natural, 
innate state of mind/ brain (Language), or constituted by socioculturally-determined 
systems of conventions that are specifically for (E-behavioural) communication 
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("languages", e. g. English, Italian, Swahili). BR and Carr argue that it is only 
"languages", and not Language, which can have a phonology. In fact, phonology is 
necessary for the E-instantiation or E-realisation of "languages" in communication, 
while the characteristic Saussurean arbitrariness and convention of these "languages" 
obviously arise from the way the phonological is paired with the semantic. 
The relevance of the RC to this Language vs. "languages" issue is that it provides 
an account of how one is related to the other - and, more specifically, of how the 
phonological belongs exclusively with "languages", but is also relevant in respect of 
Language. BR and Carr (BR and Carr 1999: 399404, BR 2000) argue that 
"languages" are M-representational of Language, and that phonology is a (non- 
linguistic) internalised attitude to the (non-linguistic, M-representational) E-phonetic 
phenomena which constitute speech. In short, the phonological constitutes those 
"languages" which are regarded as "spoken languages" (e. g. English, Italian, Swahili). 
Applying all of the above to (1)-(3), 1 claim that vehicles and (Saussureanly 
arbitrary and conventional) vehicle-meaniniz inairs are not linguistic, but M- 
reDresentational of the linLyuistic. I also claim that the various "languages" with their 
various sets of vehicle-meaning pairs, are in fact systems of representational 
conventions. Such systems are neither linguistic nor intrinsically fixed or autonomous. 
Instead, they arise from the volitional use, not of linguistic expressions, but of E- 
physical objects to represent linguistic expressions. Like any other volitional human 
activity, this use of the E-physical to represent the linguistic is subject to external 
(especially sociocultural) factors. 
But whereas much of BR and Cares latest RC-based work is concerned with 
phonology -- i. e. with the "vehicle" of the vehicle-meaning pair -- this thesis takes their 
claims about the non-linguistic (M-representational) nature of phonology as a starting 
point for projecting the RC into other, more general areas of inquiry that have to do 
with the "meaning" of the vehicle-meaning relation. I argue that it is the meanings, left 
behind by the vehicles' shift to non-linguistic M-representational status, which 
constitute the I-linguistic (or Language). Note that these meanings are not the 
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meanings/ semantics of anything. In my opinion, the logical conclusion of the RC is 
this: lin ssions arpý_ vehicle-less svntactico-semantic objects, 
indLstipguishableý ftom the "real" semantics of the langu4gý pf thought. Such a view of 
the linguistic has implications for the finguistic! s relation with thought and 
consciousness, and for the architecture of mind in general, which may not be 
considered acceptable even by others who subscribe to the representational conjecture. 
These implications will also be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
To conclude, a word about the notational conventions of this thesis. I begin by 
using single quotes for the "linguistic expressions" of Chomsky and relevance theory, 
double quotes for utterances of these "linguistic expressions", and italics for the 
semantics of "linguistic expressions" as well as for the "real" semantics of what is 
conveyed via particular uses/ utterances of "linguistic expressions". For example, when 
Bill produces the utterance "thing", he is using (the "linguistic expression") 'thing' to 
convey thing. Note, however, that "linguistic expressions" which can be uttered are 
utterable/ usable/ E-instantiable in virtue of having vehicles, i. e. phonological 
properties. As mentioned above, one of the main arguments of chapter 5 is precisely 
that vehicles and vehicle-meaning pairs are M-representational and therefore not 
linguistic. It follows from this that the utterable "linguistic expressions" indicated by 
single quotes are not of natural, innate, I-cognitive Language, but of E-instantiable, M- 
representational "languages". The development of this argument will be reflected by 
the changes in my notational conventions, starting from section 5.3. Instead of single 
and double quotes, there will only be braces and italics -- braces for M-representations 
(e. g. {thing)), and italics for the vehicle-less, phonology-free syntactico-semantic 
objects which constitute linguistic expressions (e. g. thing). 
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2 
Literalness and Chomsky's I-language 
2 Introduction 
This chapter is mainly concerned with a certain view of the relation between literalness 
and language, the assumptions underlying such a view, and the question of whether these 
assumptions -- about language as well as literalness -- are coherent, both in themselves and 
as the basis for associating literal meaning with linguistic semantics. My approach is to 
consider the nature of literalness within the framework of a particular theory of language. I 
have chosen Chomsky's, for the reason that it appears to be the most detailed and 
uncompromising view of language as an autonomous, unchanging set of principles which 
exists and operates with absolutely no reference to anything other than itself and its own 
inherent properties. According to this view, language is quite separate from the mental 
heterogeneity which characterises metaphor and non-literalness in general, and therefore 
an apparently ideal basis for a concept of literal meaning that is truly distinct from 
metaphorical meaning. 
However, I also argue that there may be a fundamental problem with Chornsky's 
theory of language (discussed in 2.1) -- a problem which is highlighted by my attempt to 
apply the theory to the notion of literalness. Chomsky could be said to have reconstructed 
the pre-theoretical autonomy of vehicle-meaning pairs as purely internalist linguistic 
expressions (LEs) generated by I-languages which are supposed to be entirely innocent of 
human activities and concerns -- and, more specifically, entirely innocent of how I- 
languages are USED, or what they are usedfor. I argue that, instead of confirming and 
strengthening the autonomy of the linguistic "vehicle-meaning pairs", Chomsky's 
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internalist conception of language seems to lead to an even more complex entanglement of 
linguistic properties with aspects of language use. 
To begin with, the austerity of Chomsky's I-language is such that the speaker-hearer 
who has an I-language is (according to Chomsky) able to consciously access it only by 
means of using it. (See, for example, Chomsky 1995b: 17. ) It follows from this that 
speaker-hearers can only conceive of LEs in terms of how they are used. In other words, 
Chomskian I-language is not "designedfor use" (Chomsky 1995b: 18, my italics), but can 
only be consciously accessed hy heing used. Furthermore, the austere and internalist 
semantics of Chornsky's I-language does not in itself consist of the sort of propositional 
meaning which may be regarded as literal, and has to be used to express that sort of 
propositional meaning. All this, I argue in 2.2, has the effect of subordinating I-language, 
and I-linguistic semantics in particular, to the speaker-hearet's use of I-language. I also 
argue that Chomsky himself deviates from his internalist perspective by defining and 
describing I-linguistic semantic properties only in terms of the propositional meanings 
which they are conventionally and extra-linguistically used to express. This comes across 
particularly clearly in Chornskys discussion of the "misuse of language", as I attempt to 
show in 2.3. 
It must be stressed that Chomsky himself almost never addresses the issue of 
literalness, or at least not directly. Indeed the entire Chomskian framework is very retiring 
on the question of linguistic semantics and propositional meaning in general -- perhaps 
because of the problems mentioned above. This means that any attempt to connect 
Chomskian linguistics with the notion of literalness is generally my own, unless I indicate 
otherwise. 
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2.1 Chomsky's internalist theory of language 
Although Chomskys theory of language has developed and changed not a little in the past 
forty years or so, it is nevertheless possible to pick out certain guiding ideas upon which 
his views have been consistently based. The most fundamental of these -- and I think the 
vaguest -- is that there is a discrete component of the human mind/ brain, the 
LANGUAGE FACULTY, dedicated to language (and that language therefore belongs in 
the natural world). As Chomsky himself points out in his recent Minimalist Program, this 
is one of the "underlying factual assumptions" (1995b: 2) running through his work since 
the 1950's. 
But Chomsky's (A) positing of a specific, innate language faculty which "provides an 
array of capacities that enter into the use and understanding of language" (ibid: 167) is, in 
my opinion, not as important as (B) his view of LANGUAGE itself as being mentally 
constituted. It is (B) which makes Chomsky's theory of language an explicitly 
INTERNALIST theory, one that is diametrically opposed to externalist theories like the 
behaviourists'. 
The externalist view holds that language consists only of the physical: physical 
utterance phenomena are all there is to language, and sentences are nothing more than 
potential utterances or theoretical constructs, abstractions from utterances actually 
produced and interpreted by speaker-hearers. Thus language in Bloomfield 1926, for 
example, is "the totality of utterances that can be made in a speech community". This is 
not inconsistent with (A), since the "capacities that enter into the use and understanding of 
language" may be construed as the ability to carry out certain inductive processes on 
certain categories of physical phenomena (i. e. utterances). But with (B) Chomsky is 
claiming that language is not the thing which humans have the capacity to produce and 
interpret, but the (mentally constituted) capacity itsetf For Chomsky, language is 
CONDETENCE, "the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language" (1965: 4), not 
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PERFORMANCE, the "actual use of language in concrete situations" (ibid) or the 
"practical ability to speak and understand" (1986: 9). 1 In Minimalist Program (1995b: 
14), competence is "knowledge and understanding", while performance is "what [the 
speaker-hearer] does with that knowledge and understanding" -- language being, of 
course, competence rather than what is done with competence (i. e. performance). 
Chomsky also distinguishes between what he calls I-LANGUAGE and E- 
LANGUAGE. This does not exactly correspond with the competence-performance 
distinction -- I-language appears to be equivalent to competence, but E-language is more 
accurately defined as the E-physical products of performance. I. e. Bloomfield's "totality of 
utterances that can be made in a speech community" is in fact Chomsky's E-language. The 
important point is that, for Chomsky, language is not E-language -- 
The E-language that was the object of study in most of traditional or 
structuralist grammar or behavioral psychology is now regarded as 
an epiphenomenon at best. (1986: 25) 
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Here is a foretaste problems to come. Chomsky's internalist concept of language as 
competence rather th%: 
ýnonlance 
is in fact at odds with his own definition of competence as the 
speaker-hearees kn ledge of language -- simply because language cannot simultaneously be the 
speaker-hearer's wledge of L, and the L of which he has knowledge. (This issue is also discussed 
in George 1989. 
; 7y 
point also applies to the quote in (A) about the language faculty providing 
"an array of capacities that enter into the use and understanding of language" (1995b: 167). 
According to Chomsky's competence-performance distinction, language IS the array of capacities, 
and therefore cannot at the same time be what is "used and understood" - unless, of course, the 
capacities provided by the so-called language faculty are not linguistic capacities. Even then, 
language as defined by Chomsky is not something which a speaker-hearer knows or understands - 
as he himself points out, "Note that Jones has this knowledge [of language] whether or not he is 
aware of these facts about himself; it may take some effort to elicit such awareness, and it might 
even be beyond Jones's capacities" (1995b: 17). 1 suspect that the "language" which Chomsky 
describes the speaker-hearer as "understanding" and having "knowledge" of is in fact Bloomfields 
"totality of utterances"; and that this use of the word "language" is just one of the many ways in 
which the externalist notion haunts Chomsky's supposedly internalist theory. See section 2.2. 
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The central task is to find the basic elements of I-language -- 
henceforth, language. (ibid: 51) 
E-language -- 
. where E 
is to suggest "external" and "extensional"... (I 995b: 16) 
-- consists of utterances, the products of human behaviour, and therefore involves or is 
determined by 
... complex and obscure sociopolitical, 
historical, cultural, and 
normative-teleological elements... which plainly lie far beyond any 
useful inquiry into the nature of language... (1992a: 102)2 
The term "Manguage", on the other hand, was 
... chosen to indicate that this conception of 
language is internal, 
individual, and intensional... (1992b: 221) 
Chomsky describes I-language as "a state of mind, realised in some arrangement of 
physical mechanisms [of the brain]" (1986: 40), and as "[having] no objective existence 
apart from its mental representation" (1972: 169). 
In short, ChomsVs main claim is that his internalist theory represents a shift 
... from behavior or the products of behavior to states of the mind/ brain that enter into behavior. (1986: 3) 
2 Burton-Roberts (1994: 196) points out: "If so-called E-language really is of no significance to the 
theory of language, then the term T-language" seems profoundly inappropriate - as does 
Chomsky's continued reference to "linguistic behaviour"... " 
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-- "behavior" and its "products" being, respectively, what Chomsky calls perfonnance and 
E-language, and "states of the mind/ brain" constituting I-language. 
2.1.1 I-language 
In this section I discuss I-language in greater detail, with particular attention to Chomsvs 
theory of I-linguistic semantics and how it is affected by the relation between I-language 
and what Chomsky calls the "performance systems". 
Firstly, it is important to note that, while it is certainly not a set of utterances, neither 
is an I-language a set of sentences or linguistic expressions (LEs). Nor does it 
manufacture LEs, or bring them into existence in some active or mechanical way, even 
though Chomsky describes it as generating LEs. This is because Chomsky uses the term 
"generative" to mean something like "explicit": 
If the grammar [i. e. the I-language] is... perfectly explicit -- in other 
words, if it does not rely on the intelligence of the understanding 
reader [or speaker-hearer] but rather provides an explicit analysis of 
his contribution -- we may... call it a generative grammar. (1965: 4) 
... "generative" means nothing more than "explicit"... 
(1986: 3) 
The "generating", "computing", "mapping" etc performed by an I-language is in no 
way sequential or temporal. Perhaps the I-language should not even be referred to as 
"performing" anything (as in "performing a procedure", for example). To be entirely true 
to Chomsky's definition of "generative/ generate", an I-language cannot be described as 
assembling its LEs step by step from their constituent parts. Rather, it merely specifies 
what those LEs are or consist of Another way of putting it is that I-language is nothing 
more than "a description of the ideal speaker-hearees intrinsic competence" (1965: 4, my 
is 
italics). ChomsVs very specific use of the terms "generative" and "generate" has to be 
borne in n-dnd when we come across verbs like "compute", "map", "form", "construct", etc 
in his accounts of I-language. 
Thus the LEs generated by an I-language are not the constituents of that I-language, 
i. e. an I-language is not a set of LEs. And since they exist in virtue of being defined (rather 
than constucted) by the I-language, nor are they, strictly speaking, the I-language's 
products. 
According to Chomsky's Nfinimalist Program (1995b), the I-language consists of (i) a 
CONPUTATIONAL CONVONENT (CIjL) and (ii) a LEXICON. C][jL determines 
computations or DERIVATIONS which form STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTIONS (SDs), 
while the lexicon characterises the lexical items which appear in the SDs. (1995b: 20). 
Although Chomsky occasionally makes it sound as if SI)s and LEs were two separate 
entities -- 
When we speak of a grammar as generating a sentence with a certain 
structural description, we mean simply that the grammar assigns this 
structural description to the sentence. (1965: 9) 
... the conception of a language as a generative procedure that 
assigns structural descriptions to linguistic expressions... (1992a: 
103) 
Each SD... specifies the full array of phonetic, semantic, and 
syntactic properties of a particular linguistic expression. (1995b: 15)3 
A rather more disturbing quote concerning the relation between LEs and SDs is 
Jones has mastered a generative procedure that associates with utterances 
structural descriptions, including semantic properties, and has other 
capacities of mind that allow him to produce and interpret linguistic 
expressions making use of these structural descriptions. (1995a: 121, my 
italics) 
-- in which Chomsky appears to be using the phrase "linguistic expressions" to refer to E-physical 
utterance phenomena. 
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-- the fact is that SI)s are what I-languages generate, i. e. LEs: 
We may take the linguistic expressions of a given I-language to be 
the SI)s generated by it. (1992b: 221) 
One component of the language faculty is a generative procedure (an 
I-language, henceforth language) that generates structural 
descriptions (SDs)... These SDs are the expressions of the language. 
(1995b: 167) 
By ChomsWs definition, an SD consists of a pair of representations or symbolic 
objects -- these are 7r, the PF ("phonetic form") representation, and %, the LF ("logical 
form") representation: 4 
The elements of these symbolic objects can be called "phonetic" and 
"semantic" features, respectively, but we should bear in mind that all 
of this is pure syntax, completely intemalist... (1995a: 19) 
7c and X, which together constitute an SD, are formed at PF and LF respectively. The 
two important characteristics of PF and LF are that (i) they are levels of representation or 
symbolic systems to 7c and Vs representations or symbolic objects; and (ii) they are 
INTERFACE levels which interface with particular PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS. As 
their name indicates, performance systems are to do with performance rather than 
competence -- i. e. what the speaker-hearer does with his competence/ I-language, or his 
use of his I-language. In Chomsky's words: 
... performance systems... make use of [information stored 
in the I- 
language] for articulation, perception, talking about the world, asking 
questions, tellingjokes, and so on. (1995a: 12)5 
4 Chomsky states that "representation" here is "not to be understood relationally, as "representation 
of ...... (1995a: 53). Within his internalist framework, representations like X and ic are "postulated 
mental entities" (ibid. ), and do not represent anything. 5 The notion of I-language being made use of by performance systems has to be considered in the 
light of an earlier remark in the same paper (Chomsky 1995a: 8): 
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In short, performance systems have to do with behaviour (i. e. performance) and the 
products of behaviour (i. e. E-language). PF interfaces with the ARTICULATORY- 
PERCEPTUAL (A-P) performance systems, and LF with the CONCEPTUAL- 
INTENTIONAL (C-I) performance systems. 
Together, these performance systems and the I-language form what Chomsky calls 
the LANGUAGE FACULTy. 6 Whereas the I-language is "a cognitive system that stores 
information", the performance systems "access that information and use it in various ways" 
(1995b: 2). 
So how does an I-language generate an SD? The following account is taken from one 
of the more recent versions of Chomsky's linguistic theory, his NEnimalist Program 
7 (1995b). An operation, presumably applying to the lexicon, forms aNUNERATIONN: 
... a set of pairs (LI, i) where LI is an item of the 
lexicon and i is its 
index, understood to be the number of times that LI is selected. 
(1995b: 225) 
More cautiously, we may say that in appropriate circumstances people 
think, not their brains, which do not, though their brains provide the 
mechanisms of thought. I may do long division by a procedure I learned in 
school, but my brain doesn't do long division even if it carries out the 
procedure. 
Assuming that the performance systems are as much a component of the human mind/ brain as the 
I-language, this implies that ultimately it is the person - and not his performance systems - that 
makes use of his I-language. 
6 Note that Chomsky is not consistent as to whether or not the performance systems are included in 
the language faculty. The "language faculty" of Chomsky 1975(: 324), for example, consists only 
of principles specifying linguistic form. Burton-Roberts and Carr point out (1999: 387; the 
references cited are consistent with my bibliography) that Thomsky sometimes has it that the 
linguistic includes... a "performance system" (e. g., 1995a: 12,1995b: 2), at others that it is 
"embedded within" such a system (e. g., 1995b: 15,158). " 7 See also Chomsky 1998. 
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This "array of lexical choices" is computed upon by CHL, the operations of which 
"recursively construct syntactic ohiects from items in N and syntactic objects already 
formed" (ibid: 226). The operations of CI-IL are divided into three components. The one 
which first applies to N is the OVERT COMPONENT. This overt component includes the 
operation SELECT, which picks an LI from N -- thereby reducing its index by I -- and 
introduces it into the computation as a syntactic object. There is also an operation, 
MERGE, which "takes a pair of syntactic objects (SOi, SOi) and replaces them by a new 
combined syntactic object SOU" (ibid). For the computation as a whole to be a 
DERIVATION -- i. e. for the computation to actually yield an SD -- Select must reduce N 
to zero, and Merge must apply often enough to give a single SO at the interface levels. 
The overt component computation "splits into two parts" (ibid: 229), one carried out 
by the COVERT CONTONENT and the other by the PHONOLOGICAL 
CONTONENT. This "split" occurs at the application of the operation SPELL-OUT, 
which "strips away from Z [the structure formed by the overt component] those elements 
relevant only to 70 (ibid). These phonological elements are mapped by the phonological 
component to 7c at PF. The phonological component also has a morphological 
subcomponent which "constructs word-like units" (ibid). 8 What remains of E is mapped by 
the covert component to X at LF. 
At the interfaces, PF and LF, the computation may CONVERGE or CRASH (ibid: 
220). It converges if the representations it yields, 7c and X, satisfy the interface 
convergence condition FULL INTERPRETATION (FI), and crashes if they do not. FI 
states that n must consist entirely of LEGITIMATE PF OBJECTS, and X of 
LEGITIMATE LF OBJECTS (ibid: 194,219). These legitimate PF and LF objects give 
INSTRUCTIONS - consisting of information "about the properties of each linguistic 
8 "Word-like units" is a rather enigmatic phrase, and one that prompts the question: how exactly 
are (a) word-like units, (b) words, (c) SDs, (d) lexical items, and (e) syntactic objects different 
from, and related to, one another? 
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expression, including its sound and its meaning" (ibid: 21) -- to the A(rticulatory)- 
P(erceptual) and C(onceptual)-I(ntentional) performance systems respectively. The A-P 
and C-I systems in their turn assign INTERPRETATIONS to the Fl-satisfying 7c and X 
representations. 
To summarise: an I-language generates an SD when its CHL's computations upon an 
N, an array of lexical choices, constitute a convergent derivation -- i. e. a derivation that 
is forms, at PF and LF, a (7c, %) pair which gives appropriate instructions to, and 
assigned appropriate interpretations by, the appropriate performance systems. 
2.1.2 Chornsky's internalist semantics 
X, LF representation of the SD pair, is a symbolic object which consists of "semantic 
features". According to Chomsky: 
We may take the semantic features S of an expression E to be its 
meaning... E means S in something like the sense of the 
corresponding English word,... S... providing the relevant 
information for the performance systems. (I 995a: 19-20) 
So it is X that appears to be the locus of the Manguage-generated LE's semantics, and 
therefore central to Chomsky's account of linguistic semantics. The important point is that 
this account is part of an intemalist theory -- one that holds that language is an innate, 
internal, mentally-constituted component which "produces" LEs only insofar as it specifies 
or determines their properties. The LEs of Chomsky's linguistic theory exist and have 
certain properties only in virtue of being specified or described by a component -- i. e. the 
I-language -- in the human mind/ brain, and not because they are or can be uttered by 
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humans. 9 Similarly, these LEs have certain semantic properties M because the I-language 
states that they do -- not because people utter or interpret them to mean M. 
10 
Hence Chornsky's condition of INCLUSIVENESS: 
A "perfect language" should meet the condition of inclusiveness: any 
structure formed by the computation (in particular, 7c and %) is 
constituted of elements already present in the lexical items selected 
for N; no new objects are added in the course of computation apart 
from rearrangements of lexical properties... (ibid: 228) 
In other words, the 7c and X generated by the "perfect" language ought to "consist of 
nothing beyond properties of items of the lexicon (lexical features)... " (ibid: 225). 
The lexical properties that form X constitute 
... a rich texture of purely 
internalist 
general properties, and evidence for 
(including analytic connections). (1992b: 
semantics, with interesting 
formal semantic relations 
218) 
-- a semantics which arises from, or is based on 
... a rich conceptual structure 
determined by the initial state of the 
language faculty (perhaps drawing from the resources of other 
genetically determined faculties of the mind), waiting to be awakened 
by experience. (I 992a: 115-6)" 
9 This is not to say that I-language is peculiar to humans. 
10 All this, of course, is on the assumption that mentally-constituted, truly I-linguistic expressions 
can actually be "uttered'. 
11 The possibility of the language faculty "drawing from the resources of other genetically 
determined faculties of the mind" (I 992a: 115) raises questions concerning the nature of Chomsky's 
supposedly internalist linguistic semantics. He acknowledges that "Questions remain... as to just 
what kind of information is within the lexicon, as distinct from belief systems" (1992b: 217); and 
also asks, "In what respects... do these [linguistic semantic] properties belong to the language 
faculty as distinct from other faculties of mind to which it is linked? How do lexical resources 
relate to belief systems, for example ... T' (1995a: 23). It seems to me that these questions are important - not because they enrich, but because they undermine, Chomsky's n-dninialist program. 
Tle notion that language "draws from" other cognitive systems for its semantics, and that lexical 
items are "hased on conceptual structures" (1992a: 113, my italics), implies that language is 
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This is why, Chomsky argues, "it is a very difficult matter to describe the meaning of a 
word" (ibid: 113). Notions of location, actor, recipient, event, intention, etc, together with 
their "specific properties and interrelations", "enter widely into lexical structure, often in 
quite abstract ways" (ibid. ). 'Chase, for example, is an apparently simple word which 
actually has a highly intricate meaning: 
To chase Jones is not only to follow him but to follow him with the 
intention of staying on his path, perhaps to catch him. (ibid. ) 
But the important point is that this semantics, though "rich" and "intricate", is 
nevertheless "purely internalist", "determined by the initial state of the language faculty", 
and has no direct relation to the entities and situations in the world (or any actual or 
possible world) which it supposedly "describes" or "represents". Xs (and its) are mental 
representations, symbolic objects -- 
... postulated mental entities, to be understood 
in the manner of a 
mental image of a rotating cube, whether the consequence of 
tachistoscopic presentations or of a real rotating cube or of 
stimulations of the retina in some other way; or imagined, for that 
matter. (1995a: 53) 
-- and Chomsky reminds us that "all of this is pure syntax, completely internalist... " (ibid: 
19). LEs with Xs do not represent the world, or pick out things in the world. They are not 
related to the world in any Fregean or Peircean sense. Such relations, Chomsky argues, 
primarily to do with the vehicle half of the vehicle-meaning relation, linking 7r/ PF properties to 
concepts that are essentially pre- and (therefore) non-linguistic in nature. In other words, the 
implication is that 7, and 7c are not'on an equal linguistic footing, the semantic features which I 
consists of being "linguistic" only to the extent of having been assigned a vehicle by 14anguage. 
This idea is reinforced by Chomsky's suggestion "... that there is something like an array of innate 
concepts and that these are to a large degree merely "labeled' in language acquisition... " (ibid: 116, 
my italics). See chapter 5. 
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are invented technical notions: terms like extension, reference and denotation are 
"technical innovations, which mean exactly what their inventors tell us they mean" (ibid: 
42), and "[have] no counterpart in ordinary language" (ibid: 24). 
For Peirce (1933), reference is a triadic relation between person X, real object in the 
world Y and sign S, whereby X refers to Y by S. Frege suggests that 
A logically perfect language (Begriffsschrifl) should satisfy the 
conditions, that every expression grammatically well constructed as a 
proper name out of signs already introduced shall in fact designate an 
object, and that no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name 
without being secured a reference. (1952: 70)12 
Both Peirce and Frege are mainly concerned with "signs" having truth value, i. e. being 
true or false of objects in the world (in Peirce's case, real objects in the real world). 
Chomsky, on the other hand, seems to be denying that LEs have any such relation with the 
world in virtue of their semantic properties. " All they do, he claims, is to provide 
perspectivesfor viewing things: 
Perhaps the weakest plausible assumption about the LF interface is 
that the semantic properties of [an LE] focus attention on selected 
aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems, 
and provide intricate and highly specialized perspectives from which 
to view them... (1995a: 20) 
... a lexical item provides us with a certain range of perspectives 
for 
viewing what we take to be things in the world, or what we conceive 
in other ways; these items are like filters or lenses, providing ways of 
looking at things and thinking about the products of our minds. 
(1992b: 221) 
12 By "proper name" Frege means any designation which has as its reference a definite object 
(1952: 57). 
13 This view of LEs and their semantics is not entirely at odds with Peirce's definition of reference 
as a triadic relation. It could be argued that Peirce's sign S, in itself, does not refer to anything 
either - it requires person X to use it to refer to Y (real object in the world). 
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That is, Chomsky's LEs do not refer to things, but merely "provide ways of looking at 
things". Furthermore, the things which they provide perspectives for viewing are most 
emphatically NOT things in the world, but "selected aspects of the world as it is taken to 
he by other cognitive systems", or "what we take to be things in the world'. In other 
words, what is viewed through the LE-supplied perspectives is not the world itself, but 
our conception of the world -- or, more specifically, the particular perceptual/ cognitive 
effects, in particular circumstances, which the world produces in us. 
So there are two points which we have to bear in mind. The first is: 
(1) it would appear that ChomsWs phrase "the products of our minds" -- these 
"products" including, of course, the world as we perceivel cognise it - covers 
everything which purely internalist LEs are in some way semantically related to. 
The second (and probably more important) point is that 
(2) this relation is as necessary to the existence and nature of the internalist 
semantics as, say, light waves are to the existence and nature of "filters or lenses" - 
- that is to say, not necessary at all. 
In general, Chomsky rejects the notion of a "common public language" -- like Frege's 
Begriffsschrift - consisting of "grammatically well constructed" signs that have a Exed 
relation ("reference") to objects in the world taken as things divorced from the intrinsic 
properties, and from particular speakers' use, of the mode of designation (i. e. the signs 
themselves) (1992b: 222,1995a: 26). He also disagrees with Dummett's suggestion that a 
speaker-hearer's linguistic ability consists in a "partial, and partly erroneous, grasp" 
(Dummett, 1986: 468) of some common public language whose words have meanings 
"independently of any particular speakers" (ibid: 473). Chomsky's position can be 
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explained in terms of both (1) and (2). He is against the idea of a reference-based common 
public language, not only because he believes that LEs have a semantics regardless of the 
things in the world that they are said to "represent" ((2)); but also because it is arguably 
only through the perceptual/ cognitive systems of "particular speakers" that aspects of the 
world are available for the signs of a common public language to be related to ((I)). 
I feel it is necessary to underline (1) and (2), for they have implications which 
Chomsky does not unequivocally set out, and whose place within his intemalist/ minimalist 
framework he does not clearly indicate. To reiterate: (2) has to do with Chomsky's own 
remarks about a linguistic semantics providing nothing more than filters or lenses to view 
things through. It follows from this that the things, and the viewing of them, have nothing 
to do with the existence and nature of the semantics itself Point (1) is that the things 
which we view through the semantically-supplied perspectives are NOT things in the 
world, but what we take to be things in the world. In other words, Chomsky's linguistic 
semantics is the filters/ lenses through which we can view our view of the world - i. e. not 
the world itself, but our (presumably) pre-linguistic view of the world. So, taking (1) and 
(2) together, it could be said that language for Chomsky is at two removes from objects 
in, and states of, the real or some possible world, since it is 
(P) the world as we perceivel cognise it, not the world itself, that is 
(2) viewed through the perspectives provided by the linguistic semantics, rather 
than directly referred to by LEs. 
And if language within Chomsky's internalist framework is at two removes from the world, 
we should also remember what it is at one remove from -- (r), or "the products of our 
minds" (Chomsky 1992b: 221). In other words: while LEs are not directly related to 
things in the world, neither do they appear to be directly related to "the products of our 
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minds" which Chomsky's linguistic semantics provides perspectives for viewing. 14 Or 
rather: LEs represent neither the world nor our thoughts, impressions and experiences of 
the world. 
This brings me to an important point which I feel is insufficiently stressed by 
Chomsky: that, not only is it true that LEs do not refer to objects in the world, they do not 
even "express shared thoughts" (1995a: 26) along the lines of Frege's Sinn. Perhaps they 
cannot be said to express anything at all, for it follows from ChomsVs account of 
internalist semantics that his LEs do not have the sort of truth-conditional "meaning" that 
belongs to conscious thought or communicative utterance. What they do have are Xs -- 
the study of which is, as Chomsky puts it, pure syntax, since Xs are nothing more than 
mental representations or symbolic objects. 
Chomsky does use the phrase "the meaning of a word" (1992a: 113). And, in the 
quote (1995a: 19-20) which I use at the beginning of this section, he suggests that the 
semantic features S of expression E consititute Es meaning. But he goes on to say, rather 
equivocally, that "means" in E means S is to be taken "in something like the sense of the 
corresponding English word" (my italics). As applied to E and S, what Chomsky means by 
"mean/ meaning" cannot be anything like "the sense of the corresponding English word" if 
it is to be consistent with (1), (1% (2) and (T). Such a X-based, perfectly internalist 
linguistic semantics as he outlines is simply and inherently NOT expressive of propositions 
which (i) individuals may mentally entertain or physically communicate; and (ii) are, in 
virtue of having (or being able to have) truth value, mentally entertained or physically 
corm-nunicated for the purpose of representing states of the world. Henceforth I shall use 
"meaning" to refer to propositions expressed and entertained (and sought for) by human 
14 These "products of our minds" are, presumably, the products of cognitive systems other than the 
I-language: "... the semantic properties of [an LE] focus attention on selected aspects of the world 
as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems... " (1995a: 20, my italics). 
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individuals, and something more specific like "(finguistic) semantic content" for the 
semantic elements of Chomskys I-linguistic expressions. 
It is possible that the features of ChomsWs intemalist semantics mentioned above -- 
as specified by, or deducible from, his own remarks -- are part of what makes his notion of 
language INCLUSIVE as well as INTERNALIST. In other words, these may be the 
properties that define inclusiveness as well as intemalism with regard to the V LF side of 
I-language. Chomsky's LEs are internalist in that they are not a set of utterances or 
behaviours which include the act of verbally referring to objects in the world, and 
semantically internalist in that there is nothing in their semantics that allows them to refer 
(or even to be used to refer) to objects in the world. And, leaving aside objects in the 
world and taking just the mind into consideration, it could be that the semantic aspect of 
inclusiveness in general -- i. e. LEs being generated from nothing but I-linguistic lexical 
items -- consists in the basic irrelevance to, and exclusion from, linguistic semantics of 
other "products of our minds". 
To summarise: in virtue of its internalist and inclusive nature, Chomsky's linguistic 
semantics is not a relation between LEs and objects in the world ("reference"). It is not 
even a relation between LEs and the thoughts of an individual with an LE-generating I- 
language, in that it is very far from being a set of "meanings" which are intrinsically and 
directly expressive of the individual's percepts, knowledge and intentions. Nfinimalist 
semantic properties merely provide perspectives -- albeit very intricate ones -- through 
which things (i. e. "the products of our minds") may be viewed. 
2.1.3 The "USE" of (I-)language 
Although 
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(3) the semantic content of Chornskian LEs 
is by its nature nothing like, and completely independent of, 
(4) the sort of propositional meaning which humans are concerned with; 
the fact is that (4), according to Chomsky, may be expressed through the USE of (3). 
Chomsky claims that the process of using LEs involves the performance systems which 
interface with the I-language, as well as other conceptual resources (e. g. belief systems) to 
do with "human interests, intentions, goals and actions" (1995a: 30). It is these cognitive 
systems, and not the linguistic semantics, which are largely responsible for - which 
provide the crucial, expressive, truth-evaluable part of -- the "meanings" that we can 
express through the USE of language. Even the very elementary notion of nameable 
thing, Chomsky argues, is specified not by language, but by us. He points out that 
What we take as objects, how we refer to them and describe them, 
and the array of properties with which we invest them, depend on 
their place in a matrix of human actions, interests, and intent... 
(1992b: 207) 
Even the status of (nameable) thing, perhaps the most elementary 
concept we have, depends crucially on such intricate matters as acts 
of human will... (1995a: 22) 
For example, a person who comes across some sticks on a road might not take them to be 
a thing at all, unless he discovers that 
... they were specifically constructed as some kind of object, whether by people or, perhaps, beavers. (1995a: 30) 
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So nwneable thing is not so much a concept as our concept; it is inseparable from the 
"human interests, intentions, goals and actions" which form the basis of, or perhaps 
constitute, our conceiving of it. 
Chomsky is careful to distinguish such concepts from the semantic content of 
internalist LEs. For him, the notion of nameable thing is a part of "common sense 
understanding" or "how people interpret object constancy, the nature and causes of 
motion, thought and action, and so on" -- the study of which he calls "folk science" 
(1995a: 28). He also uses the term "ethnoscience" to refer to the more general study, 
encompassing "folk science", of "what people take to be constituents of the world, 
however they may talk about it" (ibid: 30). The important point is: 
Yhe study of semantic resources of the language faculty is not 
ethnoscience... (ibid: 3 1, my italics) 
Chomsky claims that it is the cognitive systems and processes involved in "common sense 
understanding" -- NOT an internalist semantics -- which determine concepts like that of 
nameable thing; and that these concepts are, consequently, the object of ethnoscientific 
rather than linguistic inquiry. 
It is these concepts which constitute (4) from the beginning of this section, i. e. the 
sort of propositional meaning which humans are concerned with -- and which, Chomsky 
argues, may be expressed through the USE of LEs. Therefore, if Chornsky's "study of 
semantic resources of the language faculty" is not ethnoscience, then neither is it the study 
of how LEs are used. Nor is it the study of how utterances are interpreted, or rather, how 
utterances are produced to express, and interpreted as expressing, (4) -- utterance 
production/ interpretation being (to my knowledge) the one clear example of language use 
that Chomsky provides. Chomsky (1992b, 1995a) agrees with Davidson's view that 
knowing how to interpret utterances is indistinguishable from "knowing our way around in 
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the world generally" (Davidson 1986: 446), and points out that utterance interpretation 
therefore involves not just the language faculty but also "all other capacities of the mind, 
whatever they may be" (1992a: 120). 
Note that Chomsky seems to take it for granted that to utter LEs is to use them for 
communication, for he asserts that: 
The study of communication in the actual world of experience is the 
study of the interpreter [of utterances]... (1992a: 120)15 
Moreover, communication encompasses the rather more diffuse list of uses for language -- 
all of them to do with utterance production/ interpretation -- which he mentions 
elsewhere: 
... articulation, perception, talking about the world, asking questions, 
tellingjokes, and so on. (1995a: 12) 
Thus Chomsky also claims that "the study of communication in the actual world of 
experience" -- including, of course, the study of how LEs are used in the production and 
interpretation of utterances -- is actually "the study of everything" (1992a: 120). 1 take 
"everything" in this context to mean "knowing our way around in the world generally", 
"all other capacities of the mind", and "human interests, intentions, goals and actions". 
For instance, the notion of nameable thing may be communicated or retrieved when 
certain LEs (e. g. 'nameable thine, 'cat', 'The cat sat on the mat', 'Go and catch a falling 
star') are used. For Chomsky, what is communicated/ retrieved is not contained within 
those LEs (at least not completely), and has a great deal more to do with how and why the 
speaker used the LEs, and (perhaps more importantly) with the interpreter's assumptions 
about how and why the speaker used the LEs -- all of which, of course, is based on the 
15 In Chomsky 1971 (: 19), however, he remarks that language use "need not involve 
communication, or even the attempt to communicate". See also section 4.4. 
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"human interests, intentions, goals and actions" of the speaker and hearer, and what they 
take to be the constituents of the world. 
It has to be pointed out that, although he discusses language use in tenns of 
utterances produced by speakers (e. g. in Chomsky 1995a and 1995b), Chomsws (and 
Davidsorfs) theories and comments should apply equally to, say, orthographic inscriptions 
produced by a writer. For convenience, I shall use the term "UTTERANCE" to cover all 
E-physical phenomena that humans produce in virtue of "using language" -- speech, 
writing, the gestures of sign language, etc. The issues of how these different types of E- 
physical phenomena are related to one another, and whether all of them can really be 
accounted for by various important theories of language and language use, are important 
ones. However, my present concern is only with the physical nature of utterances, and its 
implications for Chomsky's notion of language use. 
For Chomsky, the use of LEs in humans is in part effected by the performance 
systems, which include the articulatory-perceptual (A-P) systems. Also, the I-linguistic 
phonological component which interfaces with the A-P systems has corresponding "special 
properties" that "relate to the need to produce instructions for the sensorimotor systems, 
for production and perception" (1995b: 229). Assuming that it is impossible for a 
Chomskian derivation to bypass PF (much less the phonological component within the l- 
language), 16 and bearing in mind that PF is the interface with the arficulatory-perceptual 
systems, it would appear to follow from ChomsWs own conception of the language 
faculty that the process of language use for human beings must in some direct or indirect 
way involve the articulation and perception, the production and interpretation, of 
articulable/ perceivable -- i. e. E-physical -- utterance phenomena. 
16 That a derivation cannot bypass PF does not actually need to be assumed, since it is 
presupposed by the very concept of "derivation" -- according to Chomsky, a derivation is a 
derivation (rather than just a computation) iff it converges at PF (and LF). 
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It may seem superfluous to stress that "language use" as discussed throughout this 
chapter is language use in humans. However, Chomsky claims that 
Some other organism might, in principle, have the same I-language 
(brain state) as Peter, but embedded in performance systems that use 
it for locomotion. (1992b: 213) 
-- so I feel it is necessary to point out that "language use" in the strictest Chomskian sense, 
while not necessarily a process which distinguishes humans from other species, has to do 
with utterance production and interpretation if and only if the I-language is embedded in 
the appropriate sort of performance systems, i. e. the sort which humans possess. Put 
another way: within Chomsky's framework, humans may not be the only organisms to 
have, and use, I-language; but it is possible that only human I-language is embedded in 
performance systems designed for the production and interpretation of E-physical 
utterance phenomena. 
The important point, however, is that these performance systems are A-P as well as 
C(onceptual)-I(ntentional). While abstract concepts and intentions are clearly required for 
what Chomsky regards as language use in humans, it seems that the E-physical, and the 
articulation and perception of the E-physical, are also an integral part of the process. All 
this implies that human I-language, according to Chomsky, is used primarily for the 
production/ interpretation of E-physical utterance phenomena, and for communication in 
particular. I say "primarily" rather than "only" for utterance and communication, for 
Chomsky's theory does appear to allow for the possibility of "thinking in LEs". Although 
language tends to be very strongly associated with communication (or at least with 
utterances), there is no doubt that we do "think in LEs" -- that, among the different kinds 
of thought or the various ways in which we think, there is at least one which language is a 
crucial part of. But because the human I-language is specifically and inextricably 
embedded in performance systems that have to do with utterance production/ 
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interpretation, and because these performance systems effect all uses of the I-language, it 
would appear that language use in humans (as conceived by Chomsky) must somehow 
involve utterance phenomena, whether a person is speaking to someone or "thinking in 
LEs". It follows from this that, within Chomsky's framework, the LEs one thinks in can 
only be in the form of internalised utterances, i. e. mental representations of physical forms 
(or potentially physical forms) defined, unavoidably, by PF and the A-P systems. 
So an example of the only sort of "thinking in LEs" permitted by Chomsky's theory of 
language is when a person thinks up LEs to utter -- i. e. what goes on in one's brain when 
one is framing expressions for writing down or saying aloud; like what I am thinking now 
as I write these words. This kind of mental use of LEs is nevertheless closely related to 
communication, for it is aimed at the formation of expressions that arefor uttering. " 
17 Of course this "thinking in LEs" need not necessarily be the thinking up of LEs to utter to 
someone - the internalised utterances may very well have been directed at oneself. As may be the 
case even for entirely E-physical "uninternalised" utterances, although I have been assuming that to 
utter LEs is to use them for communication. Black (1979.188-9) points out that the "soliloquizing 
thinker" presents a problem for Searle's (1969,1975) speech-act approach: 
Any clear cases of speech-acts that come readily to mind involve 
communication with an audience: it makes little sense to think of pron-dsing 
onesetf something, or warning, advising, pronouncing judgement, and so on, 
to oneself. (Black 1979: 188) 
In my view, there is a similar problem for those theories of language use according to which certain 
meanings are attributed to utterances of LEs on the basis of assumptions that two or more 
conversational participants are exhibiting cooperative behaviour (Grice 1975), or that utterances 
are intended by their producers to convey relevant information to the hearers (Sperber and Wilson 
1986a/ 95). Such assumptions are clearly unnecessary in the case of a person speaking to himself, 
since that person is privy to his own intentions. So the phenomenon of speaking to oneseýf seems 
devoid of purpose, and consequently inexplicable, if considered within theories of speaking to 
someone else. But perhaps it is not "speaking to yourself' which is pointless in terms of "speaking 
to someone else", but "speaking to someone else" which is impossible compared to "speaking to 
yourself'. After all, assumptions of cooperation and relevance are merely assumptions; and there is 
no guarantee that an interpreter ever interprets correctly or that a speaker ever communicates 
perfectly. Strictly speaking, the speaker/ interpreter only has his own experiences to go on, rather 
than any true knowledge of other people's states of mind. In attempting to communicate something 
clearly and unequivocably to Mary, for example, Peter's expectations concerning Mary's behaviour 
and interpretive abilities have much less to do with what she actually knows and is capable of, than 
with what he thinks she knows and is capable of. This, in turn, is based on what he thinks the 
process of utterance interpretation requires; indeed, what he himself would apply to the process 
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Note once again that "thinking in LEs" or thinking which involves language (whether 
or not language here is Chomsky's I-language) is merely one of several different kinds of 
thought. Note also Chomsky's position in respect of the debate over whether language is 
necessary for thought or vice versa: while he says nothing about "thinking in LEs", it is 
clear that he does subscribe to the notion that there is some variety of pre- and non- 
linguistic thought which, furthermore, is a prerequisite for both I-language and language 
use. From the "a priori framework of human thought, within which language is acquired" 
(1992a: 114) and the "conceptual structures" (ibid: 113) or "innate concepts" (ibid: 116) 
upon which I-linguistic lexical items are semantically based, through the numerations 
assembled from Us according to the "choices and intentions of speakers" (1995b: 237), to 
the "human interests, intentions, goals and actions" which determine the production/ 
interpretation of utterances -- there is a sense that certain mental processes and entities 
drive the use (via performance systems) of I-language, as well as the mechanisms of the I- 
language itself However, these (i) non-linguistic mental processes/ entities and their role 
in the workings of the language faculty must not be confused with (ii) the sort of mental 
activity which does involve I-language, and the part which I-language in its turn plays in 
this process of "thinking in LEs". And of course it is (ii) which I have been discussing -- 
my argument being that, if LEs are pairs of PF and LF representations generated by a 
Chomskian I-language, then "thinking in LEs" would be equivalent to the use of LEs for 
thinking. 
Taking into consideration Chomsky's view that the performance systems in which the 
human I-language is embedded consist of A-P as well as C-I systems, I also argue that this 
use of LEs in thought must be secondary to, and more circuitous than, the use of LEs in 
the production and interpretation of utterances. This is because all uses of LEs are 
were he the interpreter. On Mary's side, it could be said that her beliefs about speaker behaviour, 
which determine the assumptions she makes about Peter's intentions, are founded on her own 
experiences, intentions and behaviour as a speaker. 
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(according to Chomsky) facilitated by the same performance systems, the A-P elements of 
which would automatically convert LEs into some "utterable" form even if the intention 
was to use the LEs for thought rather than in utterance. 
As I am mainly interested in the semantic aspects of Chomskian linguistics, I began 
this section on language use with a discussion of the discrepancy between (a) the (purely 
linguistic) semantic content of LEs and (b) the propositional meaning which LEs can be 
used to express. From this semantic point of view, it could be said that the most important 
elements of Chomsky's theory of language and language use are (i) 7,; (ii) the half of the 
language faculty leading to, and partly constituted by, LF and the C-I performance 
systems; and (iii) how aX emerging from the covert component of the I-language is 
endowed, by the C-I systems (and other conceptual resources like belief systems) at the 
LF interface, with the propositional meaning that it is used to express. 
However, it also follows from Chomsky's theory that the propositional meaning which 
arises from the use of the human I-language is not simply EXPRESSED. A fuller 
characterisation of this type of propositional meaning, along Chomskian lines, is that it is 
CONMUNICATED -- or can be communicated -- and communicated, specifically, by 
means of particular E-physical phenomena (i. e. UTTERANCES) to other non-telepathic 
humans. In that case, what the C-I systems do to % is merely part of a process whose 
uniqueness lies in the nature of the entire set of the performance systems which effects 
that process -- i. e. not just the C-I systems, but also the A-P systems, whose operations on 
7c determine the E-physical features of language use. In short, it seems that language use in 
humans as defined by Chomsky occurs only when LEs interact with BOTH types of 
performance systems. (This is anyway indicated by the fact that the Chomskian LE is an 
SD consisting of aX that gives instructions only to the C-I systems, and a 7c that gives 
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instructions only to the A-P systems -- so that, for the whole LE to be used, instructions 
have to be taken from both X and 7c, and therefore by both C-I andA-P systems. ) 
I conclude this section with some general remarks on Chomsky's concept of language 
use; and especially on how it brings into relief what are probably the most important and 
fundamental features of the object which is used, I-language. 
There are two main points. The first has to do with the apparent INACCESS]EBELITY 
of the I-language to the human consciousness in the absence of the performance systems. 
The phrase "language use" may give the impression that the I-language is something which 
the human individual H is conscious of possessing; whose capacity for being used for 
communicating propositional meaning H is intelligently aware of; and which H 
consequently uses for that purpose. But the converse appears to be true: it is not that H 
uses I-language and LEs because he is conscious of their existence, but that he is 
conscious of them only insofar as he does or can use them. According to Chomsky, there 
are certain things which a person -- say, Jones -- knows in virtue of having an I-language. 
However, 
... Jones has this knowledge whether or not 
he is aware of these facts 
about himself [i. e. the fact that he has an LE-generating I-language, 
and "facts" about the I-language and the LEs it generates]; it may 
take some effort to elicit such awareness, and it might even be 
beyond Jones's capacities. This is a question that falls within the 
broader context of performance systems. (I 995b: 17) 
Here, Chomsky seems to be saying that it is only through certain performance systems that 
Jones is aware of having an I-language -- the degree and quality of his awareness 
depending on the character of his performance systems. Another way of putting this is that 
any "awareness" of his I-language which Jones may have would be constituted by the 
interaction between his performance systems and I-language -- i. e. by the process of 
language use as carried out by the performance systems. 
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Thus, given that 
(5) our performance systems, and therefore our use of language, provides our 
consciousness with the only route to our I-language; and that 
(6) these performance systems have to do with utterance production/ 
interpretation, 
Chomsky's claim appears to be that it is only in virtue of producing and interpreting 
utterances, or at least of being able to produce and interpret utterances, that we ever gain 
conscious mental access to I-language and the LEs it generates. 
But this claim -- that it is the performance systems which establish the I-language in 
the very prominent place it undoubtedly occupies in the human consciousness -- must not 
be allowed to obscure the fact that the "I" in "I-language" also stands for 
"INTENSIONAL". In other words, it has to be balanced with what is perhaps the most 
fundamental of ChomsVs claims about the nature of language: that it is intrinsically I. 
linguistic, and not defined by what it does or what happens to it -- or, in the case of 
humans, what it is used for. Although under certain circumstances it can be used for 
utterance production/ interpretation, Chomsky's I-language is not essentially a facility or 
instrument for communication. As he puts it: 
In general, it is not the case that language is readily usable or 
"designed for use. " The subparts that are used are usable, trivially; 
biological considerations lead us to expect no more than that. 
(1995b: 18) 
So, its very close and important relation to the performance systems notwithstanding, 
the (human) I-language is not "for" the production/ interpretation of utterances, or the 
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communicating of propositional meaning. In fact no I-language, human or otherwise, 
ought to befor anything. 
These, then, are my two points: 
(7) On the one hand, the performance systems and the I-language are (at least in 
humans) so closely related that, without the former, the latter could be said to be 
of no significance whatsoever to the conscious human individual. Or, to put it 
another way, the human individual must, as it were, take the performance systems 
with the I-language if he is to "have" the I-language at all. 
(8) On the other hand, Chomsky's intensionalist notion of language has it that the 
I-language is defined by inherent properties that are obviously not determined or 
affected by anything external to it -- not even by the performance systems which it 
is embedded in, and interfaces with. 
In semantic terms, (7) and (8) may be expressed thus: 
(7) We tend to think that LEs have fully propositional, mentally entertainable meanings; 
and that in these meanings lies the significance, the primary epistemic value, of language 
for us. Or rather, what we refer to, broadly, as "the meanings of words/ sentences" is what 
we generally believe to be the whole "point" of language (even though there is no real 
reason for language to have anything like a "point" or a "purpose"). But according to 
Chomsky, such meaning only arises through the use of -- via the interaction of the C-I 
systems with -- the I-language. Thus Chomsky's claim is that, without the C-I systems, 
what we regard as central to language would be lost to us. 
(8') Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that propositional meaning is not expressed by the 
I-language, but through the USE of the I-language -- the process and products of which 
are not supposed to have any bearing on the intrinsic nature of the I-language itself. Such 
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propositional meaning, therefore, does not constitute a linguistic semantics. For example, 
it is obviously a matter of language use, and not one of (I-)linguistic semantics, that the I- 
language is used to describe or represent the world. Or, as Chomsky points out, his 
internalist/ intensionalist framework has 
... no provision 
for what Scott Soames calls "the central semantic 
fact about language,... that it is used to represent the world", because 
it is not assumed that language is used to represent the world, in the 
intended sense... (1995a: 27; Soames 1989; my italics) 
And if the USE of language to represent the world, or to express propositional meaning in 
general, is not a LINGUISTIC SEMANTIC fact, then: 
It is possible that natural language has only syntax and pragmatics; it 
has a "semantics" only in the sense of "the study of how this 
instrument, whose formal structure and potentialities of expression 
are the subject of syntactic investigation, is actually put to use in a 
speech community"... (ibid: 26) 
What Chomsky seems to be saying is this: if the term "semantics" has to do with the sort 
of propositional meaning which the conscious human mind is interested in, then I-language 
does not have a semantics, because that sort of meaning is not expressed by the I-language 
itself but only through the use (by an intending agent) of the I-language. 1& 
18 However, as Chomsky himself uses the terms "semantic features/ properties/ relations" and 
"internalist semantics" in his discussions and descriptions of his I-language, I shall continue 
referring to Xs and LF objects as the "semantics" of LEs. 
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2.2 How exactly does the I-linguistic semantics bear upon the "literal use" of 
an I-language? 
In chapter II argued that an account of what is metaphorically expressed by an utterance 
of, say, the LE 'Bill is a bulldozee must include an account (or at least an assumption) of 
what that utterance literally expresses. Furthermore, I claimed that literal meaning19 is a 
USE notion, albeit one which presupposes that the vehicle-meaning pairs used to express 
literal meaning are antecedent to, and independent of, how they are used. Thus literal 
meaning is conveyed by the literal use of a vehicle of meaning. The literal use of such a 
vehicle is to use it to mean what it autonomously means, rather than to mean what one 
wants it to mean. In chapter II also argued that literalness tends to be associated with the 
notion of language, for the reason that the latter is often assumed to be a fixed set of rules 
determining autonomous vehicle-meaning relations, and therefore a suitable locus for a 
stable, accessible literal meaning upon which metaphorical meaning may be constructed. 
Note that my distinction between vehicle-meaning relation and the use of that relation 
does not necessarily entail a distinction between the meaning expressed by the vehicle, on 
the one hand, and the meaning expressed hy the literal USE of the vehicle, on the other. 
However, that Chomsky's I-linguistic semantics cannot in fact he regarded as literal 
meaning is evident from two different but related aspects of his theory of language: (i) the 
nature of the "meanings" carried by the vehicles which constitute Chomsky's LEs, and (ii) 
Chomsky's conception of language use. With respect to (i): within Chornsky's internalist 
framework, the autonomy of the linguistic vehicle-" meaning" pairs (i. e. the PF and LF 
representations) appears to follow from, or to take the form of, an ontological distinction 
between the "meanings" of LEs and the sort of propositional meaning which is expressed 
through the use (literal or otherwise) of LEs. I have been putting quotation marks around 
19 As I have stated in section 2.1.2,1 am using "meaning" (e. g. "literal meaning", "the meaning of 
expressions") in the sense ofpropositional meaning which humans are interested in. 
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"meaning" connected with ChomsWs LEs, because these LEs do not have propositional 
meaning -- the supposedly intemalist and inclusive linguistic semantics merely provide 
perspectives for viewing the world. Thus the non-propositional linguistic semantics of 
ChomsWs LEs obviously cannot be the propositional literal meaning of those LEs. 
Apart from the fact that ChomsWs linguistic semantics does not constitute the sort of 
propositional meaning which may be regarded as literal, there is also (ii): Chomsws 
notion of the use of his LEs. Literalness is not just an expression meaning what it means, 
but rather an expression being interpreted, or intended to be interpreted, as meaning what 
it means. In other words, literalness involves conscious thought, intention -- which, as far 
as Chomsky's I-linguistic expressions are concerned, is only achieved through the 
performance systems that facilitate their use. 
Thus, in his linguistically-orientated version of the use of the vehicle-meaning relation, 
Chomsky sharpens and makes absolute the distinction between vehicle-meaning pair and 
the use of the vehicle: by attributing to the linguistic "vehicles" a non-propositional, 
internalist and inclusive linguistic semantics, and by relegating the use of the linguistic 
vehicle-"meaning" pairs to external, extra-linguistic performance systems. While this has 
the effect of emphasising the distinction, it also raises the following questions: 
(9) How exactly does the use of the linguistic semantics involve or implement the 
linguistic semantics? 
(10) How is the propositional meaning which is expressed through the use of the 
linguistic semantics actually related to the non-propositional linguistic semantics? 
Chomsky does assume that how an I-language is used is at least to a certain extent 
constrained by the I-language itself What is more, he seems to be of the opinion that each 
I-language corresponds to a particular use of that I-language to convey a particular set of 
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meanings -- a use and a set of meanings which may be referred to as literal. From this 
quote -- 
Jones may speak in a way that is not in accord with his I-language, or 
may offer judgements inconsistent with his I-language... (Chomsky 
1992a: 122) 
-- it can be deduced that there is supposed to be one particular use of Jones' I-language, 
expressive of a particular set of meanings, which is "in accord" with the I-language, and 
which (I argue) is what Chomsky would regard as literal. But Chomsky does not provide 
any answer to the question of the relation between I-language(/I-linguistic semantics) and 
language use(/propositional meaning expressed through language use). In fact he appears 
to evade the question by contradicting his own internalist conception of language. For a 
start, how does Jones use his LEs in a way that is "in accord with his I-language", when 
Chomsky's view of language is such that the language-user has no real idea of the nature 
of his innate, internalist and inclusive I-language? As I pointed out in the previous section, 
Chomsky suggests (1995b: 17) that an awareness of having an I-language, and of the LEs 
generated by the I-language, may be beyond the capacities of Jones. 
More importantly, Chomsky also argues that the question of whether or not Jones is 
aware of having an I-language "falls within the broader context of PERFORMANCE 
SYSTEMS" (ibid, my caps). According to Chomsky, a person is aware of having an I- 
language only in virtue of being conscious of uttering LEs, or in virtue of his capacity for 
uttering LEs. He does not use I-language because he knows he has one -- rather, he 
knows he has an I-language in virtue of using it. Thus a human's awareness of his I- 
language is constituted by his use of it. This means that he may be conscious that he is 
using his I-language, but there is no reason to suppose that he knows what it is that he is 
using -- or, more specifically, what it is that his performance systems are accessing. 
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Because our relation to I-language is always mediated by the performance systems, we can 
only be conscious of LEs, not "as they are", but only as they are used by us. 
Yet Chomsky claims that Jones 
... may choose to violate the rules [of his I-language]... 
(1995a: 36, 
my italics) 
This clearly implies that "the rules of an I-language" are things which Jones may 
consciously, volitionally and directly adhere to or deviate from. 
The same sort of contradiction occurs in Chomsky's use of the phrase "knowledge of 
language" (as I have already mentioned in section 2.1, fhl). In Chomsky 1965 (: 4) he 
refers to the "the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language" as "linguistic competence", 
and simultaneously argues that language is constituted by this "competence". As recently 
as 1995 (b: 14), Chomsky equates "mature linguistic competence" with the steady state I- 
language. He also describes "competence" (ibid) as the speaker-hearees "knowledge and 
understanding", and contrasts it with "performance", i. e. "what [the speaker-hearer) does 
with that knowledge and understanding". Thus "knowledge of language" for Chomsky 
cannot be "knowledge" in the usual relational sense of conscious, and consciously 
acquired, awareness OF language. As he himself puts it, "knowledge of language,, is 
"knowledge without grounds" (1986: 12) . 
20 This "knowledge of language" simply is 
language -- is, in fact, constitutive of internalist and inclusive I-language. 
But Chomsky also uses "knowledge" in "knowledge of language" in the relational 
sense, conflating I-linguistic semantics which is supposed to be (partly) constituted by 
"knowledge of language" in the non-relational sense, with the conscious and relational 
"knowledge" which the speaker-hearer has of what particular LEs can be used to 
expressed. For example, he claims that 
20 See also Chomsky 1980(: 41-2), and Burton-Roberts and Carr 1999(: 383-4). 
46 
The fact that a brown house has a brown exterior, not interior, 
appears to be a language universal... (1992b: 219; see also 1995a: 
20) 
That a brown house has a brown exterior rather than a brown interior, Chomsky argues, is 
an instance of the "intricate and highly-specialised" (1995a: 20) nature of the perspectives 
afforded by LEs for viewing the world -- the complexity of which 
... poses problems of "poverty of stimulus" so extreme that knowledge of language in these regards... can only be assumed to be 
in substantial measure innately determined... (ibid, my italics) 
It is not clear what exactly Chomsky means by "knowledge of language" in this case. The 
knowledge of "the fact that a brown house has a brown exterior, not interior"? There are 
two problems with this. Firstly, this knowledge seems to be the conscious, relational 
knowledge -- i. e. knowledge of something (i. e. the fact that a brown house has a brown 
exterior), rather than knowledge which is constitutive of something (i. e. I-language). 
Secondly, the fact that a brown house has a brown exterior cannot be a fact about the I- 
linguistic semantics of the LE 'a brown house'. Having a brown exterior obviously pertains 
to some E-physical brown house, or at least to the concept of some E-physical brown 
house. Neither of these can be in any direct relation to the I-linguistic semantics of the 
Chomskian LE 'a brown house', although one may be referred to, and the other expressed, 
through the use of the LE. So, what Chomsky calls a "language universal" appears to be a 
fact about the use of the LE 'a brown house', rather than a fact about the LE itself. 
Returning to my main argument, my point is that Chomsky merely assumes, but never 
explains how, an LE like 'a brown house' is used literally to express a house with a brown 
exterior. Rather than giving an independent account of the semantics of the LE, Chomsky 
simply assumes that, since the LE 'a brown house' is generally used to express a house 
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with a brown exterior, the LE must provide "intricate" house-with-brown-exterior- 
orientated perspectives for viewing the world. In short, he simply projects aspects of the 
use of the LE onto the LE itself, contrary to his own assertions about the purely intemalist 
and inclusive nature of I-language. 
That Chomsky tends to attribute aspects of language use to LEs is clear from some of 
his remarks on the nature of I-linguistic semantics. For example, he maintains that LEs do 
not refer to things in the world, but can be used for that purpose hecause their semantics 
provide perspectives for viewing those things. He even goes as far as to make the 
following claim: that one of the semantic properties of a word is that the word "can he 
used to refer to certain kinds of.. things" (1992b: 219, my italics). This suggests that, in 
virtue of providing such perspectives or having such semantic properties, the LEs of 
Chomsky's supposedly internalist theory are not independent entities, but merely 
instruments to be used -- or "potentialities of expression" (1995a: 26, my italics), as 
Chomsky himself puts it. These instruments or "potentialities" are therefore inextricably 
linked, and subordinate, to the performance systems whch employ them for the 
articulation, interpretation, expression of beliefs and desires etc. 
In fact Chomsky himself states quite explicitly that I-language is subordinate to 
performance systems. Presumably LEs are used for expressing thoughts, or conveying 
meaningful communicative intentions, in virtue of having an LF interface, i. e. an interface 
with conceptual-intentional systems. But according to Chomsky, these LEs with their Xs 
do not express any meaning. More importantly, Chomsky claims that the I-language 
which generates LEs cannot be said to be "a language" unless it is embedded in the A-P 
and C-Iperformance systems: 
It is only by virtue of its integration into [the A-P and C-1] 
performance systems that [1-language] qualifies as a language. Some 
other organism might, in principle, have the same I-language (brain 
state) as Peter, but embedded in performance systems that use it for 
locomotion. (1992b: 213) 
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It appears that this generative device which Chomsky calls the I-language cannot be said 
to be anything at all unless it is embedded in some sort of performance system which 
makes use of it in some way. This means that the semantics of the I-language is a 
semantics only in virtue of having the capacity to be used by certain performance systems. 
So it would seem that Chomsky's supposedly internalist LEs are not so much used 
because they have a semantics, as endowed with a semantics in virtue of their capacity to 
be used - andfurthermore, used in a culturally, historically and completely accidentally 
determined manner. 
This problematic relation between I-language and performance systems can also be 
perceived in the technical detail of the Minimalist Program. It could be argued that the 
whole architecture of the I-language, as described in the Minimalist Program, is geared 
towards the condition of Full Interpretation (FI) at the interfaces with the performance 
systems. FI has to be satisfied by the PF and LF representations at the interfaces, in order 
for a derivation to converge. It follows from this that I-language and the LEs it generates 
are subject to externalfactors which have to do with extra-linguistic performance. To 
satisfy FI at LF, X must (i) provide the C-I performance systems with "appropriate 
instructions"; and (ii) be assigned "uniform, language-independent interpretations" by the 
C-I systems (1995b: 194). This means that convergence at the interface, and consequently 
whether and what LEs emerge from CHL, is at least partly decided by the performance 
systems. 21 
The role played by the performance systems in the generating of LEs comes across 
more clearly in the case of 7c and the PF interface. In 2.1.3 1 noted that the nature of PF is 
such that the process of language use for humans must in some direct or indirect way 
involve the production and interpretation of E-physical utterance phenomena. According 
21 Chomsky himself admits that the principle of inclusiveness is violated at both PF (1995b: 229, 236) and LF Obid: 227). 
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to Chomsky, this has to do with the "bare output conditions" imposed at the interface by 
"systems that make use of the information provided by CHL": at PF, the information 
which constitutes 7c "has to be accommodated to the human sensory and motor apparatus" 
(1995b: 221). But Chomsky adds: 
Hence U[niversal] G[rammar] must provide for a phonological 
component that converts the objects generated by the language L to 
a form that these "external" systems can use: PF, we assume. If 
humans could communicate by telepathy, there would be no need for 
a phonological component, at least for the purposes of 
communication; and the same extends to the use of language 
generally. (1995b: 221) 
What Chomsky seems to be saying here is this: it is only the non-telepathic humaws need 
to communicate through the production and interpretation of E-physical utterances that 
demands a phonological component in the human I-language, and a PF representation in 
the LE. This means that the nature of I-language is profoundly influenced by the 
performance- systems in which it happens to be embedded, and the way it happens to be 
used. 
2.3 Chomsky on the "misuse of language" 
The "misuse of language" is a topic which will be discussed in much greater detail in 
chapters 4 and 5. My aim here is to set out Chomsky's views, not so much on the 
phenomenon of the "n-dsuse of language" itself, but on what he considers to be a confusion 
of the misuse of I-language with the misuse of certain non-linguistic entities. I intend to 
demonstrate that, without an independent account of how I-language constrains the use of 
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of an I-language which is not "designedfor use" (1995b: 18), on the one hand, and the 
usel misuse of entities specifically constructed to be used by speaker-hearers, on the 
other. 
ChomsWs discussion of "misuse" is in response to Davidson 1986. Davidson argues 
that our ability to correctly interpret malapropisms, new words and "incomplete or 
grammatically garbled" utterances (1986: 437) indicates that there is 
... no learnable common core of consistent 
behaviour, no shared 
grammar or rules, no portable interpreting machine set to grind out 
the meaning of an arbitrary utterance. (1986: 445) 
Davidson points out that any speaker, "ingenious or ignorant" (ibid: 441), may convert 
any word or construction to a new use, or even invent completely new words. And yet 
speakers and interpreters "get away with it" all the time -- they may arrive at an occasion 
of utterance with different theories of determining utterance meaning, but 
... the speaker is nevertheless understood; the 
interpreter adjusts his 
theory so that it yields the speaker's intended interpretation. (ibid: 
440) 
Thus Davidson concludes that, if language is regarded as "a clearly defined shared 
structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases", then "there is no such 
thing as a language" (ibid: 446). 
For Chornsky, however, language is I-language, upon which the production and 
interpretation of utterances, or the use or misuse of language, is supposed to have no 
bearing whatsoever. Chomsky describes three types of "misuse of language", all of which 
(he claims) "[play] no important role in the study of language, meaning, communication, 
or whatever" (1992a: 122). There is "misuse" in the "individual sense": 
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Jones may speak in a way that is not in accord with his I-language, or 
may offerjudgments inconsistent with his I-language... (ibid: 121) 
When one speaks in a way that is not in accord with one's I-language, it appears that one 
tends to do so deliberately: 
He may choose to violate the rules [of his I-language], perhaps using 
the word "chair" to mean table in a code -- knowing that in his own 
language it means chair... (1995a: 36) 
However, Jones may or may not be aware of the inconsistency of his judgement with his I- 
language when he "[misinterprets] an expression, in that his performance system yields an 
interpretation different from the one his internal language imposes" (ibid). Nevertheless, 
speaking, judging and interpreting are all instances of behaviour, and "much more than I- 
language is involved in behavior" (1992a: 121). 
Chomsky also mentions "misuse of language" in the "community sense". Examples of 
this include Jones using the word 'disinterested' to mean uninterested, or his native dialect 
in a formal lecture (1992a: 121,1995a: 36). Or 
... Jones may try to adapt to the practice of some community 
for 
some reason, or perhaps for no reason at all, ap d may fail to do so, 
in which case people observing Jones may speak informally of a 
mýisuse of the language of this community. (I 992a: 12 1) 
Chomsky claims that what Jones misuses or fails to conform to in these cases are not in 
fact I-linguistic principles or I-linguistic expressions, but "community norms" or "social 
practices" (ibid). These "community norms" are probably set up by certain authority 
figures, and observed by most of the members of the social group to which Jones belongs. 
As Chomsky points out (ibid), such "community norms" may be "of interest for the study 
of the sociology of group identification, authority structure, and the like". 
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The third and last sort of "misuse of language" which Chomsky discusses is misuse in 
the "expert sense". This "derives from Mary Putnam's [(Putnam 1975a)] notion of "the 
division of linguistic labour" " (Chomsky 1992a: 121): one may be said to misuse language 
in the "expert sense" when one's application of terms like 'elm', 'acid' or 'mass' does not 
correspond to the way they are used by experts to whom one defers. But what is misused 
in the "expert sense" is (as in the case of the "community sense") not language as defined 
by Chomsky, but symbolic systems constructed for picking out objects in the world or 
expressing shared thoughts (1995a: 26). Such systems constitute "the Fregean ideal", as 
Chomsky calls it (ibid); and belong to naturalistic inquiry and perhaps a special "science- 
forming faculty", rather than to ordinary usage and the language faculty. Chomsky argues 
that the constructions of naturalistic inquiry and the science-forming faculty -- like 'mass' 
or 'momentum' in the physicist's sense, 'elm' in the botanist's sense, or 'acid' in the chemist's 
sense -- have origins and properties different from, say, 'house', and therefore "do not 
really belong to natural language" (ibid: 25). Instead of 
... [entering] the lexicon by the same mechanisms of the language faculty that allows a child to pick up such words as "house" or 
"rise"... (ibid: 46) 
naturalistic inquiry terms "abstract from the intricate properties of natural language 
expressions" (1992b: 209) and are "assigned meaning in a considered and determinate 
fashion" (ibid: 208). Concepts of common-sense understanding, on the other hand, "simply 
"grow in the mind", much in the way that the embryo grows into a person" (ibid). 
Also, the meaning assigned to a naturalistic inquiry term consists of "semantic 
properties that may well not hold for natural language, such as reference" (ibid: 209). 
Chomsky maintains that naturalistic inquiry terms are 
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... divested of distorting residues of common-sense understanding 
and... assigned a relation to posited entities and a place in a matrix of 
principles. (ibid: 208) 
In short, his claim is that naturalistic inquiry terms are constructed for the purpose of 
picking out things in the world -- their semantics based on Frege's Bedeutung, a technical 
relation between symbols and things (ibid: 226,1995a: 26) -- while the semantics of 
natural language LEs is entirely intensional and internal (as outlined in section 2.2.2). 
It would appear that at least two out of Chornsky's three types of "nýsuse of 
language" -- the "community" and "expert" senses -- are irrelevant to the study of 
language because, in either sense, it is not I-language which is misused. In other words, it 
is not LEs, but the constructions of social practice and naturalistic inquiry, which are 
(respectively) the objects of "community" and "expert" n-dsuse. So it is only in the 
"individual" sense that the I-language is misused and, of course, used. This, then, is all that 
we may deduce about literalness within the Chomskian framework: the literal use of 
language is to speak orjudge in a way that is in accord with one's I-language. According 
to Chomsky, Jones misuses his I-language when he uses 'table' to mean chair. It follows 
from this that Jones' use of his I-language is consistent with the I-language itself when he 
uses 'table' to mean table and (presumably) 'chair' to mean chair. (Or when he interprets 
'table' as meaning table etc. ) But not when he uses 'disinterested' to mean disinterested and 
'uninterested' to mean uninterested, apparently, since the 'disinterested'-'uninterested' 
distinction is supposed to be a community, not an I-linguistic, norm. And not when he uses 
1momentum'to mean whatever it is that physicists refer to when they use the term, because 
'momentum' in that sense is not an LE, but a construction of naturalistic inquiry and the 
science-forming faculty. 
Clearly this is not saying very much about either literalness or the use of I-language. 
But, vague and uninformative though it is, a problem nevertheless arises as soon as this 
formulation of "individual" language use is considered side by side with the examples of 
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adherence to community or scientific norms. The problem is that the distinction between 
these examples and examples of use in the "individual" sense may not be as well-defined as 
it should be. 
To begin with, the use of 'table'Pchaie may not have any more to do with I-language 
than the use of 'disinterested'funinterested' or 'momentum. According to Chomsky, the 
most obvious difference between the "individual" and the other two senses of use or 
misuse is that the use of 'table'Pchair' is a matter that is strictly between Jones and his I- 
language; while the use of 'disinterestedPuninterested' and 'momentum' involves authority 
figures and experts, and their influence over groups of people. More specifically, Chomsky 
claims that the common-sense concepts which are expressed by the use of 'table'Pchai? 
grew naturally in Jones' mind "much in the way that the embryo grows into a person" 
(1992b: 208). In contrast, the 'disinterested'Puninterested' conventions and the particular 
physicists' use of 'momentum' are set up, deliberately and without any individual I- 
language being taken into account, by authority figures and experts. 
But apart from this, there is nothing to prevent Chomsky's example of "individual"- 
use from changing places with the examples of the other two senses. It is perfectly 
possible that the use of 'table' to mean tahle is a community norm in some other 
community; just as it is possible for the use of 'disinterested' to mean disinterested, or 
'momentum' to refer to some posited entity, to constitute behaviour that is in accord with 
someone's I-language. The question is, just how natural and individual is the process by 
which Jones learns to use his supposedly I-linguistic 'table' to mean tahle, compared to the 
process of learning the community norm of using 'disinterested' to mean disinterested? 
Surely Jones. hai: Lto defer to other speakers in his environment about 'table', as he does to 
authority figures and experts about 'disinterested' and 'momentum'. From this point of view 
it does appear that "individual" use is not as I-linguistically determined, and as different 
from "comi-nunity" and "expert" use, as Chomsky claims it is. 
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There is a further blurring of this distinction when one considers the possibility that 
the use of 'disinterested'tuninterested' and 'momentum' may not have any less to do with I- 
language than the use of 'table'Pchaii. Chomsky himself suggests this, in two ways. Firstly: 
while he states that naturalistic inquiry terms "do not really belong to natural language" 
and "do not have the properties of natural language" (1995a: 26), Chomsky nevertheless 
concedes that we may articulate them "with the phonetics of our language", and "borrow 
constructions of our language in using them" (ibid); or construct them from "resources of 
the I-language (pronunciation, morphology, sentence structure, etc. )" (1992b: 226). The 
same may be said of terms and constructions set up by authority figures as "community 
norms". 
Secondly, Chomsky appears to be claiming that changes in one's I-language are 
created when one adopts naturalistic inquiry terms like 'momentum', or community norms 
like the use of 'arthritis' to mean a pain in the thigh (1992a: 122). Constructions of 
naturalistic inquiry are "language-like accretions to the I-language"22 (1992b: 226), while 
one's modification of one's use of, say, 'arthritis' may be a "marginal and rather arbitrary 
[variation] of I-language" (ibid: 228). 
All this is worrying -- not just because of the implied transformation of what was 
originally excluded from natural language into "accretions to" or parts of I-language, but 
also because it seems to contradict the fundamental Chomskian idea that it is the I- 
language which determines language use, and not vice versa: 
The fact remains that Jones speaks and understands the way he does 
on the basis of the I-language he has acquired in the course of 
language growth; and if Jones does or does not follow what we 
choose, for some transient purpose, to call "community norms" or 
22 "Language-like accretions" is in fact an almost infinitely ambiguous and suggestive phrase. For 
one thing, what exactly does "language-like" mean: does "language" refer to Manguage, and what 
is it to be "like" language? Another question is: if the accretions are merely "language-like" rather 
than "linguistic", then why are they accreting to the I-language? 
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"social practice", it is on the basis of this internalized I-language 
(along with much else). (I 992a: 123) 
For Chomsky, it is only in the "individual" sense that I-language is used. Thus the 
"individual" sense of use is distinguished from the "community" and "expert" varieties -- 
the constructions and processes of which, according to Chomsky, are irrelevant to the 
study of language precisely because they are not in any way determined by I-language. But 
without an independent account of I-linguistic semantics, and of how the "individual" use 
of an I-language is determined by the I-language, Chomsky has no way of showing that 
the "individual" use is in any way different from the other kinds of use. More specifically, 
he has no way of showing that the object of "individual" use is I-language, while the object 
of "community" or "expert" use is not I-language. Furthermore, his description of 
"individual" use as "speaking/ judging in a way that is in accord with one's I-language" is 
reduced to meaninglessness by his claim that the terms of community norms and 
naturalistic inquiry are constructed from elements of, and may eventually be incorporated 
into, I-language. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The notion of literalness -- of there being a fixed, direct way of expressing and recovering 
meaning -- appears to be closely related to two notions about language: 
(11) Language is a set of principles that leads us quickly and directly from vehicle 
to meaning. 
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(12) Language is autonomous -- it is crucial that the set of linguistic principles is in 
some way set apart from the complexities and irregularities of thought and 
behaviour which the phenomenon of metaphor in effect represents. 
While not exactly in conflict, these two notions require a link. Because, strictly 
speaking, it is not language but people that express and recover meaning, it is necessary 
for us to have some sort of mental hold on language if it is to do what we expect of it. 
Hence the concept of language USE, according to which one uses language to express and 
recover meaning. In this way we end up with two loci of semantic content -- language, on 
the one hand, and the meaning which we sometimes express through the use of language, 
on the other. 
Chomsky's intensionalist and internalist theory of language appears to be intended, 
and is generally assumed, to be the account par excellence of language as an autonomous 
set of principles. In fact it could be said that he goes one further in claiming that I- 
language is not designedfor use (1995b: 18); and that its semantics is therefore not 
semantic in the sense of pertaining to the sort of propositional meaning which humans find 
significant. In other words, one of the main points of Chomsky's theory is this: even 
though it does happen to be used (in humans) to express and recover propositional 
meaning, I-language is not necessarilyfor the expressing and recovering of propositional 
meaning (or, for that matter, anything else). 
This may be a perfectly logical progression from notion (12), i. e. the notion of the 
autonomy of language. However, it also exacerbates the problem of how an autonomous 
linguistic semantics may be harnessed for the characteristically human purpose of 
entertaining, expressing and recovering propositional meaning, by raising two additional 
questions: 
(13) What exactly does an autonomous non-propositional semantics consist of? 
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(14) How is it accessed and converted into the propositional meaning which 
humans are interested in? 
The problem is conceptual as well as empirical, and one of the arguments in this 
chapter is that it is not solved by any concept of "language use", or by the postulation of 
performance systems that interface with I-language. Another problem with the extreme, 
non-propositional austerity of ChomsWs version of linguistic semantics has to do with his 
shifting the entire burden of propositionality to the territory of language use -- this, 
together with the unanswered questions (13) and (14), creates a dangerous (conceptual/ 
empirical) gap between I-language and language use. I have argued that Chomsky ignores 
the problems mentioned above, and simply assumes that there is a particular use of an I- 
language which is "in accord with" that I-language. The result of this assumption is that, 
instead of giving an independent account of what an I-language and its semantics consists 
of, Chomsky ends up attributing to I-language some of the properties of the products of 
language use, thus contradicting the original, crucial notion of language's autonomy. 
In 2.2 1 pointed out that ChomsWs definition of I-language and I-linguistic semantics 
is undermined by the extent to which it is bound up with, and determined by, the 
performance systems which effect the use of I-language. If I-language is so closely related 
to the performance systems as to be subject to the influence of how it is used by humans, 
then clearly its semantics does not really count for anything -- the corollary being that we 
can bend I-language to our will, use any LE to express anything. These remarks of 
Chomsky's on language use seem to bear it out: 
... person X uses expression E with its intrinsic semantic properties to 
talk about the world from certain intricate perspectives, focusing 
attention on particular aspects of it, under circumstances C, with the 
"locality of content" they induce... THE COMPONENTS OF E 
MAY HAVE NO INTRINSIC SEMANTIC RELATION AT ALL 
TO WHAT JONES IS REFERRING TO, as when he says the 
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performance at Jordan Hall was remarkable, referring to Boston and 
his favourite string quartet. (1995a: 43-4, my caps) 
This leads me back to the notion of literalness; and to suggest that literalness cannot 
in fact be defined in terms of a fixed and autonomous set of I-linguistic principles, for the 
lack of an intelligible concept of "language use" or whatever it is that is required for 
mediating between intemalist linguistic semantics and cognisable, expressible literal 
meaning. So perhaps it is the other way round -- perhaps it is the notion of literalness 
which is the basis for theories of language like Chomsky's, and the root of all the problems 
which I have mentioned so far. The fact is that literalness is, for all its apparent stability 
and autonomy, as inseparable from thought and behaviour as metaphor is, and therefore 
no basis for an intemalist linguistic theory. And yet the very concept of an intemalist 
linguistics appears to have arisen from the notion of literalness. Consequently, all truly 
internalist theories of language may be doomed to circularity. 
60 
3 
The distinction between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics: 
literal meaning and relevance theory 
3 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I claimed that literal meaning has to do with the use of language, 
rather than with language itself I argued that such a notion of literal meaning follows 
from Chomsky's internalist linguistics. In this chapter I argue that it also follows from the 
modular view of language that appears to underpin Sperber and Wilson's account of 
verbal communication. Sections 3.1 and 3.1.1 are concerned with some of the general 
theoretical background of Sperber and Wilson's (1986a/95) relevance theory. In 3.1.2 1 
set out Sperber and Wilson's respective definitions of their principle of relevance and 
what they call ostensive-inferential communication. 
In chapter 21 observed that Chomsky's linguistic semantics is constituted by LF 
representations -- "mental representations" which have no relation to, and are therefore 
neither true nor false of, things in the world. For Chomsky's linguistic expressions to 
express the sort of propositional and entertainable meanings which bear upon "human 
interests, intentions, goals and actions" -- to express a concept even as elementary as 
nameable thing -- their LF representations have to interface with the C-I performance 
systems, i. e. have to be used (by an agent). 
Sperber and Wilson, whose relevance theory is the subject of this chapter, also 
subscribe to the notion of linguistic semantic representations as mental objects that "never 
surface to consciousness" (1986a/95: 193) -- and therefore as distinct from the sort of 
truth-theoretic propositional meaning which could be said to be literal (or non-literal). So 
within the framework of classical relevance theory, literalness (or non-literalness) does not 
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apply at the level of the linguistic expression itself (i. e. the linguistic semantics), but at the 
level of what is (Uterally) said through the uttering of the linguistic expression (Le. the 
truth-theoretic semantics). 
Thus both Chomsky and the relevance theorists regard language as an autonomous I- 
language or language module, setting its "semantics" apart from the "reaP', truth-theoretic 
semantics of what the language user expresses. However, neither Chomsky nor Sperber 
and Wilson seem able to avoid confusing or conflating one with the other. As I argued in 
chapter 2, Chomsky begins by positing a truly autonomous generative procedure, but ends 
up defining I-linguistic semantics in terms of how LF representations interface with the C- 
I systems (and, more generally, defining the I-language in terms of how it interfaces with 
the performance systems). Sperber and Wilson's problem, ironically, is that -- unlike 
Chomsky, who simply asserts that his I-linguistic semantics is independent of the 
performance systems in which it is (or can be) embedded -- they attempt to provide some 
sort of semantic grounds for their distinction between linguistic and truth-theoretic 
semantics. In sections 3.2-3.3.11 argue that each of the two assumptions upon which the 
distinction appears to be based presupposes in its turn that linguistic and truth-theoretic 
semantics are related in such a way as to override the distinction which the relevance 
theorists seek to make. 
The first of these two assumptions (discussed in sections 3.2-3.2.1) is that many (but, 
problematically, not all) linguistic expressions are non-truth-conditional and non-truth- 
evaluable in virtue of encoding "semantically incomplete" logical forms. However, 
Sperber and Wilson also claim that such logical forms undergo formal logical operations 
like truth-theoretic propositions do, and enter into logical relations with truth-theoretic 
propositions. What is more, it is essential that a linguistically encoded logical form has 
these features, in order that it may be "developed' into a truth-theoretic propositional 
form -- i. e. so that it may be used to express a truth-theoretic propositional form. The 
relevance-theoretic process of logicalform development is outlined in the expository 
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section 3.2, while in section 3.2.1 1 discuss and criticise Sperber and Wilson's idea that 
there are "semantically incomplete" logical forms which have to be "developed". 
The second assumption which underlies the relevance-theoretic distinction between 
linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics (discussed in 3.3) is that there are some truth- 
evaluable, fully propositional forms which are nevertheless non-truth-theoretic in virtue of 
being "trivially true or blatantly false" (Carston 1998: 160) and/ or "too unspecified" (ibid: 
164) to be something which "humans are interested in communicating" (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986a/95: 174). Examples of these include 
(a) It will take some time to get there. 
(b) I haven't eaten. 
Thus the second of Sperber and Wilson's reasons for distinguishing linguistic semantics 
from real, truth-theoretic semantics has to do with their view of truth-theoretic 
propositions as propositions which are worth entertaining or communicating -- in short, 
propositions which are relevant. This, of course, presupposes that Sperber and Wilson's 
"non-truth-theoretic" propositions and truth-theoretic propositional forms are 
interchangeable to the extent that one can measure the former's lack of relevance against 
the relevance of the latter. 
I conclude that Sperber and Wilson's attempt to distinguish linguistic semantics from 
truth-theoretic semantics -- to set language apart from what it is used for -- not only fails 
on its own terms, but also creates problems for the relevance framework. Within the 
wider context of this thesis, my conclusions suggest that, while the idea of linguistic 
expressions as vehicle-meaning pairs does presuppose some sort of distinction between 
the meaning of the "linguistic" vehicle, and the meaning which the vehicle is used to 
express, it also presupposes a notion of language use -- of "linguistic" vehicles as 
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specifically for being uttered -- which an absolute ontological distinction between 
linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics is simply not consistent with. 
3.1 Relevance theory's Fodorean foundations 
Before I go into the relevance theory account of communication and non-literalness, it is 
necessary to discuss the Fodorean framework assumed by Sperber and Wilson on certain 
fundamentals concerning thought and language. 
Firstly, Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory is predicated on the assumption that 
cognition is computational. This view of cognition -- which they take very much for 
granted -- is set out in some detail, and argued for, in Fodor's 1975 Yhe language of 
thought. (See also Fodor 1987. ) One of its most important aspects has to do with the fact 
that computation presupposes a medium for computation, a means of representing what 
the computations compute: i. e. a representational system or language. Thus Fodor posits 
an internal language, a "language of thought", in which cognitive processes are carried 
out. Take perception, for example, which he defines as the formation and confirmation of 
hypotheses about what the world is like (1975: 44-9). On his computational- 
representational approach, this would involve the inference (computation) of conclusions 
(representations of hypotheses constructed and chosen) from premises (representations of 
perceptual inf6rmation, as well as information stored in the memory). 
Secondly, Sperber and Wilson also subscribe to Fodor's modularity thesis (Fodor 
1983), which distinguishes between input systems (or modules) and central systems. 
According to Fodor, all of these systems are computational and representational, but in 
different ways. The input systems perform computations over perceptual representations, 
and each input system only processes information in a representational format peculiar to 
itself -- the visual module only processing visual information, the auditory module only 
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processing acoustic information, and so on. Fodor calls this property of input systems 
"domain specificity" -- 
... only a relatively restricted class of stimulations can throw the 
switch that turns [an input system] on... (1983: 49) 
-- while Sperber and Wilson describe input processes as "local": 
... a 
local process is either context-free or sensitive only to 
contextual information from some set domain... (1986a/95: 65) 
All these domain specific input systems function to convert perceptual information, 
represented in their different ways, to the single format which constitutes the domain for 
the operation of the central processes. Fodor argues that it is the central systems that 
integrate what the input systems (and memory) deliver, and "use this information to 
constrain the computation of 'best hypotheses' about what the world is like" (1983: 104). 
This means that the central systems are what Fodor calls "domain inspecific" (ibid: 103), 
in the sense that they take into account and operate over all available information, whether 
the information is provided by the input systems, stored in the memory ("background 
knowledge" (ibid: 102) ) or, possibly, innate. Or, to use Sperber and Wilson's term, the 
central systems are "global" as opposed to "local", in that they have "free access to 
conceptual memory" (1986a/95: 65). 
Thirdly, Sperber and Wilson share the Fodorean view of natural language utterances 
as perceptual information: 
... utterances (e. g., sentence tokens) are themselves objects to be 
perceptually identified, just as mountains, teacups, and four-alarm 
fires are. (Fodor 1983: 44) 
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To be more precise, they see utterances of linguistic expressions as perceptual infon-nation 
in a particular representational format, processable only by the appropriate input system. 
They regard this input system as a specifically linguistic module which converts utterance 
information into conceptual representations over which the central systems can operate. 
Note that although he sometimes refers to input systems as perceptual systems (e. g. 
1983: 43-4), Fodor's theory of perception has it that nothing is perceived without the 
participation of the central systems. He argues that input processing of information about 
some aspect of the world is necessary but not sufficient for that aspect of the world to be 
actually perceived. This is because: 
... perception is a mechanism of belief 
fixation par excellence: the 
normal consequence of a perceptual transaction is the acquisition of 
a perceptual belief. (ibid: 40) 
In terms of computations and representations, the fixation of perceptual belief involves the 
confirmation of hypotheses about what the world is like, or is said to be like. It is not 
possible for any single input system, with its own computational and representational 
system, to perform such a task, since all the input systems (not to mention memory) 
provide information about the world, and any of this information may be relevant to the 
construction of representations of how the world appears to be (ibid: 102-3). The "global" 
central systems, on the other hand, do have access to the output of all the input systems -- 
in fact, presumably, to every source of conceptual representations that the mind has. Thus 
it is the central systems that carry out inferential processes on representations, while the 
input systems merely provide some of these representations. Or, as Fodor puts it, it is the 
central systems which "people have in mind when they talk, pretheoretically, of such 
mental processes as thought and problem-solving" (ibid: 103, my italics). The input 
systems, on the other hand, merely function to "represent the world' so as to make it 
"accessible to thought" (ibid: 40). 
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All this has to be borne in mind when one considers the particular case of utterance 
interpretation. The language module is, of course, an essential part of the process. Fodor 
points out that 
Understanding a token sentence presumably involves assigning it a 
structural description, this being part and parcel of computing a 
token-to-type relation; and that is precisely the sort of function we 
should expect an input system to perform. (ibid: 44) 
But if understanding an utterance is a "typical perceptual process" (ibid: 45), then 
obviously it cannot consist of input computations alone. Or, to put it another way, 
utterance interpretation cannot simply be the matching of physical forms to concepts, or 
the conversion of particular types of sensory data (i. e. utterance phenomena, like acoustic 
or orthographic objects) into conceptual representations upon which central processes 
may operate. Following Fodor's notion of what perception involves, it is clear that an 
utterance is understood only when the conceptual output of the language module is 
operated upon by the central systems. 
To summarise the main Fodorean ideas which relevance theory assumes: 
(1) Cognitive processes are computational, and have representational systems in 
which to compute. 
(2) There is a distinction between (A) systems whose function is to provide 
representations of information about the world (the INPUT SYSTEMS), and (B) 
systems which perform inferential processes over those representations (the 
CENTRAL SYSTEMS). 
(3) One of the input systems is a language module, which -- together with the 
central systems -- is essential for, and specific to, utterance interpretation. 
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(4) The distinction between the language module and central systems is 
coextensive with the distinction between what Sperber and Wilson call (N) 
"NATURAL" (or EXTERNAL) LANGUAGES, the representations of which 
form the domain for the operation of the language module; and (B') an 
R, TMRNAL LANGUAGE (or language of thought), the medium for central 
computations. 
In conclusion, I must stress that it is Sperber and Wilson's "natural" or external 
languages - representational formats over which the linguistic input system operates -- 
that I am talking about when I use terms such as "linguistic", "linguistic expressions", 
"sentences", "linguistic semantic representations" and (obviously) "language module" in 
this chapter. When I discuss internal language - the medium for central computations - 
I will refer to it as such (e. g. "formulae of the internal language"). 
3.1.1 Relevance theory's departures from Fodor 
That the language module on its own cannot effect utterance interpretation is one of 
relevance theory's starting points. Sperber and Wilson certainly share Fodor's view of 
utterance interpretation as a largely central and therefore inferential process involving the 
construction and confirmation of hypotheses about the speaker's communicative intentions 
(Fodor 1975: 108, and fh7). From this they also conclude, explicitly, that linguistic 
expressions (LEs) and linguistic meanings in themselves -- without any interaction with 
the central systems, without any interaction with thought, i. e. without being used -- are of 
no immediate cognitive significance to utterance producer or interpreter: 
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One entertains thoughts; one does not entertain semantic 
representations of sentences. Semantic representations of sentences 
are mental objects that never surface to consciousness. If they did, 
they would seem entirely uninteresting (except, of course, to 
semanticists). (1986a/95: 193)1 
Or, as Carston (1998: 103) puts it, "We do not communicate logical forms (though we do 
communicate via logical forms)". 
These remarks seem consistent with Fodoes conception of the input and central 
systems' respective roles in utterance interpretation, but in fact this is where Sperber and 
Wilson begin to diverge from Fodor. To begin with, the language module occupies a far 
more important place in Fodor's theory than in Sperber and Wilson's. For Fodor, a 
"natural" or external language is "a system of conventions for the expression of 
communicative intentions" (1975: 106), and 
Verbal communication is possible because the speaker and hearer 
both know what the conventions are and how to use them: What the 
speaker knows allows him to pick a value of [acoustic object] U 
which encodes a given value of M [what the speaker intends to 
communicate], and what the hearer knows allows him to pick the 
value ofM which is encoded by a given value of U. (ibid: 108) 
The knowledge of such linguistic conventions may be used to 
... [effect] a certain correspondence 
between the mental states of 
speaker and hearer: The speaker is enabled to construct utterances 
which do express the messages that he intends them to express; the 
hearer is enabled to construe the communicative intentions of the 
speaker. (ibid) 
I This last sentence is somewhat at odds with the point Sperber and Wilson are making - that 
linguistic semantic representations are not what we communicate or entertain unless they have 
been incorporated with thought in some way. Within the relevance framework it is true that 
semantic representations of LEs "never surface to consciousness". But if they did, they would be 
interesting, and not just to semanticists - they would be interesting simply in virtue of having 
surfaced to consciousness. They would not surface to consciousness if they were not being used, or 
thought of; and if they were being used or thought of they must be interesting. 
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In other words, Fodor assumes that there is a direct and systematic correspondence 
between "messages" and linguistically encoded semantic representations; and, therefore, 
that the recovery of "messages" is simply a matter of decoding (even though the actual 
perception of linguistically encoded semantic representations as "messages" is brought 
about only by the central processes). So it seems that this Fodor 1975 account of verbal 
communication is based on what Sperber and Wilson call the code model of 
communication (1986a/95: 2). 
For Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, there is no such concurrence between 
what the utterer of an LE intends to convey, and the semantic content of that LE. They 
argue that what a speaker communicates when he utters an LE is much more, and much 
more complex, than the semantic content of that LE. They also argue that this additional 
non-linguistic content has to be inferentially recovered. To observe that Sperber and 
Wilson differ from Fodor in this respect may seem somewhat trivial -- after all, there is no 
doubt that pragmatic inference and implication features prominently in relevance theory, 
while it is not clear if Fodor 1975 takes pragmatics into consideration at all. Thus one 
might argue that the difference is simply down to the absence of a semantic-pragmatic 
distinction, and Fodor's (1975) situating of all verbally conu-nunicated meaning in the 
semantics of "natural" or external languages. 
However, there is at least one point upon which Sperber and Wilson's account of 
utterance interpretation uncontrovertiblY diverges from Fodor's. They attribute a property 
(if one can call it a property) to linguistic meaning which practically guarantees the 
involvement of inferential processes, even if the central systems were not already deemed 
essential for utterance interpretation: they claim that LEs either are, or often are, 
SENLANTICALLY INCONDLETE. According to Sperber and Wilson, a semantic 
representation of an LE is a linguistically eticoded logicalform -- a logical form being 
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... a well formed formula, a structured set of constituents, which 
undergoes formal logical operations determined by its stucture. 
(1986a/95: 72) 
-- and that most of these linguistically encoded logical forms are "semantically 
incomplete" and therefore non-propositional and incapable of being true orfalse (ibid): 
... the sense of a sentence is often an incomplete logical form. (ibid: 73, my italics) 
Semantic representations [i. e. linguistic ones] are incomplete logical 
forms, i. e. at best fragmentary representations of thoughts. We have 
argued that they are incomplete in more than one way: not just 
because they contain indeterminate referring expressions such as 
pronouns, but also because they contain underdefined contituents 
such as 'too', 'some time', or the genitive. (ibid: 193) 
For example, they maintain that the pronouns in the sentence 
(5) She carried it in her hand. 
"do not correspond to definite concepts, but merely mark an unoccupied place where a 
concept might go" (1986a/95: 72-3). So the logical form which (5) encodes cannot be 
used to represent a state of affairs in a possible or actual world, and hence cannot be true 
or false. 
Note that Sperber and Wilson seem to be simultaneously claiming that ALL linguistic 
semantic representations are "incomplete logical forms" (1986a/ 95: 193), and that 
linguistic semantic representations are "often" (ibid: 73) but NOT ALWAYS incomplete 
logical forms. It is clear that Sperber and Wilson do accept the existence of semantically 
complete, fully propositional LEs, for they state that 
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(5a) No one ever carried anything. 
"is, or can be understood as, propositional" (ibid: 73). But the words "can be understood 
as [propositional]" suggest that (5a) can also be "understood as NON-propositional". 
Those words also suggest that, for Sperber and Wilson, the notion of "what is 
propositional" is inseparable from the notion of "the proposition understood to have been 
expressed". Furthermore, if some linguistically encoded logical forms are or can be 
propositional, then surely all linguistically encoded logical forms are propositional, simply 
because those that are will be entailed by those that are supposed not to be. 
I will be returning to this problematic distinction between the "semantically 
incomplete" and the fully propositional in section 3.2.1. Here, my main purpose is to make 
the following point: Sperber and Wilson agree with Fodor that verbal communication 
involves both the language module and the central systems, and that the language module 
decodes linguistically encoded semantic representations, but have a different view of the 
central systems' role in utterance interpretation. For Fodor this appears to be confined to 
the confirmation of perceptual belief, leaving the burden of propositionality to be carried 
by the language module. Sperber and Wilson, however, claim that the central systems also 
contribute -- and must contribute -- to what the speaker conveys. 
These opposing views are based on a disagreement concerning the role -- or rather, 
roles -- of language in human thought and behaviour. But first, consider what the 
relevance theorists and Fodor do agree about. Like Fodor, Sperber and Wilson claim the 
following: 
(6) A language is "a grammar-governed representational system" or "a set of 
semantically interpreted well-formed formulas" (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/ 95: 
173). 
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(7) The formulas of languages are semantically interpreted in more ways than one 
(Fodor 1975: 65-6,73) -- they may be "put into systematic correspondence... with 
the formulas of another language, with states of the user of the language, or with 
possible states of the world" (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/95: 173). 
(8) How a language is semantically interpreted depends on what that language is 
fo r. 
(9) Language is a medium for cognition (hence internal language) as well as 
communication -- 
Language is an essential tool for the processing and 
memorising of information. Any organism or device with a 
memory must be able to represent past states of the world or 
of itself Any organism or device with the ability to draw 
inferences must have a representational system whose 
formulas stand in both syntactic and semantic relations to 
each other. (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/95: 173) 
-- and especially for the cognitive processes of communicating devices -- 
Two devices capable of communicating with each other must 
also be capable of internally representing the information 
communicated, and must therefore have an internal language. 
(ibid: 174) 
But, unlike Fodor, Sperber and Wilson stress that although language as defined in (6) 
is absolutely necessary for cognition, it is 
... not a necessary medium for communication: non-coded 
communication exists. (ibid: 174) 
They point out that there is another model of communication, the inferential model, 
according to which 
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... communication is achieved by the communicator providing 
evidence of her intentions and the audience inferring her intentions 
from the evidence. (ibid: 24) 
They argue that purely inferential communication exists (ibid: 26) -- it is possible, for 
example, to communicate something through (or infer someone's communicative 
intentions from) movements of some part of the face or body, those movements being 
"evidence" of the communicator's intentions. More importantly, the output of linguistic 
decoding is also regarded by Sperber and Wilson as constituting evidence from which the 
audience infers the intentions of the person who provided the linguistic input (ibid: 27). It 
follows from this view of linguistic decoding (which in itself is perfectly consistent with 
Fodor's claim that the central processes are a necessary part of utterance interpretation), 
together with the possibility of purely inferential communication, that coded 
communication via linguistic encoding and decoding is subservient to inferential 
communication. In other words, if 
(10) inferential communication is possible without the involvement of the language 
module, and 
(11) the language module's sole purpose is to provide evidence for inferential 
communication -- 
then, as a means of communication, linguistic encoding and decoding must be secondary 
to the central inferential mechanisms. 
And it is on the basis of (10) and (11) that Sperber and Wilson maintain: LEs need 
not -- and therefore do not -- encode everything that a speaker might want to 
communicate, since the interpretation process will invariably be completed (inferentially) 
by the central systems. Thus they argue that the semantics of "naturaP/ external languages 
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"might be too weak to encode all humanly thinkable thoughts" (1986a/95: 193), in virtue 
of the secondary nature of their role in communication. Or, as Carston puts it, 
... the language system 
does not have the resources to encode the 
propositions speakers succeed in expressing, and what I am 
suggesting here is that there is a very good reason for this: that sort 
of expressive power is redundant. A powerful 'mind-reading' 
capacity is employed in the interpretation of human behaviour quite 
generally... (1998: 55) 
There is an even more fundamental level at which Sperber and Wilsorfs departureg 
from Fodor may be considered. To Sperber and Wilson, 
The fact that the semantic representations of natural-language 
expressions are merely tools for inferential communication suggests 
that inferential communication had to exist before external languages 
developed: human external languages are of adaptive value only for a 
species already deeply involved in inferential communication. 
(1986a/95: 176) 
Carston also observes that 
The wide application of this capacity [for inferential communication] 
in human cognitive activity and its presence in rudimentary form in 
apes, who lack a linguistic system, make it reasonable to suppose 
that the linguistic code evolved later than, or perhaps in step with, 
the capacity to attribute mental states. (1998: 55) 
In contrast, Fodor thinks that the view of the central systems as "philogenetically prior" to 
the input systems (including, presumably, the linguistic one) is "[a] fairly dubious 
evolutionary [assumption]" (1983: 43), suggesting instead that input systems, "with their 
relatively rigid domain specificity and automaticity of function", could in fact be the 
"aboriginal prototypes" of inference-making central systems (ibid). 
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I have demonstrated that, for Sperber and Wilson, communication is predon-dnantly 
inferential, and linguistic decoding very much a subsidiary mechanism. Hence they argue 
that there is a division of interpretational labour between the language module (decoding) 
and the central systems (inference) during verbal communication. 
One of the consequences of these views is that LEs do not need to -- and therefore 
do not -- encode everything that the speaker might intend to communicate. This is clearly 
at odds with Kat; es stronger interpretation of his "principle of effability" (1981: 226): 
Katz's principle of effability: Every proposition (thought) is 
expressible by some sentence in every natural language. 
Katz! s stronger interpretation of the effability principle: Every 
thought is encoded by a sense of some sentence. (in Sperber and 
Wilson's words, 1986a/95: 191) 
For Sperber and Wilson, not every thought is encoded by a "natural"/ external language 
sentence, because the nature of "natural" languages is such that they cannot encode 
certain aspects of thought, and the nature of verbal communication is such that they do 
not need to. 2 Reference, for example, is regarded by Sperber and Wilson as obviously 
ineffable: 
... two people may be able to think of the same man... without 
being 
able to think exactly the same thought, because they might not 
individuate him in exactly the same way. Similarly, by saying 'He has 
gone' I may induce in you a thought which is similar to mine in that it 
predicates the same thing (that he is gone) of the same individual, 
but which differs from mine in the way you fix the reference of 'He'. 
(1986a/95: 192-3) 
21 am assuming that Katz agrees with Sperber and Wilson on what "thoughts" are - i. e. 
conceptual representations (i. e. propositions in the internal language format). 
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More generally, Recanati (1987,1995; cited in Carston 1998: 37-8) suggests that 
reference is always determined by context. In Recanati 1993, he argues that the linguistic 
semantic content of a proper name is not so much a meaning, as a sort of procedure or 
constraint specifying that the proper name refers to its bearer -- the identity of the bearer 
being, of course, a matter of context. He also proposes (in Recanati 1987) that the 
reference of a definite description always depends on the "domain of discourse", defined 
as "that with respect to which the speaker presents his or her utterance as true" (Recanati 
1987: 62). 
Thus Sperber and Wilson conclude: 
It seems to us neither paradoxical nor counterintuitive to say that there 
are thoughts that we cannot exactly share, and that communication can 
be successful without resulting in an exact duplication of thoughts in 
communicator and audience. We see communication as a matter of 
enlarging mutual cognitive environments, not of duplicating thoughts. 
(1986a/95: 193) 
Carston expresses similar sentiments when she suggests that 
A speaker's choice of linguistic form takes account of the hearer's 
immediately accessible assumptions, encoding just what seems to be 
necessary to direct the hearer's inferential processes to the intended 
interpretation... Verbal communication, on this view, is not a means 
of thought duplication; the thought(s) that the speaker seeks to 
communicate are seldom, if ever, perfectly replicated in the mind of 
the audience... (1998: 18) 
3.1.2 Ostensive-inferential communication and the principle of relevance 
As I have mentioned in the previous sections, Sperber and Wilson claim that there are two 
modes of communication; and that one, coded communication, is subservient to the other, 
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inferential communication. Coded communication involves, of course, a code: a system of 
message-signal pairs which enables information-processing devices to communicate by 
decoding signals into which messages are encoded. According to Sperber and Wilson, the 
Morse code is an example of a simple code -- "a straightforward list of message-signal 
pairs" (ibid: 4) -- while an example of a more complex code is the grammar of a language, 
which "pairs phonetic and semantic representations of sentences" (ibid: 9). Language thus 
defined is therefore a medium for coded communication. However, Sperber and Wilson 
argue that this type of coded cominunication is an essential component of, but does not 
constitute, verbal communication. This is because they regard verbal communication as a 
particular kind of ostensive-inferential communication that is strengthened by coded 
communication via "natural"/ external languages (1986a/95: 63). 
Before a formal definition of ostensive-inferential communication can be given, the 
notions of (A) MANIF STNESS, and of the communicator's (B) INFORMATIVE and 
(C) COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS, have to be introduced: 
(A) An assumption is manifest to an individual at a given time "if and only if he is 
capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as 
true or probably true" (ibid: 39). Thus to make an assumption manifest to 
someone is to present it as true or probably true, or to make it perceptible or 
inferable. 
(B) A communicator's informative intention is to make manifest or more manifest 
to the audience a set of assumptions (I) (ibid: 58). 
(C) A communicator's communicative intention is to make mutually manifest to 
audience and comunicator the latter's informative intention (ibid: 61). 
This is Sperber and Wilson's definition of ostensive-inferential communication: 
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Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a 
stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and 
audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, 
to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of 
assumptions (I). (ibid: 63) 
For a stimulus -- an ostensive stimulus -- to evince the communicator's intention to 
make manifest or more manifest (I) (i. e. to evince the communicator's informative 
intention), it has to (a) attract the audience's attention, and (b) focus the audience! s 
attention on the communicator's communicative intention (ibid: 153). An example -- in 
fact the example par excellence -- of how (a) is achieved is the use of language in verbal 
communication. As Sperber and Wilson point out, "spoken utterances in one's own native 
language automatically impinge on the attention" (ibid, my italics). 
As for (b): a stimulus may focus the audience's attention on the communicative 
intention in virtue of being RELEVANT if and only if the audience takes it to have been 
produced with a communicative intention -- i. e. if and only it is taken to be an ostensive 
stimulus. A phenomenon is relevant if it gives rise to large and numerous 
CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS when it is processed with minimum effort. Contextual effects 
arise from the interaction between new information conveyed by some phenomenon and 
the old information of a particular context. They come in three categories: the addition of 
new assumptions; the providing of evidence for, and therefore strengthening of, old 
assumptions; and the providing of evidence against old assumptions, leading to their 
abandonment. The relevance of a phenomenon is proportionate to its contextual effects 
and processing costs -- the stronger and more numerous the contextual effects, the 
smaller the processing costs, the more relevant the phenomenon. 
When the communicator's informative intention has been made manifest, the 
addressee has to "construct possible interpretive hypotheses about the contents of (I), 
and to choose the right one" (ibid: 165). Sperber and Wilson's PRINCIPLE OF 
RELEVANCE states that 
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Every act of ostensive communication communicates the 
presumption of its own optimal relevance. (ibid: 158). 
So one of the members of (I) must be the PRESUNTTION OF OPTHAAL 
RELEVANCE: 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the 
addressee's effort to process it. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with 
the communicator's abilities and preferences. (1995: 270)3 
In other words, every act of ostensive communication carries a guarantee of its own 
optimal relevance. Hence the addressee will choose the hypothesis which he has reason to 
think will confirm the presumption of optimal relevance. This hypothesis should be the 
first accessible hypothesis consistent with the principle of relevance. According to the 
second part of the presumption of relevance, the communicator would not have used a 
stimulus which sends the addressee on an effort-wasting pursuit of more than one 
hypothesis (1986a/95: 168). 
3.2 Sperber and Wilson's account of verbal communication: logical form 
development 
In this section, Sperber and Wilson's account of verbal communication is described in 
terms of an "assumption construction" process which they refer to as LOGICAL FORM 
DEVELOPMENT 
3 This "presumption of optimal relevance" is the revised version given in the "Postface" of the 
second edition of Sperber and Wilson's Relevance: communication and cognition. 
80 
Sperber and Wilson's example (1986a/95: 176-82) has Mary uttering the complex 
sound 
(1) [ ItlgetkaUld ] 
in the presence of Peter. Being "a perceptible modification of the physical environment" 
(ibid: 176), this utterance makes manifest to Peter a set of assumptions (A). The members 
of (A) include 
(2)(a) Someone has made a sound. 
(b) Mary is at home. 
But since (1) is, specifically, a "linguistic stimulus", it also makes manifest the assumption 
that 
(3) Mary has uttered the sentence 'It will get cold! 
As mentioned above, Sperber and Wilson claim that utterances like (1) "automatically 
impinge on the attention" (ibid: 153). In terms of Fodor 1983, this is because linguistic 
decoding is performed by an input system, and, like all other input processes, performed 
automatically on the system's being triggered by some "linguistic stimulus". Hence a 
semantic representation will be automatically assigned to (1), making manifest assumption 
(3) in the process. 
Verbal communication proper begins "when an utterance... is manifestly chosen by 
the speaker for its semantic properties" (1986a/95: 178). Sperber and Wilson point out 
that we usually do assume that utterances are used for communication in virtue of their 
linguistic semantic properties -- the reason being that the first accessible interpretation of 
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an utterance that is consistent with the principle of relevance tends to be based on that 
utterance's automatically (and therefore very easily) recoverable linguistic semantic 
representation (ibid). So Mary's utterance (1) would also make manifest the assumption 
(4) Mary has said to Peter'It will get cold. ' 
and, "since saying something to someone is a case of ostensive communication" (ibid), the 
assumption 
(5) There is a set of assumptions fI) which Mary intends to make manifest to 
Peter by saying to him 'It will get cold. ' 
as well. Having made (5) manifest, Mary would have achieved her communicative 
intention -- i. e. she has made it mutually manifest to herself and Peter that she intends to 
make (I) manifest to Peter. And if Peter "both understands her and trusts her enough" 
(ibid: 179), then she would also have achieved her informative intention -- i. e. her 
intention to make {I) manifest to Peter. In that case, {I) would be a subset of {A), and 
Peter's task would be to decide which members of {A) were also members of {I). In 
short, Peter's task is to decide which of the assumptions made manifest by Mary's 
utterance are also communicated, or intended to have been made manifest, by the 
utterance -- i. e. to identify the EXPLICATURES and IMPLICATURES of the utterance. 
Sperber and Wilson's definition of explicitness will be given at the end of this section. At 
this point it is sufficient to state that the main difference between explicatures and 
implicatures is that an explicature has some linguistically encoded semantic representation 
as a "sub-part", while an implicature does not. 
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The rest of this section deals with the progress from linguistic semantic 
representation via propositionalform to explicature by way of logical form development. 
After it has been made manifest to him that 
(5) There is a set of assumptions (I) which Mary intends to make manifest to 
Peter by saying to him'It will get cold. ' 
Peter clearly has to make something propositional out of the supposedly non- 
propositional logical form which he had recovered through linguistic decoding, before he 
can even begin to identify the fully propositional members of (I) which have that logical 
form as a sub-part (i. e. the explicatures). 
According to Sperber and Wilson, the task of assigning a unique PROPOSITIONAL 
FORM to an utterance is an inferential one, and involves disambiguation, reference 
assignment and general enrichment of the utterance's linguistically encoded logical form 
(1986a/95: 179,185-91). In the case of Mary's utterance, Peter has to decide whether 
'cold' means experiencing cold or inducing cold, assign a referent to 'it', and enrich the 
meaning of "vague items" like 'will' (bid: 179). If, for example, he decides that 'it' refers to 
the dinner and 'cold' means inducing cold, and adds very soon to the meaning of 'will', 
then he would take the propositional form of Mary's utterance to be 
(6) The dinner will get cold very soon. 
It should be stressed that (6) is merely what Peter assumes to be the propositional 
form of Mary's utterance, and may or may not be a member of the set of assumptions (I) 
communicated by the utterance. In other words, we should remember that Peter would 
not know whether or not (6) is the explicature of the utterance -- not until he has 
identified the mood in which (6) is expressed, and, more importantly, the propositional 
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attitude which Mary intended to communicate (ibid: 180). Sperber and Wilson claim that 
mood is linguistically determined, and underdetermines propositional attitude. 
According to Sperber and Wilson (ibid: 180-1), the propositional forra (6) is an 
explicature only if the propositional attitude is one of assertion. In other words, Mary 
communicates (6) if and only if Peter assumes that she has asserted it. Sperber and Wilson 
argue that it is not enough for him to recover the assumption 
(7) Mary has said that the dinner will get cold very soon. 
-- because 
... in the weak sense of 'saying that' which corresponds to the declarative mood, one can say that P without communicating that 
one believes that P. For example, in saying that the dinner will get 
cold very soon, Mary might be speaking metaphorically or 
ironically, in which case she would not communicate that she 
believes that the dinner will get cold very soon. (ibid: 180) 
Nor do they think it is enough for Peter to assume that 
(8) Mary believes that the dinner will get cold very soon 
--because 
A speaker who communicates that she believes that P does not 
automatically communicate that P. For instance, suppose it is 
mutually manifest that Peter believes that the dinner will stay hot 
for as long as it takes him to finish what he is doing, and that he 
has no reason to trust Mary's opinion more than his own. Then 
Mary could not have intended her utterance to achieve relevance 
by making manifest to Peter that the dinner would get cold very 
soon, but only by making manifest that she believes it will. (ibid: 
181) 
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It is only when he decides that Mary is in fact asserting that the dinner will get cold 
very soon, that Peter would assume that she intended (6), as well as (7)-(8), to be made 
manifest by her utterance. Sperber and Wilson refer to such an utterance -- one which 
cornmunicates its propositional form; or rather, one whose propositional form is its 
explicature -- as an ORDINARY ASSERTION. They also describe (6)-(8) as having "as 
sub-parts one of the logical forms encoded by the utterance" (ibid: 181). More 
specifically, each of (6)-(8) is a DEVELOPMENT OF TBE LOGICAL FORM encoded 
by Mary's utterance -- having been 
... constructed inferentially, 
by using contextual information to 
complete and enrich this logical form into a propositional form, 
which is then optionally embedded into an assumption schema 
typically expressing an attitude to it' (ibid). 
This notion of logical form development is significant in that it is an integral part of 
Sperber and Wilson's definition of ENPLICITNESS: 
Explicitness 
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and 
only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. (ibid: 
182) 
(6)-(8), therefore, constitute the explicit content of Mary's utterance. In short, (6)-(8) are 
the EXPLICATURES of Mary's utterance. And what Sperber and Wilson would call an 
ordinary assertion is an utterance whose propositional form constitutes one of its 
explicatures. This, then, is the difference between Sperber and Wilson's explicatures and 
implicatures: both explicature and implicature are assumptions communicated by an 
utterance, but only the explicature is a development of the logicalform encoded by the 
utterance. An explicature usually does have some non-linguistic content -- logical form 
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development is an inferential process -- but the difference lies in the fact that explicatures 
have linguistically encoded logical forms as "sub-parts", while the derivation of 
implicatures is entirely inferential. 
Here is a summary of the respective places of (linguistically encoded) logical form, 
propositional form and explicature within Sperber and Wilson's account of verbal 
communication. 
The hearer who has recovered only the linguistically encoded LOGICAL FORM of 
the sentence uttered by the speaker knows that: 
The speaker has uttered "S" (S: the sentence which encodes the 
logical form) 
-- whether or not he assumes that the speaker is communicating something by uttering the 
sentence. Even if he did assume that something was communicated, he would not have 
made any assumptions about what it is. 
Nor would he have made any assumptions about what was said -- not, at least, until 
he has constructed the PROPOSITIONAL FORM of the utterance from the logical form. 
The hearer who has identified the propositional form P assumes that 
The speaker has said that P. 
Such an assumption is an EXPLICATURE in itself, since the speaker who intended to 
communicate something by saying that P must at least have communicated that he has 
said that P. But it is only when the hearer assumes that P has been asserted by the 
speaker, that he would be able to identify P as an explicature -- i. e. assume that the 
speaker has communicated P. 
Therefore -- 
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LOGICAL FORM: what is encoded by the speaker's utterance. 
PROPOSITIONAL FORM: what is said by the speaker. 
ENPLICATURE: what is communicated, or intended to be made 
manifest, by the speaker. 
In view of Sperber and Wilson's account of non-literalness (which will be discussed in 
3.3), it is necessary to point out that there appears to be two ways of developing a given 
logicalform. 
According to Sperber and Wilson, logical form development involves the completion 
and enrichment of a logical form with contextual information, and its optional embedding 
into an assumption schema expressing an attitude to it. They also refer to a logical form as 
being a "SUB-PART" of any assumption derived through logical form development. What 
I want to point out is that there appears to be two different kinds of logical form 
development, because itfollowsfrom Sperber and Wilson's definition that there are two 
different senses of "sub-part". Both kinds of logical form development involve the 
completion and enrichment of the logical form into a propositional form. The difference 
lies in the fact that the propositional form is embedded into an assumption schema 
expressing an attitude to it, during what I shall refer to as COMMUNICATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT, but not during the other kind of logical form development which I 
shall call LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 
Assuming, as Sperber and Wilson do, that logical forms are "amenable to logical 
processing", having the logical form as a "sub-part" would be equivalent to having it as a 
logical implication in the case of logical development, but not in the case of 
communicative development (hence "logical" and "communicative" respectively). 
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For example, the propositional forms (7) and (8) 
(7) Mary has said that the dinner will get cold very soon. 
(8) Mary believes that the dinner will get cold very soon. 
arise from the communicative development of the logical form linguistically encoded by 
Mary's utterance "It will get cold", while 
(6) The dinner will get cold very soon. 
is a logical development of the logical form. 
It is curious that assumptions about propositional attitude should be "optional". for 
the choice of one kind of logical form development over the other clearly plays a crucial 
role in the identification of the explicature (and implicatures) of an utterance. For 
example, an utterance is an ordinary assertion only if the logical form it encodes goes 
through logical development, and not communicative development -- or at least goes 
through logical development independently of going through communicative 
development. Put another way, the propositional form of an utterance is an explicature if 
and only if the propositionalform alone -- without any attitudinal embellishment, as it 
were, and therefore logically implying the logical form -- is presented as true, made 
manifest, communicated. 
A non-literal utterance, on the other hand, is one whose propositional form P is not 
explicated, because the hearer assumes that the speaker has merely said that P, or said 
that he believed that P, or said P metaphorically, etc. In other words, a non-literal 
utterance is one whose logical form undergoes communicative development. Sperber and 
Wilson claim that the "only obvious explicature" (1986a/95: 225) of a metaphorical 
utterance like 
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(9) This room is a pigsty. 
is 
(9a) The speaker is saying that this room is a pigsty. 
In terms of Sperber and Wilson's definition of logical form development, there is only one 
way of developing a metaphorical utterance's logical form into something fit for 
presenting as true (i. e. fit for explicating), and that is to integrate the inferentially 
enriched, fully propositional version of the logical form -- the utterance's propositional 
form P -- into the appropriate assumption schema to give 
(9b) The speaker said that P. 
(9a), of course, does not logically imply the logical form or the propositional form of the 
metaphorical utterance (9). The most important part -- in fact the most relevant part - of 
what (9) cornmunicates is conununicated implicitly -- i. e. in the form of implicatures 
which, unlike explicatures, are not developed from the linguistically encoded logical form. 
Therefore, since the propositional form of a metaphorical utterance is not explicated, and 
since the propositional form of an utterance may not be what the speaker believes, or 
intends to communicate, but is -- as (9a) shows -- definitely what the speaker has "SAID", 
we can only conclude that a metaphorical utterance, for Sperber and Wilson, involves 
saying something which one has no intention of communicating. What is more, since the 
only explicature of a metaphorical utterance with propositional form P is (9b), the person 
who makes that utterance is in effect explicitly communicating that he is saying what he 
has no intention of communicating. In section 3.3 1 will be arguing that Sperber and 
89 
Wilsores conception of propositional forms and their truth-theoretic semantics creates 
problems for the relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation, especially in the 
case of non-literal utterances which explicate, not their propositional forms, but their 
communicatively developed logical forms. 
3.2.1 "Semantically incomplete" logical forms and the distinction between 
linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics 
Following on from my description of the relevance-theoretic process of logical form 
development in the previous section, this section raises questions about the nature of (a) 
Sperber and Wilson's linguistically encoded logical fonns, and of (b) the relation 
between these logical forms and what they are developed into. In the process, we shall see 
how certain assumptions about (a) and (b) may have motivated and influenced Kempson's 
(1986) and Carston's (1988) distinction between LINGUISTIC and TRUTH- 
TIHEORETIC SEMANTICS. 
As mentioned above, Sperber and Wilson maintain that most sentences have semantic 
representations that are semantically incomplete logical forms (hence the necessity of 
developing them into fully propositional forms for communicative purposes). They claim 
that a logical form has to be "semantically complete" to be capable of being true or false: 
... that is, it must represent a state of affairs, in a possible or actual 
world, whose existence would make it true. (1986a/ 95: 72) 
Thus Sperber and Wilson regard linguistic semantics as non-truth-conditional and non- 
truth-evaluable. However, they also argue that a conceptual representation need not be 
"capahle of heing true orfalse "for it to he "amenahle to logical processing" -- it OnIY 
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needs to be "well formed" (ibid, my italics). For example, Sperber and Wilson claim that 
(10)-- 
(10) She carried it in her hand. 
-- has a semantically incomplete logical form which can be neither true nor false. 
Nevertheless: 
In spite of its non-propositionality, [(10)] has obvious logical 
properties. For instance, it implies [(10a)], which is equally non- 
propositional, and it contradicts [(10b)], which is, or can be 
understood as, propositional: 
[(10a)] She held something in her hand. 
[(10b)] No one ever carried anything. (ibid: 73) 
The problem is that it is not at all clear that logical forms like (10)'s are really non- 
truth-conditional and non-truth-evaluable. Sperber and Wilson do not deny that there is a 
"relationship between truth and logic" (ibid: 72). The logical properties of conceptual 
representations consist in their being capable of undergoing formal logical operations -- 
Conceptual representations must have logical properties: they must 
be capable of implying or contradicting one another, and of 
undergoing deductive rules. (ibid) 
Furthermore, logical operations are by (Sperber and Wilson's) definition truth-preserving. 
But how can a "semantically incomplete logical form", like the one which (10) supposedly 
encodes, have logical properties -- how would we identify it as a logical form, or know 
that it logically implies or contradicts other logical forms -- if it cannot have any truth 
value for logical operations to preserve? How, for example, do we state the relation 
between (10) and (10a) -- i. e. that (10) logically implies (10a) if and only if (10a) is true 
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when (10) is true, and (10) is false when (10a) is false -- since both (10) and (10a) are 
supposed to be incapable of being true orfalse? And, most obviously, how can the non- 
propositional (10) contradict (10b), which is propositional? 
Also, if (10) is an utterance whose linguistically encoded logical form is logically -- 
not communicatively -- developed (see 3.2) into the propositional form 
(10c) Deirdre Wilsonj carried the booki in her (Deirdre Wilson'sj) hand. 
then the propositional form (10c) ought to entail the logical form of (10). But again this 
requires (10) to be true (and hence have a truth value) when (I Oc) is false. 
Thus my argument is this. As long as linguistic semantic representations are regarded 
as logical forms which can undergo logical operations, it is impossible that they should 
also be incapable of being true or false. In fact there may be no reason why (10) cannot 
represent a state of affairs, and be true or false (depending on whether or not the state of 
affairs it represents exists). As Wilson and Sperber themselves point out (1981: 156), the 
range of the pronouns' possible referents is "explicitly given by [linguistic] semantic rules". 
Thus (10) ought to be perfectly true of any situation in which 
(11) [THIRD PERSON (FFMALE)] carried [THIRD PERSON (NEUTER)] in the 
hand of [THIRD PERSON (FEMALE)]. 
-- i. e. in which any member of the set of thefirstpronoun's possible referents carried any 
member of the set of the second pronoun's possible referents in the hand of ally member 
of the set of the third1first pronoun's possible referents. (And the hand does not even 
have to belong to the subject of the sentence. ) 
It is possible that Carston might take (11) to be equivalent to 
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(I I a) Some female entity in some domain carried at some past time something in 
that female entity's hand. 
which she regards as the result of a "simplistic" attempt at formulating the semantic 
content of an obviously semantically incomplete LE: 
... wherever you find an indexical you put 
in a phrase which spells 
out the indexical constraint in conceptual terms and wherever you 
spot an inarticulated constituent you use one of the family of 'some! - 
indefinites (something, somewhere, sometime, etc. ) to make it 
visible. (1998: 69) 
She raises two objections to this (ibid). Firstly, she argues that (10) and (Ila) are not 
truth-conditionally synonymous. Indeed, (10) is not truth-conditionally synonymous with 
(Ila), since (10) in fact entails (Ila). But whether or not (10) is truth-conditionally 
synonymous with (Ila) ought to be beside the point for Carston, since within the 
relevance framework it is unnecessary, because impossible, for the supposedly non-truth- 
conditional (10) to be truth-conditionally synonymous with (Ila). Secondly, Carston 
claims that (I I a) "cannot but be true", which she calls "a ludicrous result". It is not clear 
what is so ludicrous about that, especially in view of the fact that the extremely vague 
(I I a) can always be enriched by the central inferential processes -- which are of course 
acknowledged by the relevance theorists to be an essential component of utterance 
interpretation -- to give a more specific and informative proposition. Thus I agree with 
Carston that 
... the truth conditions of the vast majority of utterances depend on input from pragmatic processes... (Carston 1988: 176) 
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but at the same time deny that there is a non-truth-conditional linguistic semantics which 
is distinct from "real", truth-theoretic semantics. 
In my view, the linguistically encoded logical form of (10) entails the fully 
propositional (Ila), is entailed by the fully propositional (10c), and is itself a truth- 
conditional, truth-evaluable proposition. Let me just exan-dne and compare the respective 
subjects of (10), (11 a) and (I Oc). 'She' in (10) does not encode as "definite" (see Sperber 
and Wilson 1986a/ 95: 73) a concept as Deirdre Wilsoti in (I Oc), because 'she' does not in 
itself refer to a specific (female) individual. However, 'she' does encode a more "definite" 
concept that (I I a)'s some female entity in some domain, because 'she' CAN refer to a 
specific (female) individual. It seems to me that, for Kempson, Carston and Sperber and 
Wilson, the truth-theoretic semantics of a proposition has to "represent", not only "a state 
of affairs in a possible or actual world" (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/ 95: 72), but a very 
particular and narrow state of affairs. Thus they maintain that truth-theoretic status is 
reached only when she has been inferentially enriched to the point that it refers specifically 
to the (female) individual Deirdre Wilson, or Robyn Carston, or whoever is being referred 
to. I, on the other hand, argue that, for 'she' to encode a semantically complete logical 
form, it is enough that'shecati (as opposed to does) refer to a specific (female) individual 
belonging to a possible or actual world. Similarly, it is not necessary to consider any 
possible or actual world in order to know, for example, that (10) entails (10a) and 
contradicts (10b), or to confirm that a tautology such as 'War is war' or 'A bachelor is an 
unmarried man' is necessarily true. 
For Kempson and Carston, the distinctioti which they make between linguistic and 
truth-theoretic ("real") semantics depends (partly) on the apparent non-truth- 
conditionality of linguistically encoded logical forms, while the relation which they 
assume exists between the two kinds of semantics is possible only if non-truth-conditional 
logical forms can undergo logical operations: 
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... the 
linguistic meaning of expressions has to interact with 
contextual parameters of a rich and complex sort to determine the 
truth-theoretic content of the propositions that a sentence expresses. 
(Kempson 1986: 77) 
It seems then that we must distinguish two kinds of semantics, 
linguistic and truth-conditional, the former naturally figuring only in 
a theory of utterance meaning, the latter taking as its domain 
propositional forms, whether of utterances or unspoken thoughts. 
Linguistic semantics IS autonomous with respect to pragmatics; it 
provides the input to pragmatic processes and the two together make 
propositional forms which are the input to a truth-conditional 
semantics. (Carston 1988: 176)4 
In Carston 1998(: 64-5), the differences between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics 
are set out in greater detail. Linguistic semantics has to do with the encoded meanings of 
natural language formulas, and is "translational" in that it involves the mapping of natural 
language logical forms into the formulas of the internal representational system (i. e. the 
language of thought). Truth-theoretic semantics is the semantics of this internal language, 
and is "real" rather than translational because it relates the mental representations of the 
language of thought to the objects and states of affairs in the world which they represent. 
In other words, the distinction between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics is co- 
extensive with the distinction between linguistic decoding and the central inferential 
process. 
Sperber and Wilson claim that 
4 One might argue that Kempson's "linguistic meaning of expressions" is exactly the same thing as 
her "propositions that a sentence expresses" - sentences are linguistic expressions, and the 
propositions they express must constitute "linguistic meaning". Similarly, there appears to be little 
to choose between Carston's "utterance meaning" and "propositional forms... of utterances or 
unspoken thoughts". Considering that the objective of Carston 1988 is to argue for the distinction 
between linguistic sentence semantics and the truth-conditional semantics of the propositions 
which, as she herself points out, are expressed by utterances, the use of "utterance meaning" to 
mean 'linguistic semantics' is confusing, to say the least. Tberefore one of the main problems of 
Kempson 1986 and Carston 1988 is the rather haphazard manner in which the terms "sentence" 
and "utterance" are used. 
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A formula is semantically interpreted by being put into systematic 
correspondence with other objects: for example, with the formulas of 
another language, with states of the user of the language, or with 
possible states of the world. (1986a/ 95: 173) 
According to Kempson and Carston, only truth-theoretic semantic formulae can be "put 
into systematic correspondence" with possible states of the world. They regard natural 
language formulas as non-truth-theoretic: 
Those entities which all truth-based theories of meaning assume as 
the basis of semantics under one conception or another -- the truth- 
bearing entities, propositions -- will not be generated by the grammar 
at all. (Kempson 1986: 101-2) 
The language ability... is the ability to map linguistic forms onto 
logical forms matching to a high degree the mappings made by a 
certain group of others (the speakers of English). In theory this 
ability could exist without the further capacities involved in matching 
these with conditions in the world. (Carston 1988: 177) 
Their linguistic semantics, then, maps linguistic forms onto "concepts" (Carston 
1988: 179, fn 16) or "linguistic meanings" (Kempson 1986: 100-1) -- by which they mean 
logical forms which cannot be true or false of states of the world or possible worlds. But, 
as Sperber and Wilson point out, these logical forms can be developed -- with "input from 
pragmatic processes" (Carston), or by "[interacting] with contextual parameters of a rich 
and complex sort" (Kempson) -- into propositional forms which CAN BE true or false of 
states of the world or possible worlds. It is these propositional forms which belong to the 
domain of truth-theoretic semantics. 
The distinction between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics would be greatly 
weakened should all linguistically encoded semantic representations -- or indeed any 
linguistically encoded semantic representation -- turn out to be perfectly propositional. As 
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we have seen above, Sperber and Wilson maintain that most linguistically encoded logical 
forms are in fact non-propositional and therefore incapable of being true or false of states 
of the world or possible worlds. For example, the linguistic expression 'She carried it in 
her hand' is claimed to be semantically incomplete, most obviously because the pronouns 
"do not correspond to definite concepts, but merely mark an unoccupied place where a 
concept might go" (1986a/95: 72-3). For Sperber and Wilson, this "non-propositionality"/ 
"semantic incompleteness" is one of the two features4 of linguistically encoded logical 
forms which distinguish linguistic semantics from truth-theoretic semantics. I have argued 
that linguistically encoded logical forms must be fully propositional and truth-conditional. 
But even if they were not, there would still be problems with the claim that they are 
inferentially enriched to give the propositional forms which come under truth-theoretic 
semantics. 
To begin with, there are two questions which have already been raised, but ought to 
be discussed in greater detail: what exactly does a linguistically encoded logical form 
consist of, and how is it (to use Sperber and Wilson's term) developed into a propositional 
form? Taking into consideration the distinction between the two kinds of semantics, the 
more specific and interesting versions of these questions would be: what exactly does a 
non-truth-conditional, non-propositional logical form consist of, and how is it developed 
into a truth-conditionalpropositionalform? 
According to Sperber and Wilson, a linguistic semantic representation is non. 
propositional because some of its constituents "do not correspond to definite concepts, 
but merely mark an unoccupied place where a concept might go" (1986a/ 95: 72-3). This 
statement seems to have some sort of internal inconsistency. The first part -- "do not 
correspond to definite concepts" -- appears to presuppose that the semantic constituents 
4 The other, to be discussed in section 3.3, has to do with Sperber and Wilson's assumption that 
there are fiilly propositional forms which nevertheless are not what "humans are interested in 
communicating" (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/ 95: 174). 
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do correspond to concepts, but only to concepts which are not definite. But "merely mark 
an unoccupied place where a concept might go" implies that the pronouns in 'She carried 
it in her hand', for instance, do not correspond to concepts - "definite " or "indefinite" - 
at all, but are merely slots in which certain concepts may be inserted. 
It is possible that Sperber and Wilson actually equate "indefinite concepts" with 
"unoccupied places where concepts might go". Apart from the questionable coherence of 
such an assumption -- an "inde/Inite concept" is nevertheless a concept -- there is also the 
question of what makes a concept "definite" or "indefinite". Presumably Sperber and 
Wilson are saying that the pronoun 'she' in 'She carried it in her hand' is an "indefinite 
concept" at the level of linguistic semantics because it does not refer to a particular 
individual -- i. e. it does not correspond to a "definite concept" like Deirdre Wilson. But 
the point is that the reference to Deirdre Wilson occurs at the TRUTH-THEORETIC 
SEMANTIC level. Just because the LINGUISTIC SEMANTIC content of 'she' -- 
something like [THIRD PERSON (TFMALE)] in (11) -- has to be inferentially enriched 
before it can be used to refer to Deirdre Wilson at the truth-theoretic semantic level, does 
not mean that [THIRD PERSON (FFMALE)] is in itself "indefinite" or "semantically 
incomplete". My argument, therefore, is that the only sense in which [THIRD PERSON 
(FFAMLE)] might be "indefinite" or "semantically incomplete" is that it falls short of what 
the speaker intended for it to convey. But that is not what "semantically incomplete, ' 
means, if indeed "semantically incomplete" has a meaning at all. 
More recently (e. g. in Wilson and Sperber 1993), Sperber and Wilson have accepted 
Blakemore's (1987) distinction between CONCEPTUAL and PROCEDURAL 
information encoded by LEs. Whereas conceptual information consists of conceptual 
representations with logical and truth-conditional properties, procedural information 
comes in the form of procedures for constraining inferential processes. Or, as Wilson and 
Sperber put it (1993: 11-2), procedural information constrains the inferential construction 
of conceptual representations which are not, or not completely, linguistically encoded. 
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Pronouns, for instance, encode procedural constraints on explicatures by "guiding the 
search for the intended referent, which is part of the proposition expressed" (ibid: 21). 
In support of this argument, Wilson and Sperber cite Kaplan's (1989) example 
(12) 1 do not exist. 
as uttered by David Kaplan. Kaplan distinguishes between the character and content of an 
expression: whereas the content of an expression is its "propositional constituent" (1989: 
523), the character is a rule which determines the content in any given context. Thus 
Kaplan's character and content correspond to Blakemore's procedural constraints and 
conceptual information respectively. Kaplan observes that, if the T in (12) is treated as 
encoding the concept the speaker, then David Kaplan's utterance of (12) would express 
the proposition 
(12a) The speaker of (12) does not exist. 
If, on the other hand, we assume that the T in (12) encodes a procedural rule which states 
that the interpreter is to identify the referent by first identifying the speaker, then in a 
situation where it is uttered by David Kaplan (12) would express the proposition 
(12b) David Kaplan does not exist. 
So, on the assumption that pronouns encode CONCEPTUAL information: 
(13)(a) The SENTENCE (12), containing the pronoun T which encodes the 
concept the speaker, expresses the proposition (12a). 
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(b) David Kaplan's UTTERANCE of the sentence (12) expresses what the 
sentence encodes, (12a). 
(c) Both the SENTENCE (12) and what is expressed by the UTTERANCE of the 
sentence (12a) are "true in any state of affairs in which [(12)] is uttered and its 
speaker does not exist... such a state of affairs is impossible... " (Wilson and 
Sperber 1993: 20). 
(d) Therefore both the SENTENCE (12) and the UTTERANCE of the sentence 
are necessarily false. 
And on the assumption that pronouns encode PROCEDURAL information: 
(14)(a) The SENTENCE (12), containing the pronoun T which encodes a 
procedural constraint rather than a concept, is semantically incomplete and does 
not express a proposition. 
(b) David Kaplan's UTTERANCE of the sentence (12), however, does express the 
proposition (12b), which is inferentially derived from (12). 
(c) The SENTENCE (12) is non-truth-evaluable; any UTTERANCE of the 
sentence (12) is false. 
(d) But according to Wilson and Sperber, 
Kaplan argues that though [the procedural (12)] is false 
whenever it is uttered, it is not necessarily false. The 
proposition it expresses is true in any state of affairs in 
which David Kaplan does not exist. In other words, [(12)] 
must be understood as expressing [(12b)], not [(12a)]. 
(1993: 20) 
I have two objections to the arguments outlined in (13) and (14). Firstly, why must 
(12) be understood as expressing (12b), and not (12a)? I see no reason why necessarily 
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false propositions should be undesirable, just as I see no reason why propositions which 
"cannot but be true" should be regarded as "ludicrous" by Carston (1998: 69). 
Secondly, I disagree with Kaplan's assertion that a necessarily false proposition is 
expressed only in the conceptual account of (12), and not in the procedural account. Note 
that, whereas it is both the SENTENCE (12) and what is expressed by any UTTERANCE 
of the sentence (12) which are necessarily false on the conceptual account, the procedural 
account has it that only the UTTERANCE of the sentence (12) -- not the non-truth- 
evaluable SENTENCE itself -- *, can be true or false. So if procedural (12) is truth- 
evaluable only when it is uttered, and if it is (as Wilson and Sperber themselves put it) 
': false whenever it is uttered', then -- contrary to the claims of Kaplan, and of Wilson and 
Sperber -- procedural (12) must be necessarily false. 
Here is another way of formulating my arguments against Kaplan, Wilson and 
Sperber's claims about the procedural account of (12). The point which Kaplan, Wilson 
and Sperber are trying to make is that (12) is always false if 'I' encodes the concept the 
speaker, but can be true if the pronoun is procedurally constrained to be assigned a 
particular referent, e. g. David Kaplan, who does exist. But the procedural information 
which 'I' encodes is, as Wilson and Sperber put it (1993: 22), "an instruction to identify 
its referent by first identifying the speaker". This means that (12) would express (12b) if 
and only if David Kaplan is the speaker. Therefore -- since (I 2b) is expressed only by 
David Kaplan's utterance of (12), and since David Kaplan's uttering of (12) is obviously 
not a state of affairs consistent with (12b)s description of David Kaplan's non-existence -- 
(12b) as expressed by an utterance of procedural (12) must be necessarily false. 
It seems to me that Kaplan, as well as Wilson and Sperber, occupy a somewhat 
ambiguous position in respect of the relation between (12) and (12b). On the one hand 
Wilson and Sperber refer to (12b) as "Ihe proposilion expressed by (12)". On the other 
hand, when they claim (1993: 20) that "The proposition [(12)] expresses is true in any 
state of affairs in which David Kaplan does not exist", they seem to regard (12b) as an 
101 
independent proposition, completely dissociated from the fact that it is expressed by (12) 
if and only if (12) is perceived to be uttered, and uttered by (the existing) David Kaplan. 
Returning to the relevance theorists' advocacy of the procedural treatment of 
pronouns: in Wilson and Sperber 1993, Kaplan's account of how the conceptual treatment 
of T may result in necessary falsehoods like (12a) is used as an argument for the 
procedural alternative. What I have tried to show is that (12) - as a sentence, or 
whenever it is uttered - expresses necessarily false propositions on both conceptual and 
procedural accounts. Therefore, even on Wilson and Sperber's own terms, (12) does not 
constitute an argument against the conceptual treatment of T. 
Furthermore, if the procedural vs. conceptual debate is to be seen as turning on 
whether or not utterances express necessarily true or false propositions, then Wilson and 
Sperber should also take into consideration examples such as 
(12c) I am David Kaplan. 
It is on the procedural rather than the conceptual view of pronouns that an utterance of 
(12c) would express a proposition which is, if true, then necessarily true -- i. e. David 
Kaplan is David Kaplan -- and, if false, then necessarily false. On the conceptual YY 
account, on the other hand, (12c) or an utterance of (12c) would express Ae speaker is 
David Kaplan -- a proposition which is necessarily true only if it is necessarily true that 
the speaker is David Kaplan. 
In fact it is not clear if the procedural account of pronouns is consistent with the 
semantic incompleteness view, for it could be argued that Blakemore's procedures, and 
Kempsoifs grammar-specified sets of "constraints on constructing propositions" (1986: 
101-2) are themselves propositional. Carston's remark about how one can replace 
indexicals with "a phrase which spells out the indexical constraint in conceptual terms" 
(1998: 69, my italics) appears to corroborate the view of Blakemore's procedural 
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information as sets of propositions, albeit ones which are obviously far more general than 
those which have been pragmatically enriched and are expressed at utterance level. Put it 
this way. If a proposition is thought of as defining a logical space, then a set of constraints 
on constructing a proposition would consist of another logical space within which the 
logical space defined by the proposition must be constructed. In short, the sets of 
constraints ought to be propositions too. 
Perhaps the words which Kempson uses to define linguistically encoded logical forms 
-- "sets of constraints on constructing propositions" -- were chosen for the purpose of 
distancing logical forms from propositional forms; of stressing that logical forms, as mere 
sets of constraints on proposition construction, belong to a separate category as far as the 
propositions themselves are concerned. The same may be said of Blakemore's 
linguistically encoded procedural constraints. Carston, in fact, states that logical forms 
and propositional forms are "two different kinds of entity" (1988: 176). But she does not 
state why they are "two different kinds of entity", and it must be pointed out that the 
difference does not actually follow from the claim that logical forms have "unoccupied 
places where concepts might go" while propositional forms do not. This is because non- 
propositionality is conceived of as a sufficient but not necessary condition for non-truth- 
evaluability within this particular framework. That most, but not all, logical forms are 
supposed to be non-propositional -- 
... while linguistic sense makes a crucial contribution to truth 
conditions it almost never supplies a truth evaluable propositional 
form. (Carston, 1988: 175; my italics) 
... the sense of a sentence is ofteii an incomplete logical form. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986a/95: 73; my italics again) 
-- seems to be one of the reasons why Carston, Kempson, Sperber and Wilson distinguish 
between truth-theoretic and linguistic semantics in the first place. However, it cannot 
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constitute a basis for the distinction itself as long as there are a number (even a very small 
number) of logical forms which are fully propositional, like Sperber and Wilson's (10b): 
(10b) No one ever carried anything. 
In fact, to say that some linguistically encoded logical forms are fully propositional 
amounts to conceding that all of them are, since they enter into logical relations with one 
another. 
To conclude, some observations on the following remarks made by Kempson and 
Carston on the relation between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics: 
Linguistic semantics is... a partial translation algorithm defined in 
solely syntactic terms for mapping linguistic strings which are not 
transparent with respect to their inferential properties on to fully 
specified strings of some selected language of inference which are. 
In consequence, there is no reconstruction of truth-theoretic content 
defined directly over strings of natural languages as part of the 
grammar... (Kempson, 1986: 102; my italics) 
Distinguishing two kinds of semantics in this way... shows further 
that the semantic representation of one language may be a syntactic 
representation in another, though the chain must end somewhere 
with the formulas related to situations and states of the world or 
possible worlds. (Carston, 1988: 177; my italics again) 
These remarks seem to compromise the original distinction between linguistic and truth- 
theoretic semantics. The quotation from Kempson implies that, although the sets of 
constraints on proposition construction -- i. e. the logical forms -- specified by the 
grammar are not the actual truth-evaluable propositionalforms, they still bring about the 
"mapping" of these logical forms onto "fully specified strings of some selected language of 
inference". Thus logical forms are not "directly" truth-evaluable but, presumably, may 
nonetheless be indirectly so in virtue of their mapping function. Meanwhile, Carston 
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insists that linguistic formulas must somehow be related to states of the world or possible 
worlds ("the chain must end somewhere with the formulas related to situations and states 
of the world or possible worlds"), and then promptly posits a "third kind of semantics" to 
relate them: 
In addition to a linguistic semantics mapping linguistic forms onto 
concepts and a truth-conditional semantics relating propositional 
forms to the real world there is a third kind of semantics, a logical or 
conceptual role semantics, concerned with relations of entailment, 
contradiction, etc., amongst logical and propositional forms. 
(Carston, 1988: 179, fn 16) 
Also, in Carston 1998(: 64-5), it is stated that linguistic semantics "translates" natural 
language sentences into formulas of the language of thought, and that 
... many natural-language expressions 
have a real world truth- 
conditional semantics by inheritance; that is, given that they map 
onto parts of propositional thought representations they can be 
thought of as having a truth-conditional content that those parts of 
the thought representations have. (my italics) 
Naturally she is careful to say that LEs map only onto "parts of propositional thought 
representations"; that there are "a range of elements which do not encode conceptual 
truth-conditional content" (ibid: 65); and that the mentalese form Ijk" which the natural 
language form "abc" encodes is "incomplete" (ibid: 64). Nevertheless, it could be said that 
her "third kind of semantics" and "truth-conditional semantics BY DTHERITANCE" 
completely overturn the distinction between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics which 
she had made in the first place. 
105 
3.3 Sperber and Wilson's account of verbal communication: propositional 
form identification 
Sections 3.2 and 3.2.1 centred on one of the two reasons why a distinction between two 
kinds of semantics is fclt to be necessary by the relevance theorists: it follows from the 
view of linguistic semantic representations as non-truth-evaluable logical forms, that 
linguistic semantics must have a truth-evaluable counterpart -- truth-theoretic semantics - 
which consists of truth-evaluable propositional forms. In this section I discuss the other 
reason, which has to do with the nature of the propositional form of an utterance 
(henceforth P). 
P is variously referred to by relevance theorists as the proposition expressed by the 
utterance (or speaker), what is said, and, most importantly, the truth-conditional content 
of the utterance. Grice's 1967 notion of what is said was, after all, for the circumscribing 
of what pertains to the truth and falsity of philosophical statements. P also appears to be 
determined by speaker's intentions: in Carston 1998(: 26) it is defined as "that proposition 
which it is rational to assume the speaker intended to express". 
A minimally propositional form need not necessarily be -- and in fact seldom is -- the 
P which Sperber and Wilson's process of logical form development produces. So the 
second reason for distinguishing between truth-theoretic and linguistic semantics is based 
on certain notions about what makes a propositional form THE PROPOSITIONAL 
FORM of an utterance. Put another way, the second reason is based on notions about the 
circumstances under which a propositional form belongs within the domain of truth- 
theoretic semantics. The central, most general, of these notions may (I argue) be 
summarised thus: the property which distinguishes a propositional form as a truth- 
theoretic semantic entity is not actually inherent in that propositional form, but depends 
on its capacity for serving a particular purpose within a particular context. 
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According to Sperber and Wilson (1986a/95: 183-93), the hearer's task is to identify 
the RIGHT PROPOSITIONAL FORM, i. e. the one that was intended by the speaker. 
Quite simply, the propositional form of an utterance is the propositional form whose 
retrieval requires the least effort, and which leads to an overall interpretation that is 
consistent with the principle of relevance. Sperber and Wilson claim that such a 
propositional form -- the right propositional form -- is itself consistent with the principle 
of relevance. 
Propositional form identification involves three sub-tasks -- DISANMIGUATION, 
REFERENCE ASSIGNNI[ENT and GENERAL ENRICHMENT. During each of these 
sub-tasks, the hearer first chooses the most accessible solution, abandoning it only if it 
leads to a propositional form and an overall interpretation which are not consistent with 
the principle of relevance. Take, for example, 
(15) The child left the straw in the glass. 
-- which could mean that the child left the drinking tube in the glass, or that the child left 
the cereal stalks in the glass. Sperber and Wilson observe that 
At a purely linguistic level, there is no reason to assume that the 
cereal-stalk sense of 'straw' is less accessible than the drinking- 
tube sense; no reason, then, why one interpretation should be 
preferred. (ibid: 186) 
And yet, in the absence of a "special context", one interpretation -- the drinking-tube 
interpretation -- is preferred. This has to do with contextual factors. As Sperber and 
Wilson point out: 
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A child drinking from a glass with a straw is a stereotypical event 
which we assume... is recorded in the form of a single chunk, 
stored at a single location in memory and accessed in a single 
unit. Such a chunk constitutes a highly accessible encyclopaedic 
context in which the drinking-whe interpretation of [(15)] can be 
processed at minimal cost. (ibid) 
Infonnation about cereal stalks, on the other hand, is probably stored separately from 
information ahout children and glasses -- hence the relative inaccessibility of the 
encyclopaedic context required for the processing of the cereal-stalk interpretaion. 
However, the more accessible drinking-fuhe interpretation need not necessarily be 
the more relevant one. Take the pronoun in Mary's utterance "It will get cold". For Peter, 
the most easily recoverable referent for 'it' may be the dinner -- if, for example, he knows 
that the dinner has been on the table for the past fifteen minutes. But let us say that Mary 
goes on to utter 
(16) Put your jumper on. 
In that context, Peter would have to abandon the dinner interpretation, and conclude that 
the pronoun is an expletive which does not refer to anything. 
The inferential processes which I have discussed so far, disambiguation and 
reference assignment, are aimed at minimal propositionality. However, Sperber and 
Wilson argue that minimal propositionality is necessary but usually not sufficient for a 
proposition to be THE propositional form of an utterance. They claim (ibid: 189) that the 
interpretation recoverable from an utterance like 
(17) It will take some time to repair your watch. 
by decoding and reference assignment 
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... is a truism and thus irrelevant. It goes without saying that watch- 
repairing is a process with a temporal duration, and a speaker 
observing the principle of relevance must have intended to express 
something more than goes without saying. (ibid) 
Sperber and Wilson claim that the logical form of (17) would also have to be enriched, 
through the pragmatic narrowing of the meaning of 'some time', to give a more relevant 
propositional form like 
(18) It will take longer than expected to repair your watch. 
Note that this sub-task of propositional form identification, general enrichment, is a 
crucial aspect of how Sperber and Wilson's notion of what is said differs from Grices in 
Grice 1975. Of the utterance 
(19) He is in the grip of a vice. 
Grice remarks: 
One would know that [the speaker] had said, about some 
particular male person or animal x, that at the time of the 
utterance (whatever that was), either (1) x was unable to rid 
himself of a certain kind of bad character trait or (2) some part of 
x's person was caught in a certain kind of tool or instrument... But 
for a full identification of what the speaker had said, one would 
need to know (a) the identity of x, (b) the time of utterance, and 
(c) the meaning, on the particular occasion of utterance, of the 
phrase in the grip of a vice [a decision between (1) and (2)]. 
(1975: 44) 
Thus Grice's claim appears to be that what is said requires only the contributions of 
reference assignment ("the identity of x") and disambiguation ("a decision between 
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and (2)"). The identification of Sperber and Wilson's propositional form, on the other 
hand, involves the additional sub-task of general enrichment. The relevance theorists are 
generally of the opinion that the results of disambiguation and reference assignment are 
only enough for the construction of a minimally propositional form from a linguistically 
encoded logical form. As Carston observes: 
... most pragmatists working in the Gricean framework 
have adopted 
as a working principle the view that any pragmatically determined 
aspect of utterance interpretation, apart from disambiguation and 
reference assignment, is necessarily an implicature. The explanation 
for cutting things this way lies with the further assumption that the 
explicature must be truth-evaluable; so Grice and the Griceans are 
prepared to let in just whatever is necessary in addition to 
linguistically determined content to bring the representation up to a 
complete propositional form, i. e., something capable of bearing a 
truth value. (1988: 163) 
Thus the disagreement between Grice and the relevance theorists over the notion of what 
is said consists in the following, opposing claims: that (i) what is said is linguistic content 
plus whatever inferentially derived meaning that is necessary for minimal propositionality 
(Grice), and (ii) minimal propositionality is necessary but not sufficient for something to 
have been said -- hence the need for the third sub-task, general enrichment (the relevance 
theorists). 
As I mentioned above, Sperber and Wilson maintain (1986a/95: 189) that what is 
recovered from the utterance 
(17) It will take some time to repair your watch. 
after disambiguation and reference assignment -- the proposition 
(17a) The repairing of the hearer's watch is a process with a temporal duration. 
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-- requires enrichment to give something like 
(17b) The repairing of the hearer's watch will take longer than the hearer 
expected. 
According to Sperber and Wilson, (17a) illustrates that "the gap between semantic 
representations and propositional forms cannot be closed merely by disambiguation and 
reference assignment" (ibid: 188-9). Carston also maintains (1988: 164-5) that the truth- 
evaluable proposition recovered after disambiguation and reference assignment from the 
similar 
(20) It will take us some time to get there. 
is not "ME truth-evaluable propositional form" (ibid: 177). 
Sperber and Wilson's notion of the "right propositional form" and how it is identified 
should be considered in connection with their assumption that it is the apparent non-truth- 
evaluability of (most) linguistically encoded logical forms which distinguishes these logical 
forms from truth-theoretic semantic entities. The truth-evaluable, fully propositional form 
(17a) is also excluded from the truth-theoretic semantics, on the grounds that it is not the 
"right propositional form" of the utterance. But if (17a) is NEITHER the "right 
ProPositional form" of the utterance NOR, because it has already undergone 
disambiguation and reference assignment, the utterance's linguistically encoded logical 
form, then what is it? Carston, Sperber and Wilson do not provide an answer to this 
question. 
Sperber and Wilson do, however, claim that (17a) "goes without saying" and is 
therefore "a truism" (1986a/95: 189). Carston also argues (1988: 164, my italics) that it is 
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"too unspecified to be taken as the explicature of the utterance". In short, the relevance 
theorists stress the fact that (17a) is NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF 
RELEVANCE. So their argument appears to be that a fully propositional form may not 
constitute an utterance's truth-theoretic semantics, ' simply on the grounds that it is not 
relevant. In other words, the relevance theorists' decision about whether or not a 
proposition is a truth-theoretic semantic entity seems to turn largely on whether or not the 
proposition is (assumed to be) intended to be communicated. As Carston puts it, 
minimally propositional forms like (17a) 
... are not among the constructs of 
[a cognitive account of 
communication], as they are neither communicated assumptions [i. e. 
explicatures] nor the vehicle by means of which these assumptions 
are recovered [i. e. P]. (1998: 161) 
This probably explains the problematically close relation between propositional form 
identification and explicature recovery. That propositional form identification and 
explicature recovery are closely related may seem a trivial point -- from the very 
beginning, Sperber and Wilson make it clear that the identification of the propositional 
form of an utterance is absolutely necessary for the recovery of the utterance's 
explicature(s), and that the "right propositional form" is the most accessible propositional 
form which leads to an overall interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. 
However, the fact that the recovery of both propositional form and explicature is 
governed by the principle of relevance makes Sperber and Wilson's account of utterance 
interpretation unavoidably circular. The propositional form of an ordinary assertion is the 
5 It might even be the linguistic semantic representation of an utterance. An example of a fully 
propositional form which, according to Sperber and Wilson (1986a/95: 73), constitutes the 
linguistic semantics of an utterance is 
(10b) Nobody ever carried anything. 
See section 3.2.1. 
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propositional form which is consistent with the principle of relevance. It is consistent with 
the principle of relevance because it leads to an overall interpretation which is consistent 
with the principle of relevance. For an ordinary assertion, the overall interpretation which 
is consistent with the principle of relevance actually includes an explicature which IS the 
propositional form of the utterance. The problem is this. In order to identify what an 
ordinary assertion explicates the hearer must first identify its propositional form. But, 
according to Sperber and Wilson, the "right propositional form" of an ordinary assertion is 
the proposition that is consistent with the principle of relevance -- i. e. the proposition that 
leads to an overall interpretation which includes the propositional form itself as an 
explicature. In short, the "right propositional form" simply is the propositional form which 
is explicated. This means that, rather than identifying the "right propositional form" and 
then concluding that it is explicated, the hearer identifies the "right propositional form" on 
the basis of the assumption that it is what the speaker intended to explicate. 
That the relevance-constrained process of propositional form identification has to 
take into account the overall interpretation of the utterance -- that the identification of 
what is said is not prior to, but dependent on, assumptions about what is communicated -- 
creates even more complications in the case of non-literal utterances. This is because the 
"right propositional form" of a non-literal utterance is supposed to be relevant and yet not 
communicatedl explicated. As I pointed out in 3.2, the relevance framework has it that 
the propositional form P of a non-literal utterance is not itself explicated, but explicated as 
constituting what is said -- i. e. the explicature is not P but The speaker said that A If 
Sperber and Wilson's account of propositional form identification is anything to go by, the 
hearer would have to take all this into account before he is able to identify the "right 
propositional form". This means that, whereas the "right propositional form" of an 
ordinary assertion is (I argue) the propositional form which the hearer assumes the 
speaker intended to explicate, the "right propositional form" of a non-literal utterance 
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would be the propositional form which is not explicated, but which nevertheless 
constitutes what is said. 
Before further discussion and illustration of my point, here are a few more details 
about the role of the propositional form in Sperber and Wilson's account of non-literal 
utterances. According to Sperber and Wilson, an utterance is a representation with a 
Propositionalform, and 
... can represent some other representation which also 
has a 
propositional form -- a thought, for instance -- in virtue of a 
resemblance between the two propositional forms; in this case we 
will say that the first representation is an interpretation of the 
second one, or that it is used interpretively. (1986a/95: 229) 
Sperber and Wilson's principle claim is that every utterance is used as an interpretive 
expression of a thought of the speaker's, and that a hearer makes interpretive assumptions 
about the speaker's interpretive intention (ibid: 230-1). This is the basis of their account 
of non-literalness. An utterance is strictly literal if it has the same propositional form, with 
exactly the same set of logical properties, as that of the thought which it interpretively 
represents (ibid: 233). Hence an utterance is less than literal if its propositional form 
"shares some, but not all" (ibid) of its logical properties with the propositional form of the 
thought which it interpretively represents. That is, the utterance's propositional form 
RESEMBLES that of the thought: the utterance is not strictly literal because the 
propositional forms are not identical, but it can still represent the thought interpretively in 
virtue of the resemblance between its and the thought's respective propositional forms. 
A thought -- especially one which is very complex -- may be best represented by such 
an utterance rather than by a literal but correspondingly complex utterance. Sperber and 
Wilson argue that 
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From the standpoint of relevance theory, there is no reason to think 
that the optimally relevant interpretive expression of a thought is 
always the most literal one... The optimal interpretive expression of a 
thought should give the hearer information about that thought which 
is relevant enough to be worth processing, and should require as 
little processing effort as possible. (ibid: 233) 
For example, if the "false but economical" (ibid) utterance 
(21) 1 earn 1800 a month. 
may be used to make manifest the same assumptions as the "strictly literal and truthful" 
(ibid) 
(22) 1 earn 1792.32 a month. 
-- then it would be (2 1), not (22), which is more relevant, because it is more "economical" 
and therefore easier to process. Of course (21) has logical and contextual implications 
which the speaker did not intend to convey. But, given the principle of relevance, the 
hearer would be expected to recognise which these are. 
With reference to the examples provided by Sperber and Wilson (1986a/95: 225, 
233-4), the propositional form of an utterance like 
(23) John is a tiger. 
would be regarded as what is said, the relevant propositional form, on the assumption that 
it has logical and contextual implications which the speaker intended to communicate. The 
same propositional form would be taken to be tiot explicated, on the assumption that it 
has logical and contextual implications which the speaker does not accept as true, and 
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therefore could not have intended to communicate (1986: 234) -- i. e. on the assumption 
that the propositional form is false. 
The problem is this. According to Sperber and Wilson, 
... all the hearer has to do is start computing, in order of accessibility, 
those implications which might be relevant to him, and continue to 
add them to the overall interpretation of the utterance until it is 
relevant enough to be consistent with the principle of relevance. 
(ibid: 234) 
In other words, the logical and contextual implications which are communicated are those 
which involve the least effort to recover, and which are consistent with the principle of 
relevance. However, this is precisely how the "right propositional form" is supposed to be 
identified in the first place. 
Take the referring expression 'John'. Reference assignment is, of course, a sub-task of 
propositional form identification. MY point is that, on the one hand, the question of who 
or what 'John' refers to determines which propositional form is the "right propositional 
form" of (23); while, on the other hand, the sub-task of reference assignment has to take 
into consideration the fact that the "right propositional form" is the propositional form 
which gives rise to the relevant logical and contextual implications. The hearer can only 
take the propositional form of (23) to be explicated, and assume that (23) is an ordinary 
assertion, if he thinks that 'John' refers to some tiger. But if he thinks that John is in fact a 
tiger, then the utterance (23) would not be relevant for him, in virtue of having very few 
logical and contextual implications. So he cannot take that propositional form to have 
been explicated. Instead, he would have to assume that 'John' refers to a particular human 
individual, and conclude that the "false but economical" (ibid: 233) 
(24) John, a particular human, is a tiger. 
116 
is the "right" but unexplicated propositional form of a non-literal utterance. 
3.4 Conclusion 
What I have attempted to show in this chapter is that Sperber and Wilsows distinction 
between linguistic and truth-theoretic semantics has nothing to do with the nature of the 
linguistic in itself, but is entirely based on what "naturaP/ external languages are for. The 
fact is that relevance theory is not a linguistic theory but one of human communication 
and cognition, and that external languages and their linguistic semantics -- though 
supposedly distinct from the truth-theoretic semantics of some mentay internal language - 
- are also a "tool" (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/95: 173) for the communicatory and 
cognitive activities of the central systems. 
I have approached Sperber and Wilson's account of verbal communication in two 
different ways: (i) from the angle of logical form development, and Sperber and Wilsoffs 
notion of non-truth-evaluable linguistic semantic representations, and (ii) through the 
process of propositional form identification, and what Sperber and Wilson believe a 
propositional form should be. My argument is that Sperber and Wilson regard 
"linguistically encoded logical forms" as non-truth-conditional only because most of these 
logical forms have to undergo inferential enrichment before they become the sort of things 
which "humans are interested in communicating" (ibid: 174, my italics). Similarly, Sperber 
and Wilson's truth-theoretic propositional fornis of utterances must be more than 
minimally propositional -- they have to be consistent with the principle of relevance. In my 
view, it does not follow from the fact that (11) or (I 7a) -- 
(11) [THIRD PERSON (TEMALE)] carried [THIRD PERSON (NEUTER)] in the 
handof[ THIRD PERSON (FFMA LE) ]. 
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(17a) The repairing of the hearer's watch is a process with a temporal duration. 
are seldom assumed to be communicated or worth communicating, that their semantics 
are thereby not "real". 
In assuming that the linguistically encoded logical forms of utterances are non-truth- 
evaluable, and that propositional forms of utterances must be consistent with the principle 
of relevance, Sperber and Wilson in fact create problems for their own account of verbal 
communication. On the one hand, the need to construct propositional forms from 
linguistically encoded logical forms raises the question of how truth-evaluable logical 
forms can be "developed" from non-truth-evaluable ones -- not to mention the question of 
whether there really are such things as non-truth-evaluable logical forms. On the other 
hand, the stipulation that propositional forms must be consistent with the principle of 
relevance has the effect of collapsing the propositional form with the similarly relevance- 
governed explicature. 
I also argue that Sperber and Wilson's associating of propositional forms with the 
property of relevance creates problems for their account of non-literalness. In the first 
place, Sperber and Wilson's definition of a non-literal utterance as an utterance whose 
propositional form constitutes what is said but not what is explicated adds a new and 
problematic aspect to the relation between propositional form and explicature. In the case 
of ordinary assertions, the propositional form of an utterance is identified on the grounds 
that it is the proposition which the hearer assumes that the speaker intended to 
communicate. But it is more difficult to explain why the hearer identifies a particular 
proposition as the "right propositional form" of a non-literal utterance, since that 
proposition cannot be assumed to be communicated, and therefore cannot actually be 
described as relevant. In other words, the problem is this: how does the hearer conclude 
from the assumption that the proposition is not intended to be explicated, that it is in fact 
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the "right propositional fortn" of the non-literal utterance -- the propositional form which 
leads to an overall interpretation that is consistent with the principle of relevance? 
Actually it is no accident that the concept of the propositional form is such a 
problematic one, since it appears to be something whose existence the relevance theorists 
postulated for certain communicative and cognitive purposes. I have argued that any 
linguistically encoded logical form is in fact semantically complete in itself, and does not 
have to be developed into a propositionalform to be truth-evaluable. In that respect, at 
least, propositional forms seem superfluous. 
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4 
The "misuse" of language 
4 Introduction: phonetic vehicles and "linguistic" conventions 
In section 2.3 1 discussed Chornsky's (1992a, 1995a) comments on what is generally 
regarded as the misuse of language. For Chomsky, this is the misuse of I-language, which 
he distinguishes from the use or misuse of non-(I-)Iinguistic expressions like the 
constructions of naturalistic inquiry (e. g. 'elm' in the botanist's sense, or 'mass' in the 
physicist's sense) and of social practice (e. g. the community norrns of 'disinterested' and 
@uninterested' meaning disinterested and uninterested respectively). This chapter also 
addresses the question of whether what is (mis)used is linguistic, but in relation to the 
more general problems which the phenomenon of language misuse creates for the 
corresponding notions of language use and linguistic conventions. 
In the last two chapters I have been discussing the idea that linguistic expressions and 
their semantics are independent of the sort of truth-theoretic propositional meaning which 
humans entertain and communicate -- i. e. the sort of truth-theoretic propositional meaning 
which may be regarded as literal (or non-literal). For Chomsky, as well as for the 
relevance theorists, this truth-theoretic propositional meaning is not expressed by linguistic 
expressions in themselves, but by the USE of linguistic expressions. I have also argued 
that Chomsky and the relevance theorists fail to explain how exactly lingýistic expressions 
are "used" -- how they constrain, or are involved with, but remain absolutely distinct from, 
the truth-theoretic propositional meaning which they are used to express. 
The notion of THE correct use versus the misuse of a particular linguistic expression 
presupposes that the linguistic semantics of, say, the linguistic expression 'flaunt' has a 
truth-theoretic counterpart flaunt which constitutes the literal meaning that is expressed 
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when the linguistic expression is "correctly" used. In the case of the misuse of 'flaunt', by 
contrast, it is generally assumed that the linguistic expression 'flaunt, is used, but not to 
express the truth-theoretic literal meaning flaunt -- and not in accordance with the 
linguistic semantics which is supposed to determine what the literal meaning is. For 
example, someone might utter'flauntto expressj7out. 
But while the linguistic semantics of 'flaunt' may be seen as determining the truth- 
theoretic literal meaningflaunt, it is only the truth-theoreticflaunt which the language use 
or rnisuse has conscious access to. Significantly, linguistic meaning is referred to as literal 
meaning (and vice versa) at some point in every one of the three accounts of misuse which 
I cite in this chapter -- Davidson 1981 and 1986; Durnmett 1986; and even Carston 1998, 
a large part of which is devoted to the distinction between linguistic and truth-theoretic 
semantics. It is usually assumed that the language user knows that flaunt is the literal 
meaning of 'flaunt', not because he knows that flaunt corresponds to the "correct" 
linguistic semantics, but because he'knows some convention which states that the 
PHONETIC FORM of'flaunt'is the "correct" vehicle of the literal meaningflaunt. 
In Carston 1998 (discussed in 4.1), it appears to be the phonetic (or at least E- 
instantiable) form produced by the language user which constitutes necessary and 
sufficient evidence for a particular linguistic expression to have been used. Furthermore, 
Carston takes it for granted that there are definitive sets of linguistic conventions which 
specify that particular phonetic forms belong to (and are thereby indicative oo particular 
linguistic expressions and particular (truth-theoretic) literal meanings, regardless of what 
meaning the individual language user may have intended a certain phonetic vehicle to 
carry, or believed was carried by a certain phonetic vehicle. Thus, for Carston (as well as 
for Dummett), the speaker who UTTERS the phonetic form of 'flaunt' with the intention 
of expressing flout has misused the linguistic expression that is individuated by the 
phonetic form produced, in virtue of uttering/ using it to express a concept which, 
according to some linguistic convention, is not the meaning carried by that phonetic form. 
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I, on the other hand, argue that the use of a vehicle-meaning pair -- vehicle-meaning 
pairs being what linguistic expressions are generally considered to be (e. g. by Chomsky, 
the relevance theorists, Dummett) -- must involve both the production of the vehicle AND 
the intention to express the meaning which the vehicle is associated with. If an individual 
did not intend to express that meaning, then it seems to me that he has not USED that 
particular vehicle-meaning pair, even if he did produce the vehicle. 
Thus I am much more in sympathy with Davidson's 1986 account of malapropisms 
(set out in section 4.2), in which he assumes that an expression is individuated by its 
meaning rather than its vehicle. Like Dummett (discussed in 4.3), Davidson believes that 
the conventions which govern vehicle-meaning relations are SOCIAL conventions. But 
whereas Durnmett equates the linguistic with the social, Davidson argues that such social 
conventions are NOT (in themselves) LINGUISTIC, and that they may be deviated from, 
created or replaced in any context. On this view, the person who utters 'flaunt' with the 
intention of expressingflout has not so much deviated from a convention which states that 
'flaunt' meansflaunt, as adhered to a convention which states that 'flaunt' meansflout. It 
follows from this that he has not misused an expression 'flaunt' with the meaning flaunt. 
Instead, he has "correctly" used 'flaunt', which, according to the convention which he 
intended to follow, meansflout. 
In chapters 5 and 61 shall give a non-finguistic account of literal meaning and 
"language use/ misuse". More importantly, perhaps, I shall try to explain how Davidson's 
non-linguistic social conventions are related to the linguistic. This chapter, however, is 
mainly concerned with the difficulties of reconciling so-called "linguistic" conventions with 
the beliefs and intentions of language users who apparently "misuse" linguistic 
expressions. 
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4.1 Carston's ad-hoc concepts: a pragmatic account of misuse and slips 
Carston 1998 (: 17-8) contains a brief discussion of what she calls "the phenomenon of 
misuses and slips of the tongue". Usually the speaker intends the hearer to access what her 
utterance linguistically encodes, and also what is said (or the propositional form of the 
utterance). This is supposed to apply even to cases like metaphor, where the speaker may 
not intend to communicate the linguistically encoded concepts but nevertheless intends her 
hearer to access them "in the process of arriving at the intended interpretation" (ibid: 17). 
In the case of a misuse or slip, however, what seems to happen is that "some of the 
meaning encoded in the utterance falls outside any intention the speaker has in producing 
the utterance" (ibid). So, with regard to her example of a speaker uttering 
(1) Mary is one of the hoi polloi. 
to communicate that Mary is a member of the upper classes, Carston claims that there is a 
disjunction between what is (linguistically encoded and) said -- 
Arguably, the proposition expressed by this utterance, what is (strictly 
and literally) said, is that Mary is one of the common people... (ibid: 18) 
-- and anything which the speaker may intend the hearer to access. And this, Carston 
suggests, is because the encoding of the concept common people by the expression 'hoi 
polloi' is "not a part of her [the speakers] system of linguistic knowledge" (ibid, my 
italics); and, not being what she knows, cannot therefore be something she intends the 
hearer to access. 
From this account of (1) as an instance of a misuse or slip it is possible to infer certain 
points about how Carston conceives of what is linguistically encoded, and what is said. In 
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respect of what is linguistically encoded, Carston's account presupposes a "system of 
linguistic knowledge" that is quite independent of the speaker. This system of linguistic 
knowledge specifies that 'hoi polloi' linguistically encodes the concept common people, 
regardless of (i) the speakees intention that her hearer should recover, through linguistic 
decoding, the concept upper classes, (ii) her belief that her utterance of 'hoi polloi' 
encodes the concept upper classes, and, indeed, (iii) the entire system of linguistic 
knowledge which she, the individual speaker, possesses. Furthermore, if it is not just what 
is linguistically encoded which falls outside the speaker's intentions, but also what is said 
(i. e. the propositional form of the utterance), then it would appear that in recovering the 
latter the hearer must sometimes go against his beliefs about the speaker's intentions. So 
the speaker may believe that 'hoi polloi' encodes upper classes, and the hearer may know 
this, and believe that the speaker intended to communicate that Mary belongs to the upper 
classes. Nevertheless, Carston argues that the hearer would come to the conclusion that 
"what is (strictly and literally) said, is that Mary is one of the common people". That the 
hearees recovery of what is said should "fall outside the speaker's intentions", and even 
outside the hearees beliefs about the speaker's intentions, seems to contradict the 
relevance-theoretic account of propositional form identification (see section 3.3). As 
described in Sperber and Wilson 1986a/ 95, all the procedures of propositional form 
identification -- reference assignment, disambiguation, etc -- are based mainly on the 
assumption that the speaker is observing the principle of relevance, i. e. that the speaker 
has certain intentions, the central of which is to aim for optimal relevance. 
Carston concedes that examples like (1) seem "special and marginal", and 
... bring an unclarity into the concept of what is said, since up to now 
we have been assuming that what a speaker says by an utterance is not 
at odds with what she believes her words to mean... (ibid) 
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Later, however, she reconsiders such examples in the light of her proposals for revising 
the relevance account of pragmatic processing. To begin with, she suggests that the 
process of LOOSENING should be brought in line with ENRICHMENT (ibid: 316-35, 
Carston 1996). According to Sperber and Wilson 1986a/95 (see also section 3.3), 
enrichment is one of the ways of arriving at what is said (or the proposition expressed). 
Loosening, on the other hand, is seen as contributing only to implicatures. Briefly, the 
process of loosening goes like this. The hearer decodes the loosely-used lexical concept, 
thereby gaining access to the logical and encyclopaedic entries for that concept. He then 
sorts through the sets of assumptions which constitute these entries, rejecting the 
irrelevant assumptions (including the ones which contradict one another), and retaining as 
implicatures those which are relevant in the given context. 
Carston introduces the notion of AD HOC CONCEPT (1998: 310). An ad hoc 
concept is a relevant, communicated concept arising from the pragmatic enriching or 
loosening of a linguistically encoded lexical concept. For Sperber and Wilson (1986a/ 95), 
only enriched ad hoc concepts are incorporated into what is said, while loosened ad hoc 
concepts contribute only to what is implicated. Carston, however, suggests three ways of 
"symmetrifying" enrichment and loosening. The first symmetry position (1998: 314-6), 
which she rejects, has to do with bringing enrichment in line with loosening by assuming 
that the results of enrichment emerge as implicatures rather than contribute to the 
proposition expressed. The second symmetry position (ibid: 316-20) brings loosening into 
line with enrichment, with ad hoc concepts arising from loosening also incorporated into 
the proposition expressed. For example (ibid: 316), the propositional form for 
(2) This steak is raw. 
would be 
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(3) [This steak]y is raw*. 
where raw* represents a loosening of the lexical concept raw. 
Before I go into the third symmetry position, here are four possible objections to the 
second symmetry position which Carston considers and rejects (ibid: 316-20). On the 
assumption that 'bald', for instance, encodes totally hairless, objection [1] is that the 
lexical concept would almost always be loosened, and therefore would almost never be 
literally used. The same goes for 'hexagonal', which, according to Carston, describes "a 
property of a perfect abstract form not actually found in nature" (ibid: 317). Carston, 
however, points out that this is actually a useful feature of language. Given that the 
cognitive capacities of humans -- including 
... the ability to attribute complex mental states 
(such as higher order 
beliefs and intentions) to conspecifics, the ability to draw inferences 
from newly impinging stimuli by placing them in a context of existing 
assumptions, and the ability to recognise conceptual and other 
resemblances from a range of points of view... (ibid) 
-- can be relied upon to carry out the appropriate pragmatic processes, it is enough, and in 
fact more cognitively efficient, for many of the encoded concepts to be "quite minimal" 
(ibid). 
Under the second symmetry position, there is no question of whether the 
propositional form of an utterance is communicated, or embedded in an assumption 
schema to give a higher-level explicature. Since it would incorporate any ad hoc concept 
constructed in the course of interpreting the utterance, and since an ad hoc concept is 
always communicated, the propositional form itself must always be communicated too. In 
short, the propositional form must be a base-level explicature. Objection [2] is that the 
incorporation into the utterance's propositional form of ad hoc concepts previously 
assumed to contribute only to implicatures would remove the distinction between the 
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propositional form and that of the thought which the speaker intended his utterance to 
convey -- a distinction which is crucial to the relevance-theoretic account of non-literal 
utterances, and bridged by the relation of interpretive resemblance. This leads us to 
objection [3], which is that the speaker whose thought and utterance always have the same 
propositional form must be observing some Gricean maxim of literalness or truthfulness. ' 
As Carston herself remarks, it does follow from the second symmetry position that 
"the speaker always endorses the proposition her utterance expresses" (ibid: 318) -- Le. 
that the proposition expressed is always (explicitly) communicated- However, she claims 
that there remains a relation of interpretive resemblance between concepts in the thought 
of the speaker and communicated concepts (including, or possibly constituted by, the 
proposition expressed). Note that she distinguishes quite clearly between 
(A) what the speaker intends to communicate (the speaker's thought); 
(B) what the speaker actually manages to communicate (what explicatures and 
implicatures the hearer recovers); and 
(C) the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance. 
The second symmetry position may align (C) with (B), but does not change the relation 
between (B) and (A). It would appear that neither (B) nor (C) ever replicates (A), whether 
one takes the standard or "symmetrical" line on utterance interpretation. As I mentioned in 
the previous chapter, communication within the relevance framework does not result in 
the duplication of thoughts. Many aspects of thought are not linguistically encoded -- 
hence Carston's support for the "strong essentialist view" of underdeterminacy: 
1 Or rather, if the hearer always interprets an utterance as having the same propositional form as 
the speaker's thought, then it must be on the basis of an assumption that the speaker is observing 
some maxim of literalness or truthfulness. 
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... underdetermýinacy is an essential property of the language/thought 
relation and no sentence ever fully encodes the thought it is used to 
express. (ibid: 27) 
heoLr, -, r It is up to the obviously non-telepathic to pragmatically infer the unencoded 
elements of what the speaker intended to communicate. Of these unencoded elements, ad 
hoc concepts seem the most reliant on the hearer's inferential efforts, and therefore the 
most indeterminate. What contextual information is chosen to enrich a lexical concept, 
which subset of a lexical concept's extension is the narrowed version, what assumptions 
are retained from a lexical concept's encyclopaedic entry as the loosened concept -- all this 
is constrained by the universal search for relevance, but also depends on the individual 
hearer, his encyclopaedic entry for the lexical concept, and the context of utterance and 
interpretation. Thus, in Carston's words, the speaker's thought is "seldom, if ever, 
perfectly replicated" (ibid: 18) in the hearer's mind. 
Returning to objection [2], Carston's reply is this: loosened concepts incorporated 
into (C) lead to (C) being explicitly communicated, but -- being themselves indeterminate - 
- do not bring (C) any closer to (A). In fact one might say that the indeterminacy of the 
loosened concepts, previously the property of implicatures, is passed on to the (C) and to 
the base-level explicature which (C) becomes. 
With regard to objection [3], Carston points out that the Gricean maxim of 
truthfulness concerns the relation between what is linguistically encoded and what is 
communicated: on the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxim, the hearer 
equates what the speaker's utterance linguistically encodes with what the speaker intended 
to communicate, thereby giving the utterance a literal interpretation. This obviously does 
not apply to the second symmetry position, which has to do with the relation between 
what is said, or the proposition expressed, and what is communicated. In any case, the 
addition of loosened concepts to the proposition expressed means that the latter "[departs] 
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even more radically than before [when only the enriched concepts were included] from the 
literal linguistic content in the logical form of the utterance" (ibid: 18). 
Objection [4] (ibid: 319) concerns the notion of "the proposition literally and strictly 
expressed", "what is said", or "the truth-conditional content of the utterance". If the 
proposition expressed by the utterance of 
(4) Bill is a bulldozer. 
is 
(5) BRIX is a bulldozer*. 
(where bulldozer* is the ad hoc, loosened version of the lexical concept bulldozer), then 
the utterance of (4) would be true (if and only if Bill has the properties which correspond 
to the loosened concept bulldozer*). Objection [4] is that (4) being true goes against our 
intuitions that the proposition expressed by the utterance is the obviously false Bill is a 
bulldozer, and that 
(6) Bill is not a bulldozer. 
is true. Carston argues that such intuitions are not altogether reliable. She observes that it 
is possible to "agree or disagree with someone who utters [(4)]... or even say 'that's true' 
or'that's not true"' (ibid). She also points out that some hearers would say that (4) is true, 
and some, that (4) is false, even if all of them agree that Bill is an aggressive and 
domineering person. Carston maintains that these different responses correspond to 
intuitions coming from distinct sources: 
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... the 'true'-sayers would be considering the proposition they take the 
speaker to be expressing and endorsing (i. e. an explicature), while the 
'false'-sayers would be tapping their knowledge of linguistic meaning, 
the literal encoded conceptual content of the utterance. (ibid: 33 1) 
-- i. e. what is true for the 'true'-sayers is the propositional form which contains the 
loosened concept and is explicitly communicated, while what is false for the 'false'-sayers 
is a propositional form with the linguistically encoded lexical concept bulldozer. Similarly, 
(6) could be regarded as true for two different reasons. The hearer may assume that it is 
the lexical concept bulldozer which is being negated, and agree that it is true that Bill is 
not an inanimate object. On the other hand he may see (6) as a denial that the loosened 
concept bulldozer* applies to Bill: 
(7) Bill is not really a bulldozer; in fact he's quite insecure. (ibid: 319) 
I come now to Carston's third symmetry position (ibid: 328-30), which states that the 
results of enrichment and/ or loosening must be built into the propositional forms of only 
SOME utterances, in order for the hearer to recover (what he assumes to be) the intended 
interpretation. Thus the third symmetry position has it that there are other utterances 
which do not require the incorporation of enriched and/ or loosened ad hoc concepts into 
their propositional forms. According to Carston, (4) belongs to this second category of 
utterances. Carston cites Papafragou 1995, in which the symmetrical treatment of 
utterance interpretation is applied to examples of referential metaphor like 
(8) The wilting violet has finally left. 
but not to cases of metaphorical predication like 
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(9) Maria is a nightingale. 
and, of course, (4). With regard to (8), Carston agrees with Papafragou that the 
construction of an ad hoc concept from the encoded willing violet concept is necessary for 
reference assignment to proceed. It would be from the extension of the loosened concept 
("of a certain sort of shy, retiring person, let us suppose" (Carston 1998: 327) ) that the 
hearer picks out the individuating concept of the person referred to. But Carston and 
Papafragou claim that the classic relevance theory account of non-literalness (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986a/ 95; see also my section 3.3) not only works for (9), but is more cost- 
effective: instead of first having to build an ad hoc concept into the propositional form, the 
hearer can pick out properties intended to be ascribed to Maria directly from the 
encyclopaedic entry of the lexical concept nightingale. 
Carston argues that the third symmetry position -- that ad hoc concepts should be 
incorporated into propositional forms only when necessary -- is consistent with the 
principle of relevance, according to which the maximum number of contextual effects must 
be balanced with the minimum amount of processing effort. She also points out that in 
certain cases it may actually be impossible to build ad hoc concepts into the proposition 
expressed: in sustained metaphors, for example -- 
(10) Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon 
the stage, and then is heard no more... (Shakespeare, Macbeth V. v. 24-6) 
-- and the metaphorical use of entire sentences -- 
(I 1)(a) The cracks are beginning to show. 
(b) The lion is roaring again. (These examples and (10) from ibid: 328) 
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But although Carston states (ibid: 328,329) that the classic relevance theory account 
of non-literalness is satisfactory for such examples, it is quite clear that the "third 
symmetry position" treatment she suggests for, say, 
(4) Bill is a bulldozer. 
deviates from Sperber and Wilson 1986a/95 in more ways than one. Where ad hoc 
concepts are not built into the proposition expressed, as in the case of (4), Carston! s 
account has instead a propositional schema like 
(12) Billx is [I 
with reference assigned and the lexical concept in the predicate "functioning as a 
constraint on the sorts of concepts that may occupy the open slot" (Carston 1998: 333). It 
follows from this that "there simply is no complete proposition expressed by the speaker 
or constructed by the hearer" (ibid: 333) -- in fact, that "a fully propositional form at the 
explicit level need never be entertained" (ibid: 329, my italics). Thus the third symmetry 
position reverts to the classic relevance account of the loosening process, but adheres to 
the "symmetrical" conflation of propositional form and explicature2 -- even where the 
propositional form to be explicated is notfullyproposilional. 3 
2 It has to be mentioned that this notion -- of the proposition expressed always being explicated - 
comes only with the second and third symmetry positions, and is completely inconsistent with the 
first. 
3 Note that Carston's "third symmetry position" account of enrichment is even more radical. The 
idea that no (fully) propositional form is explicitly communicated is not that remote from the 
classic account of loose use in metaphor, according to which the (fully) propositional form is not 
itself communicated but has to be embedded in a higher-level explicature. But it certainly is a 
departure from the standard notion of enrichment: while Sperber and Wilson view enrichment as a 
way of conceptually adding to the encoded logical form, Carston suggests that it may result in a 
less propositional, in fact non-propositional, "propositional schema" like (12) in the main text. 
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Here I list what seem to me to be the main innovations of Carston's third symmetry 
position: 
(A) The results of both loosening and enrichment may or may not be built into the 
proposition expressed (depending on whether ad hoc concepts are necessary for 
arriving at the intended interpretation of the utterance). 
(B) If they are, then obviously the proposition expressed would contain ad hoc 
concepts arising from loosening or enrichment. 
(C) If they are not, the proposition expressed -- or rather, the "proposition" 
expressed -- would turn out to be a non-propositional "propositional schema". 
(D) Whichever the hearer recovers (fully propositional forms with ad hoc 
concepts, or non-propositional "propositional schemas"), it is assumed to be 
explicitly communicated. 4 In other words, the third symmetry position dispenses 
with the classic relevance theory notion of proposition expressed or "what is said", 
with the result that "the only level in the whole process of utterance interpretation 
that is not communicated is the logical form" (ibid: 319). 
Carston's third symmetry position may be summed up thus: to either of the levels of 
utterance interpretation which are communicated (i. e. to either explicature or implicatures) 
may be contributed ad hoc concepts resulting from either enrichment or loosening -- 
depending, of course, on which procedure is most consistent with the principle of 
relevance in a given context. Within the third symmetry framework, it is equally possible 
for the main import of an utterance to be implicitly communicated as it is for it to be 
4 Actually there appears to be no reason for positing "propositional schemas" in explicatures, 
except for the possibility that - if it contained the lexical concept itseýf- the proposition 
expressed could NOT be what the speaker intended to communicate. That, of course, is what 
happens in the standard account of non-literalness: for instance, the propositional form of (4) is not 
explicated because Bill is a human being, and not compatible with what 'bulldozer' linguistically 
encodes. 
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explicitly communicated. For (8) it would be carried by the explicature, a proposition 
containing ad hoc concepts. For (9) and (4) it would lie in the implicatures, for which the 
explicature -- a non-propositional "propositional schema" -- would function merely as a 
"vehicle". 
It should be clear by now that one of the most important implications of the third 
symmetry position has to do with the distinction between explicatures and implicatures, 
the two types of communicated assumptions. Carston argues that it is a mainly 
derivational distinction -- explicatures are derived by developing the linguistically encoded 
logical form, and implicatures by the inferring of whole new assumptions (ibid: 332,335) - 
- and has little to do with notions of "what is strictly and literally said". This derivational 
difference is further reduced within the third symmetry framework, according to which 
both logical form development and purely pragmatic inference involve the construction of 
ad hoc concepts through loosening or enrichment. Thus Carston claims that the distinction 
between explicatures and implicatures is NOT one 
... which is of great importance for a hearer, at least if it is viewed as a 
representational distinction which is supposed to have some impact on 
the way he views the set of communicated assumptions. (ibid: 332) 
How, then, does the third symmetry position account for the phenomenon of misuses 
and slips? Carston's only comment regarding this issue is that slips of the tongue like 
(13) She always flaunts the rules. 
... will be correctly interpreted, that is, interpreted in line with the 
speaker's informative intention, although she hasn't produced the best 
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possible linguistic evidence to ensure fulfilment of that intention. (ibid: 
334) 
In the rest of this section I shall attempt to expand on this single statement. 
It seems to me that (D) -- Carston's assertion that there is no level of proposition 
expressed distinct from that of explicature, and that "a fully propositional form at the 
explicit level need never be entertained" (ibid: 329) -- is central to the apparent resolution 
of cases of misuse and slips within the third symmetry framework. One of the features of 
misuse/ slips which makes them seem "marginal" is that what is said in those cases appears 
to fall outside the speaker's intentions. For the third symmetry position, there is no 
question of the proposition expressed falling outside the speaker's intentions, since the 
proposition expressed is always the one which the speaker intends to communicate. 
The question, though, is: what does the speaker intend to communicate, and how is it 
recovered by the hearer? Firstly, it is clear that in the case of 
(13) She always flaunts the rules. 
what is intended to be communicated, and "correctly interpreted", is something like 
(13) She always flouts the rules. 
But does the hearer arrive at (13') by incorporating ad hoc concepts into the proposition 
"pressed, or through a propositional schema? In other words, is the main import of an 
utterances like (13) explicitly or implicitly communicated? This question may seem 
unnecessary in the light of the third symmetry position, according to which strength of 
conununication is more fundamental than the means. However, one could argue that the 
hearer is not likely to recover (13') in the form of implicatures arising from 
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(14) She always [] the rules. 
-- the reason being that it seems impossible for what is communicated to be "read off the 
lexical concept" (as Carston puts it, ibid: 328) retained in (14) as a "constraint" on what 
the open slot may contain. While the hearer of 
(9) Maria is a nightingale. 
is able to pick out, say, a wonderful singer from the encyclopaedic entry of the lexical 
concept nightingale, there appears to be no way the concept of flaunt can lead one to 
flout, or hoipolloi to the upper classes. 
At this point it may be useful to compare misuses and slips with all the other examples 
which have been discussed so far, e. g. 
(8) The wilting violet has finally left. 
(9) Maria is a nightingale. 
For the latter -- even for the most non-literal of them -- the recovery of what is 
cornmunicated involves the operation of processes (enrichment, loosening) upon lexical 
CONCEPTS. For an utterance like (13), on the other hand, one might say that no amount 
of conceptual enriching or loosening could induce the lexical conceptflaunt, with its 
logical and encyclopaedic entries, to point the hearer in the direction of the concept which 
the speaker intended to communicate. This may be what Carston means when she says 
that the speaker who has a slip of the tongue "hasn't produced the best possible linguistic 
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5 evidence" (ibid: 334) for her communicative intentions. For instead of leading the hearer 
along the relatively well-defined and well-established relations between CONCEPTS, as it 
usually does, the linguistic evidence in cases like (13) provides access to the speakees 
intentions through the rather more hit-and-mýiss notion of PHONETIC -- i. e. physical -- 
RESEMBLANCES. In short, the lexical concept cannot and does not constitute the 
linguistic evidence for the inferring of what is communicated -- it is the phonetic 
properties which have that role. 
This leaves us with the possibility that (13) is explicitly communicated, and also that 
the procedure of arriving at the explicature via the construction of ad hoc concepts cannot 
involve the loosening or enrichment of lexical concepts. Instead, the hearer may have to 
pick a phonetic form similar to the one in the linguistic expression uttered -- [flaut], say, 
for its resemblance to [flo: nt], and its encoded concept's compatibility with the direct 
object the rules -- and then incorporate the new lexical concept as an ad hoc concept in 
the proposition expressed. Furthermore, it is not even clear if the explicature should be 
represented as 
(15) She always flaunts* the rules. 
for the reason that the relevant ad hoc concept was not, could not have been, directly 
derived from the lexical conceptflaunt. Another argument against the 'flaunt*' in (15) is 
that the ad hoc concept constructed by the hearer of (13) seems far more determinate, 
more definite, than those in the metaphor examples, like wilting violet in (8) -- the ad hoc 
concept for (13) appears, quite unequivocally, to be the concept encoded by 'flout', i. e. 
flout. So, if the lexical conceptflaunt could be said to undergo any process, it would be 
5 As I mentioned in section 3.1.1, the sole purpose of language within the relevance fr=ework is 
to provide evidence from which hearers infer the intentions of speakers (Sperber and Wilson 
1986a/ 95: 27,163). 
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the process of loosening taken to the limit -- the dropping of, not some, but all of the 
elements of the linguistically encoded content. 
The same could be said of the uttering of 
(1) Mary is one of the hoi polloi. 
to communicate 
(1) Mary is one of the upper classes. 
The fact is that the concept *pper-cl&ses is not something which the hearer was supposed 
to retrieve in the first place. As Carston points out, the encoding of common people by 
'hoi polloi' is "not apart of [the speakers] system of linguistic kiowledge" (ibid: 18, my 
italics); and, not being what he knows, cannot therefore be something he intends the 
hearer to decode. Moreover, the phonetic properties of 'hoi polloi' may also play a part in 
the interpretation process -- Carston suggests that there could be a "sound association" 
with 'hoity toity' (ibid: 17) 
Thus I argue that Carston's third symmetry position does not solve the problem 
presented by the phenomenon of misuse and slips -- the problem of what is said falling 
outside the speaker's intentions -- simply because it does not appear to offer a solution for 
the more fundamental problem of what is linguistically encoded falling outside the 
speaker's intentions, and in many cases outside the speaker's beliefs and his "system of 
linguistic knowledge". As Carston herself puts it, 
... up to now we have been assuming that what a speaker says by an 
utterance is not at odds with what she believes her words to mean... 
(ibid: 18, my italics) 
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Obviously there are cases of misuse where the speaker does know what the utterance 
encodes, i. e. misuses which are slips. The person who utters (13), for example, may know 
that 'flaunt' encodesj7aunt and notflout, but utters 'flaunt' due to what Carston calls a 
... temporary [malfunction] of the systern, brought on by performance factors such as tiredness or emotional strain. (ibid) 
The important point, however, is that all the examples involve the encoding of lexical 
concepts which the speaker did not intend the hearer to access/ decode, did not intend to 
use, and in fact did not even have in mind -- either because the encoding of the concept by 
the expression uttered is "not a part of the speaker's system of linguistic knowledge", or 
because the speaker knows that the expression encodes the concept but has no intention, 
and merely commits the "articulatory error" (as Carston calls it, (ibid)), of uttering the 
expression. Henceforth I shall refer to the first sort of speaker as speaker M (for "misuse 
pure and simple"), and the second as speaker S (for "slip"). 
This brings me to the main argument of this section: if the speaker did not intend the 
concept encoded by some linguistic expression to be accessed -- by anybody, including the 
speaker himself -- then surely he cannot be said to have USED that concept, the encoding 
of that concept, and hence the particular linguistic expression constituted by the encoding 
of that concept. So I argue that speakers M and S, in failing to entertain the semantic 
properties of the linguistic expressions which they are supposed to have used, do not 
actually use those linguistic expressions at all. And if they do not use the linguistic 
expressions, then they do not MISUSE them either. 
Carston's account of misuse/ slips, on the other hand, presupposes that to UTTER a 
linguistic expression IS to use it. In ordinary cases of language use (including metaphor, 
irony, etc), as well as in cases of misuse involving speakers M, 
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(A)(i) what the speaker uses, and 
(A)(ii) what the speaker utters 
are generally regarded as the same. For such cases, Carston assumes that (A)(i), together 
with 
(B) what the interpreter decodes, and 
(C) what the speaker intends to use, 
refer to the same linguistic expression. For slips, and for speakers S, Carston would 
presumably take (A)(i) and (B) to refer to the same linguistic expression (e. g. 'flaunt'), 
while the "slipping" speaker would have originally intended to use another linguistic 
expression (e. g. Tout'). 
Carston's equating of (A)(i) with (B) (and, in the case of speakers/ hearers M, with 
(C) as well) hinges upon her assumption that (A)(i) IS (A)(ii). Quite simply, if what the 
speaker uses is what he utters, and what he utters is the physical entity which the 
interpreter perceives and decodes, then (A)(i) must be (B). More importantly, misuse 
cases are almost always discussed in terms of how they are "correctly" interpreted, with 
the hearer tacitly set up as the ideal language user with some definitive set of linguistic 
rules on his side. And it is these linguistic rules, of course, which are the crucial factor in 
the identifying of the linguistic expression used, and even intended to be used, by the 
speaker. Note that, with the shift of the proposition expressed to the level of explicature 
under the third symmetry position, literalness for Carston is no longer a property of what 
is said (as it was for the classic relevance account of utterance interpretation), but is 
located in "the literal encoded conceptual content of the utterance" (ibid: 33 1, my italics). 
That there is such an entity as THE literal linguistically encoded content, as determined by 
the rules of the language, is obviously presupposed by the notion of misuse/ slips. Without 
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the notion of standard literal meanings which are independent of the individual speaker/ 
hearer, no expression could ever be said to be misused. Clearly, for Carston, the question 
of what linguistic expression is used and/ or misused is not decided by the speaker, even 
though it is the speaker who uses it, but by the linguistic rules which connect the physical 
entity produced by the speaker to its literal linguistically encoded meaning. 
Of course the speaker who utters, say, (13) might happen to agree with that set of 
linguistic rules, and with the hearer, about what linguistic expression he has used. Speaker 
S, who believes that 'flaunt' encodes flaunt and whose utterance of (13) was an 
"articulatory error", possibly believes that he has unintentionally used -- and, in doing so, 
misused (or rather, mistakenly used) --'flaunt' when he actually intended to use 'flout'. As 
for speaker M, who believes that 'flaunt' encodes flout: it may be that Carston! s claim 
about the misuse cases, that they involve what is linguistically encoded falling outside the 
speaker's intentions, implies that what remains of the linguistic expression within the 
bounds of the speaker's intentions -- most conspicuously, the phonetic properties -- is 
sufficient for the linguistic expression (i. e. 'flaunt' encoding flaunt) to be described as 
being used by the speaker. In contrast, it is not just what is linguistically encoded but every 
other element of the linguistic expression which falls outside speaker S's intentions -- he 
did not intend to utter that linguistic expression, and he is aware that he has uttered what 
he did not intend to utter. 
Thus both speakers S and M are regarded by Carston as using the encoding offlaunt 
by'flaunt'-- M, solely in virtue of intending to produce, and producing, the phonetic form 
[flo: nt]; S, solely in virtue of unintentionally producing the phonetic form [flo: ntl (which 
he happens to believe encodes flaunt). The concept flaunt, on the other hand, plays 
absolutely no part in either case, even though Carston claims that it is encoded by'flaunt'. 
Its role in Carston's account of the interpretation process is almost as insignificant as its 
role in her account of language (mis)use by speakers S and M. The hearer S or M does 
decode the utterance and access the lexical concept, but replaces it with the new and 
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unrelated ad-hoc concept flout once he decides that flaunt is far from relevant in the 
circumstances. So all in all the lexical concept supposedly encoded by 'flaunt', flaunt, has 
just one role in the entire communication process, and a rather negative one at that: it has 
to be rejected, and completely dropped (as opposed to being loosened, and partially 
dropped) in order for the hearer to derive relevant contextual effects. 
All of the above follows from Carston's view of E-physical utterance as fundamental 
to language use, according to which the SEMANTIC properties of a linguistic expression 
could be seen as somehow secondary to the PHONETIC properties. (Or, in Saussurean 
terms, the signified could be seen as secondary to the signifier. ) This concept of language 
use is shared by Sperber and Wilson, by Chomsky -- and, in theory, by anyone else who 
subscribes to the idea of linguistic expressions as vehicle-meaning pairs. As the 
"VEHICLE" for MEANING, the E-physical phonetic properties are generally seen as the 
most salient elements of a linguistic expression when it is E-physically uttered -- so much 
so that the linguistic expression is represented as being used even when what it supposedly 
encodes is disregarded by the speaker and discarded by the hearer. In fact it is when this 
happens that the fundamental issue at stake in all this becomes particularly clear. The use 
of a linguistic expression, as conceived by those who regard linguistic expressions as 
vehicle-meaning pairs, could be des cribed as the production of the E-physical vehicle to 
express its meaning, or the expressing of the meaning through its vehicle. The misuse of a 
linguistic expression, on the other hand, is always seen as a matter of producing the 
phonetic vehicle to express the "wrong", unencoded meaning (e. g. misusing 'flaunt' by 
uttering [flo: nt] to expressflout), and never of expressing the semantic meaning through 
the "wrong", unencoding vehicle (e. g. misusing 'flout' by expressing flout with the 
phonetic vehicle [flo: nt]). This implies that the identity of the linguistic expression 
apparently uttered is determined by, and only by, the phonetic form produced. 
Thus Carston claims that the speaker who attempts to communicate that Mary 
belongs to the upper classes by uttering 
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(1) Mary is one of the hoi polloi. 
has used the linguistic expression 'hoi polloi', but misused it to express the "wrong" 
meaning (i. e. a meaning which the phonetic form of 'hoi polloi' does not encode). In other 
words, Carston assumes that 'hoi polloi', encoding common people, is the linguistic 
expression which the speaker has uttered, and which the hearer perceives and maps 
"correctly" to a conceptual address for [common folk]... (ibid: 17) 
before (presumably) going on to construct the ad hoc concept the upper classes. But 
Carston also mentions the possibility of a hearer who is 
... also mistaken, and in the same way as the speaker, in his 
understanding of the expression 'hoi polloi'... (ibid) 
Here, Carston appears to be saying that the linguistic expression is ndsused by the second 
hearer as well the speaker -- both of them are "mistaken" about 'hoi polloi, the speaker 
misusing it to mean, and the hearer misinterpreting it as meaning, the upper classes. The 
implication, of course, is that 'hoi polloi' is specified as encoding commo? l people by a 
definitive set of linguistic rules which both speaker and second hearer deviate from in their 
(mis)use of the expression. But there is no denying the fact that what is an ad-hoc concept 
for the first hearer is recovered by the second hearer via linguistic decoding; and that, as 
far as cognitive effects are concerned, the speaker uses a different linguistic encoding for 
each hearer: an encoding of commoti people for the first hearer, an encoding of upper 
classes for the second. 
Before I continue, it is necessary to distinguish hearer M from hearer S. The second 
hearer referred to in the previous paragraph is, of course, hearer M -- like speaker M, his 
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system of linguistic knowledge does not include the encoding of common people by 'hoi 
polloi'. There is also hearer S, who does believe, for example, that 'flout' encodesj7out, but 
who recovers flaunt from an utterance of 'flout' as a result of a "perceptual error". The 
case of speaker and hearer S corresponds to Chomsky's account of "individual misuse" 
(see section 2.3), which he claims is the only sense in which language (i. e. I-language) is 
misused. Speaker S speaks in a way "that is not in accord with his I-language" (Chomsky 
1992a: 121), while hearer S "[offers] judgements inconsistent with his I-language" (ibid). 
But if speaker or hearer M is mistaken it is certainly not in virtue of deviating from "IRS" 
internal language or linguistic code (to use Chomsky's possessive pronoun) -- it would be 
because his entire system of linguistic knowledge has deviated from some other (perhaps 
definitive) code which he does not possess, and whose specifications about what particular 
utterances encode have absolutely no effect on how he uses language. Now, even though 
it is not a part of his linguistic code, Carston might assume (wrongly, in my opinion) that 
speaker M misuses the encoding of common people by'hoi polloi'by voluntarily producing 
a phonetic form which a certain linguistic rule matches with common people -- i. e. by 
uttering the linguistic expression 'hoi polloi' -- to express the "wrong", unencoded upper 
classes. But hearer M, on the other hand, does nothing other than automatically decode 
the utterance to recover the upper classes. So for hearer M, at least, the speaker has used 
the encoding of the upper classes by'hoi polloi', and used it correctly. 
Or rather, "correctly". with scare quotes around the word. "Correctly" is how 
Carston presents it -- not in respect of hearer M, it has to be stressed, but the hearer who 
decodes 'hoi polloi' "correctly" to recover common people (see above, and ibid: 17). This 
implies that the notions of use and misuse are relative -- and, in this case, that whether the 
speaker "misuses" 'hoi polloi' or perhaps uses it "correctly" depends on what concept(s) 
the hearer and the speaker map the utterance to. It follows from this, in my view, that to 
claim that a speaker misuses a linguistic expression is to beg the question, for we must 
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first establish what linguistic expression is actually being used before we can say that it is 
being rnisused. Carston all but concedes this in a footnote: 
Of course, the matter of what gets called an error or a misuse is 
sometimes more a matter of power and authority than anything to do 
with language itself.. (ibid: 82, fn 2) 
She also mentions "disparate encodings" (ibid) -- i. e. the fact that different people may 
have different 'systems of linguistic knowledge', different beliefs about what words mean. 
This suggests that the code itself is ad-hoc in nature; and that the issue of what is used or 
misused has nothing to do with what is uttered or what is determined by some supposedly 
fixed and autonomous set of linguistic rules, but instead involves the disparate codes of 
different language users. For instance, nothing would be misused when speaker M utters 
(1) to hearer M: as far as both their linguistic codes are concerned, speaker M has 
provided the best linguistic evidence for his intentions. But if speaker S utters (1) to hearer 
S, each would consider the other as having misused 'hoi polloi'. And in WS pairings only 
speakers or hearers S would think that the linguistic expression has been misused. 
To conclude this section, I have two points to make. Firstly, I am not arguing that a 
cognitive theory like Carston's or Sperber and Wilson's is unable to account for 
phenomena like misuse, slips and disparate encodings -- only that first principles about 
language and language use need to be clarified, and set out in far greater detail. Secondly, 
note once again that all the cases of misuse listed above involve the production of a 
phonetic form to express a concept which it is not supposed to encode, and that it is the 
phonetic form and not the concept which is assumed to determine what linguistic 
expression is misused. The reverse appears to be true for Davidson. Whereas flout for 
Carston is the "wrong" concept, not encoded by what is uttered by speaker M or S, 
Davidson would consider it to be the literal meaning of what the speaker uttered. 
Davidson's 1986 discussion of malaprops is the subject of the next section. 
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4.2 Davidson's prior and passing theories 
Carston's pragmatic account of misuse and slips is underpinned by the notion of public, 
definitive sets of linguistic rules (i. e. linguistic codes) which determine the literal meanings 
of the phonetic vehicles produced/ uttered by speakers, regardless of the individual 
speakees intentions. Davidson, on the other hand, claims that the phenomenon under 
investigation involves the taking over, not only of literal meaning by the speakees intended 
meaning, but also of one system of linguistic rules by another. In his 1986 paper "A nice 
derangement of epitaphs" (henceforth "Derangement"), an analysis of malaprops -- which 
he places in the same category as "incomplete or grammatically garbled" utterances, slips 
of the tongue, words that we have never heard before and new idiolects (1986: 437) -- 
leads Davidson to the conclusion that "there is no such thing as language" (ibid: 446). This 
is not as melodramatic as it sounds, especially with the qualification that follows: "... not if 
a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed" (ibid). 
Clearly the aim of "Derangement" is not to show that language (whatever it is) does not 
exist, but to demonstrate that phenomena like malaprops undermine the theories of "many 
philosophers and linguists" about language and linguistic meaning. 
It has to be stressed that Davidson begins by affirming that 
... nothing should be allowed to obliterate or even 
blur the distinction 
between speaker's meaning and literal meaning. (ibid: 434) 
He also has a way of defining literal meaning, which he calls "first meaning", in terms of 
what speakers or interpreters do. First meaning could be said to come first in the order of 
interpretation, except that 
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... it often happens that we can descry the literal meaning of a word or 
phrase by first appreciating what the speaker is getting at. (ibid: 435) 
Alternatively, the first meaning of a linguistic expression which a speaker utters may be 
located through the speaker's intentions in uttering the linguistic expression, and how 
these intentions are 
... usually unambiguously ordered 
by the relation of means to ends 
(where this relation may or may not be causal)... (ibid) 
For instance, Peter utters the LE 'Eat your eggplant' (example from Davidson 1981: 27 16) 
with the intention of uttering an expression that means eat your eggplant, with the 
intention of telling Mary to eat her eggplant, with the intention of getting her to eat her 
eggplant. Peter also has "the Gricean intentions to achieve certain of these ends through 
[Mary's] recognition of some of the intentions involved" (1986: 435). The first meaning of 
Eat your eggplant' is specified by the first intention which requires this self-referring 
Gricean feature. 
Note that Davidson's "first meaning" is NOT meaning endowed by the speaker's 
intentions, but merely, though necessarily, intended by the speaker to be grasped -- and 
grasped first -- by the hearer. To be more precise, it is meaning which the speaker 
necessarily wishes the hearer to grasp or register (and I deliberately use these vague verbs, 
rather than "interpret") in virtue of having understood the meaning of the expression 
uttered, but which does not necessarily constitute the ultimate and complete interpretation 
which he intends his utterance to receive. Note also that first meaning is defined here in 
terms of nothing more than the SPEAKER'S intentions -- intentions which the ]HEARER 
may not comply with. That is, what the speaker intends the hearer to grasp first need not 
6 The page numbers for Davidson 1981 are take from the 1984 reprint. 
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necessarily be the first in the order of the hearer's interpretation (hence Davidson's 
rejection of the "first in the order of interpretation" definition). 
Davidson goes on to narrow down this notion of first meaning -- which, like Grice's 
non-natural meaning, "applies to any sign or signal with an intended interpretation" (ibid: 
436) -- to one of linguistic meaning, by applying to it three "plausible" principles 
concerning first meaning in language (ibid: 436-7). 
The first principle requires that first meaning be (1) SYSTEMATIC; or rather, that 
there should be systematic relations between the meanings -- the first meanings -- of 
utterances. These systematic relations would give rise to semantic and structural 
properties, through which "a competent speaker or interpreter" (ibid: 436) interprets his 
own or others' utterances. Davidson also argues that this system of interpretation "has a 
finite base and is recursive" (ibid: 438); and proceeds to call it a theory, "as if the 
interpreter were using the theory we use to describe his competence" (ibid). 
The second principle states that first meaning must be (2) SHARED. Le. the system 
or theory of first meanings must be shared by speaker and interpreter in such a way that 
the interpreter uses it "to understand the speaker", and the speaker, "to guide his speech" 
according to "how the interpreter will interpret him" (ibid: 437). 
The third principle states that first meaning must be (3) PREPARED: "learned in 
advance of occasions of interpretation and... conventional in character" (ibid: 436). 
Note that both Davidson's notion of first meaning and his three principles about 
linguistic meaning presuppose that the sort of meaning which he is concerned with isfor 
conveying and interpreting. A system or theory of such meanings -- i. e. a language -- is 
therefore a theory of interpretation. Principle (2), in particular, does not seem so much a 
principle of language as one of communication. Davidson claims that the notion of shared 
systems of first meanings "does not demand that speaker and interpreter speak the same 
language" (ibid: 437) -- only that the interpreter shares the speaker's understanding of the 
speaker's words. Thus principle (2) in effect states that, whatever theory of interpretation 
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is used (and speaker and interpreter may have different theories), what is required for 
successful communication is that the interpreter manages to interpret the speaker's words 
or signals as the speaker understands them, 
One might argue that it is this view of language as a theory of interpretation, and not 
the phenomenon of malapropisms, which threatens the distinction between literal and 
speaker's meanings. But, as I have mentioned, Davidson does distinguish between (a) 
interpretative processes which count as one's "basic linguistic competence" and (b) those 
which are governed by general, pragmatic principles like the Gricean Maxims of 
Conversation. In other words, he does distinguish between (a) the literal or first meanings 
of LEs and (b) what is implied or implicated by someone who uses them. He stresses that 
the problems created by malapropisms and the like are quite different from problems 
concerning the (a)-(b) distinction. In the case of metaphor, for example, the question 
would be how a particular linguistic expression whose literal meaning the language user is 
fully aware of, and has deliberately chosen (together with the other elements of the 
linguistic expression), is used to convey some other meaning. Or, in Davidson's words, 
phenomena like metaphor or irony are "achieved by way of the normal meanings of the 
words" (ibid: 439). 
What Davidson is interested in is what Mrs Malaprop does in Yhe Rivals, and what 
Donnellan does in his (1968) reply to MacKay's (1968) discussion of Donnellan's (1966) 
distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions -- and the 
fact that 
... in all these cases the hearer has no trouble understanding the speaker in the way the speaker intends. (1986: 434) 
The main details of the Donnellan case are as follows. Donnellan claims that someone who 
says 'Smith's murderer is insane' has said something true as long as he is using 'Smith's 
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murderer' referentially, to refer to a particular person who is insane -- even if that person 
did not murder Smith. MacKay's objection is that this amounts to Humpty Dumpty's 
theory of meaning, whereby one uses an expression (e. g. 'Smith's murderer') to mean 
whatever one wants it to mean (e. g. the insane man who did not murder Smith). For 
Davidson, however, Donnellan's referential use has "nothing to do with words changing 
their meaning or reference" (Davidson 1986: 439). Even if the speaker uses 'Smitws 
murderee to refer to someone who did not murder Smith, 
... the reference is none the less achieved by way of the normal meanings 
of the words. (ibid) 
Once again Davidson insists on a clear distinction between literal meaning and the 
speaker's intended meaning, arguing that, while the speaker may have expressed 
something that is true, he has done so by using a sentence that is literally false. 
Davidson, of course, is much more interested in the speaker who does not proceed 
"by way of the normal meanings of the words" when he uses those words to mean 
something else. Humpty Dumpty, Davidson maintains, is NOT such a speaker, because he 
cannot be said to mean anything when be tells Alice 'There's glory for you': 
He cannot mean what he says he means because he knows that 'There's 
glory for you' cannot be interpreted by Alice as meaning 'There's a nice 
knockdown argument for you. ' We know he knows this because Alice 
says 'I don't know what you mean by "glory" ', and Humpty Dumpty 
retorts, 'Of course you don't -- til I tell you. ' (ibid: 440) 
Davidson takes Donnellan's view that 
A speaker cannot... intend to mean something by what he says unless he 
believes his audience will interpret his words as he intends (the Gricean 
circle). (ibid: 439) 
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Thus Davidson claims that one can change the meaning of an expression as one intends, 
... provided you believe (and perhaps are justified in believing) that the interpreter has adequate clues for the new interpretation. You may 
deliberately provide those clues... (ibid) 
An example of the speaker himself voluntarily providing such clues is when Donnellan 
ends his reply to MacKay with the expression 'There's glory for you'. By that Donnellan 
means Aere's a nice knockdown argumentforyou. Unlike Humpty Dumpty, however, he 
IS interpreted as meaning Aere's a nice Icnockdown argumentfor you - not only because 
he believes that the reader would interpret it to mean what he intended it to mean, but also 
because he uses it in a context which he knows would prompt the reader to interpret it as 
Aere's a nice knockdown argumentfor you. 
Davidson refers to Donnellan's 'There's glory for you', and Mrs Malaprop's 'a nice 
derangement of epitaphs, as cases of the speaker "getting away with it" (ibid: 440). What 
"getting away with it" involves is this: 
... the interpreter comes to the occasion of utterance armed with a 
theory that tells him (or so he believes) what an arbitrary utterance of 
the speaker means. The speaker then says something with the intention 
that it will be interpreted in a certain way, and the expectation that it 
will be so interpreted. In fact this way is not provided for by the 
interpreter's theory. But the speaker is nevertheless understood; the 
interpreter adjusts his theory so that it yields the speaker's intended 
interpretation. The speaker has 'gotten away with it'. (ibid) 
Furthermore, 
The speaker may [like Donnellan] or may not [like Mrs Malaprop]... 
know that he has got away with anything; the interpreter may [like 
Donnellan's reader] or may not [like Mrs Malaprop's interpreter] know 
that the speaker intended to get away with anything. (ibid) 
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To account for speakers "getting away with it", Davidson proposes that at every 
stage of what he calls a "speech transaction" speaker and interpreter have not one but two 
theories of interpretation: a PRIOR THEORY and a PASSING THEORY. During the 
speech transaction both theories are continually revised by both speaker and interpreter. 
The prior theory for the interpreter is "how he is prepared in advance to interpret an 
utterance of the speaker", and, for the speaker, "what he helieves the interpreter's prior 
theory to be". The passing theory for the interpreter is "how he does interpret the 
utterance", and, for the speaker, "the theory he intends the interpreter to use" (ibid: 442). 
Before the speaker starts speaking, the interpreter's prior theory is adjusted according 
to whatever relevant information about the speaker and the speaker's idiolect that he is 
able to take into account: information about 
... the character, dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been gained by observing the speaker's behaviour, linguistic or 
otherwise. (ibid: 441) 
During the course of the utterance the adjustment continues, and the prior theory 
continues to change "in the light of new evidence" (ibid), some of it provided by the 
speaker himself. But once he starts to interpret the utterance, there is every possibility that 
the theory which he actually uses, the passing theory, is not the theory he was prepared to 
use, the prior theory. (Like the prior theory, however, the passing theory keeps changing 
during the utterance. ) 
The speaker, for his part, has a prior theory which takes into account information 
about the interpreter and the interpreter's prior theory. The speaker is aware of the 
advantage of uttering expressions which "he believes can and will be interpreted in a 
certain way" (ibid: 442). But when it comes to the point, he may not produce an utterance 
in accordance with what he believes is the interpreter's current theory -- he may 
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"deliberately dispose the interpreter to modify [it]" (ibid) to converge with his (the 
speaker's) own passing theory. 
The problem is that neither the prior nor the passing theory of interpretation conforms 
to all three of Davidson's principles (1)-(3) concerning the nature of linguistic first 
meaning. Both theories, being full recursive theories, satisfy (1) -- even though the passing 
theory's "expected field of application is vanishingly small" (ibid). A passing theory must 
be shared (principle (2)) in the sense that communication is successful only if the theory 
which the speaker intends the interpreter to use coincides with the theory which the 
interpreter actually uses to interpret the speaker's utterance (ibid). 7 But it is certainly not 
"learned in advance of occasions of interpretation" (principle (3)), being constructed for, 
and applied to, a particular utterance on a particular occasion, and containing "its changing 
list of proper names and gerrymandered vocabulary", and "every successful -- i. e. correctly 
interpreted -- use of any other word or phrase, no matter how far out of the ordinary" 
(ibid). 
A prior theory, on the other hand, might be said to be "prepared" -- but only up to a 
point. A passing theory would, of course, be "geared to the occasion" (ibid: 441). 
However, as I have mentioned, even a prior theory takes into account information about 
the interlocutor and his idiolect. Thus interpreters "must be expected to have quite 
different prior theories for different speakers", and speakers 
... always have the 
interpreter in mind; there is no such thing as how we 
expect to be interpreted. We inhibit our higher vocabulary, or encourage 
it, depending on the most general considerations, and we cannot fail to 
have premonitions as to which of the proper names we know are apt to 
be correctly understood. (ibid: 443). 
7 Davidson adds: "Of course, there are degrees of success in communication... " (1986: 442). Since 
humans are non-telepathic, it is possible that completely identical passing theories of speaker and 
interpreter, and therefore complete success in communication, is never achieved. 
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It also follows from this that the prior theories of speaker and interpreters are neither 
shared nor even assumed to be shared. In fact Davidson maintains that there is no reason 
why they should be (ibid), precisely because shared prior theories are not necessary for 
successful communication. He cites the example of Mrs Malaprop and her interpreter: it 
does not matter that Mrs Malaprop's prior theory about 'a nice derangement of epitaphs' is 
that it means a nice arrangement of epithets while the interpreter has a prior theory 
according to which 'a nice derangement of epitaphs' means a nice derangement of 
epitaphs, for the interpreter would understand Mrs Malaprop as long as their passing 
theories coincide. 
So the argument in "Derangement" goes like this. Davidson begins by asserting (ibid: 
437,440-1,443) that malaprops do not simply involve the use of linguistic expressions to 
mean something other than what they mean. He subscribes to the view that, no matter 
how remote the speaker's intended meaning is from the literal meaning of the linguistic 
expression, the linguistic expression can be said to be used only if it is -- at least partly - 
used in virtue of its literal meaning. The speaker who utters a malaprop, on the other hand, 
appears to use the linguistic expression in such a way that the new meaning expressed IS 
the first meaning that he intends the interpreter to access. To account for the interpreter's 
ability to register and apply the change in literal meaning, Davidson suggests that he has 
two simultaneous theories of interpretation. The prior theory contains the old meaning; it 
is the passing theory which accommodates the new meaning as literal linguistic meaning: 
Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for the 
moment (knowingly deviant, or not, on one, or both, sides), is in the 
passing theory as a feature of what the words mean on that occasion. 
Such meanings, transient though they may be, are literal; they are what I 
have called first meanings. (ibid: 442-3) 
But neither prior nor passing theory conforms to principles (1)-(3). The passing 
theory is obviously not learned in advance, while the prior theory does not have to be (and 
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usually is not) shared -- thus neither theory can be described as being governed by 
antecedently shared conventions. From this Davidson concludes that there is no common 
and fixed set of linguistic conventions which determines what utterances mean in 
particular acts of communication and interpretation. Instead, speakers and interpreters 
construct convergent passing theories on the basis of 
... wit, luck, and wisdom 
from a private vocabulary and grammar, 
knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb 
for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely. 
(ibid: 446) 
4.3 Dummett's reply to Davidson: language as social convention 
Davidson's arguments and conclusions in "Derangement" are aimed at the sort of concept 
of language that Dummett subscribes to. In his (1986) reply to "Derangement", Dummett 
objects to Davidson's notion of INTERPRETATION and the very central place it 
occupies in the "Derangement" account of language and communication. As Dummett 
points out, Davidson's language users are always speakers and interpreters rather than 
speakers and hearers. Theoretically, Dummett's conception of language as a "social 
practice" could not be more opposed to the views of those who believe that social 
practices belong to the domain of the extralinguistic. Nevertheless, he joins them in 
claiming -- though of course on grounds supposedly completely different from internalist/ 
intensionalist ones -- that there is a clear distinction between interpretation, on the one 
hand, and linguistic parsing or decoding, on the other; and, co-extensively, between 
utterance/ speaker's meaning and literal linguistic meaning. 
Dummett cites (ibid: 464,467) and follows Wittgenstein's distinction between 
Deutung and Auffassung (Investigations, 201). For Dummett, a Deutung is an 
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interpretation "in the strict sense" (Dummett 1986: 467) -- when, for instance, a hearer has 
to "search for the speaker's meaning" (ibid: 464) -- and an Auffassung, a way of 
understanding or grasping which excludes any understanding of how what is understood is 
actually understood. He observes that Davidson's theory of language is based exclusively 
on the former, the "exceptional cases", and completely ignores the latter, the "normal 
case" (ibid: 471). In the "normal case", Dummett argues, the speaker or hearees use of 
language does not consist in "having any beliefs about the other person" -- for example, 
having beliefs or expectations about the other person's prior theories. The only beliefs 
involved ("if they can be called beliefs" (ibid: 472), Dummett parenthesises) are "about 
what the words mean, not about what the other takes or intends them to mean" (ibid). 
Speakers and hearers just "go on these beliefs" (ibid): 
In the normal case, the speaker simply says what he means. By this I do 
not mean that he first has the thought and then puts it into words, but 
that, knowing the language, he simply speaks. In the normal case, 
likewise, the hearer simply understands. Le., knowing the language, he 
hears and thereby understands; given that he knows the language, there 
is nothing that his understanding the words consists in save his hearing 
them. (ibid: 471) 
Speakers and hearers do more than this, engaging in interpretation, only in the 
"exceptional cases" where "there are indeed no [linguistic] rules to follow" -- when the 
hearer "has to apprehend the speaker's intention much as he has to apprehend the 
intentions behind non-linguistic actions" (ibid: 474), or when the speaker "wants to 
communicate and is conscious of obstacles to understanding" (ibid: 473). 
Durm-nett's "normal" and "exceptional" cases must also be considered within the 
framework of his own theory of language and language use. While Davidson equates 
langmages with theories of interpretation, Dummett not only distinguishes interpretation 
from "normal" linguistic behaviour, but also the latter from language itself and its 
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semantics. A LANGUAGE, for him, is a phenomenon, consisting of a set of expressions 
with structure and meanings (ibid: 467). What it is for those expressions to have the 
meanings that they have is made explicit by a FIRST-ORDER THEORY OF MEANING 
for the language. This theory of meaning "explains" speech (and other, probably secondary 
forms of linguistic behaviour to do with literacy) -- but does so only indirectly, in that it 
contains no reference to anything language users do or think (ibid). Thus LINKING 
PRINCIPLES are required to connect it to the thoughts and actions of the person who 
speaks the language, and who thereby has a SECOND-ORDER THEORY about the first- 
order theory of meaning (second-order in virtue of being a theory about another theory 
(ibid: 466)). Durnmett maintains that "no speaker knows every word of the language or 
uses correctly every word he does know" (ibid: 469), and regards the second-order theory 
as an individual's "imperfect" (ibid: 475), "partial, and partly erroneous" (ibid: 468) grasp 
of the first-order theory of meaning of the language. Consequently, the linking principles 
which connect it to the perfect, complete first-order theory of meaning have to involve the 
notion of an idiolect (ibid: 469) -- or, to be more precise, the notion of an idiolect as the 
individual speaker-hearees imperfect, incomplete second-order theory about the perfect, 
complete first-order theory of meaning for the "common language". 
However, Dummett stresses that this second-order theory is NOT a speaker-hearees 
interpretation of the first-order theory. In fact it operates like a first-order theory -- 
Its literal content is that certain expressions have certain meanings, or 
that some individual intends them to have or takes them as having those 
meanings. (ibid: 468) 
-- though unlike the first-order theory it does not state what it is for those expressions to 
have the meanings that they have. 
Dummett argues that 
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... a common language is related to an idiolect essentially as the rules of 
a game are related to a player's beliefs about what they are. (ibid: 469) 
He compares first-order theories of linguistic meaning with (representations oo the rules 
of games, speaker-hearers with players of a game, and idiolects with players' grasp of the 
rules of a game (ibid: 469,472,473). The important point here, in respect of Davidson 
and "Derangement", is that 
... the players' grasp of the rules 
does not consist in any theories they 
have about the knowledge of the rules on the part of the other players. 
(ibid: 472) 
-- they simply take for granted that the other players know the rules. Similarly, speakers 
and hearers in the "normal case" take for granted that they have a common language (ibid: 
473). 
For Davidson, apparently, there is no such "normal case". Durnmett's "exceptional 
cases" are Davidson's "normal case", and the theories used in Davidson's "normal case" 
are also what Davidson regards as languages. Thus, on Durnmett's terms, a language for 
Davidson's speaker or interpreter (rather than hearer) is not just a second-order theory 
but one whose subject is another second-order theory, that of the other speaker or 
interpreter. In other words, it constitutes an interpretation of the other speaker or 
interpreter's (also second-order) theory of interpretation, and is the basis upon which one 
might construct an interpretation of the actions or behaviour determined by that other 
theory of interpretation. 
Dummett does not disagree with Davidson's point that we constantly adjust our 
theories of interpretation according to circumstances, and according to who our 
interlocutors are in particular. His main objection, as I have mentioned, is Davidson's 
equation of language with theories of interpretation. He maintains that DavidsoWs theories 
of interpretation -- whether passing or prior -- are all second-order theories. This is 
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because of the "quasi-Gricean" nature of Davidson's account of linguistic meaning - i. e. 
because it appears to be wholly based on speakers/ interpreters' expectations of, and 
intentions towards, one another. The resulting absence of first-order theories of meaning, 
Dummett argues, means that all Davidson's theories must be of infinite order - and that 
his theory of language is an "exitless loop" of speaker's theories about interpreter's 
theories, and interpreter's theories about speaker's theories about interpreter's theories, and 
so on (ibid: 470). Thus Dummett regards Davidson's theory of language as "a more 
sophisticated version" of Humpty Dumpty's idea of linguistic expressions meaning 
whatever the speaker wants them to mean, and a refutation of Alice's idea of linguistic 
expressions having meanings independently of language users (ibid). 
According to Dummett, Davidson arrives at this "Humpty Dumpty" view of language 
from "[concentrating] too exclusively on communication" (ibid: 471). While he believes 
that the primary role of language is as an instrument of communication, and that "language 
is a vehicle of thought because it is an instrument of communication, and not conversely" 
(ibid: 470-1), Dummett also maintains that one cannot build a theory of language around 
the phenomenon of verbal communication alone, if only because language is supposed to 
have that other (though secondary) role as a vehicle of thought which the theory must also 
be able to account for. Dummett cites Wittgenstein again, this time appealing to his 
challenge to say one thing and mean something else (ibid: 471; Investigations, 510), and 
arguing that the "difficulty" of saying 'The sky is clouding over' and meaning 'There is no 
odd perfect number' has nothing to do with failing to meet the interpreter's expectations, 
since it is "just as great if you are saying it to yourself' (ibid: 47 1). As Durnmett sees it, 
... the difficulty lies in the fact that 'The sky is clouding over' does not 
mean 'There is no odd perfect number'. (ibid) 
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- i. e. in the fact that the linguistic expression 'The sky is clouding over, means Yhe sky is 
clouding over and not Yhere is no odd perfect number, regardless of the fact that the 
speaker or thinker intended to say or think'The sky is clouding over' and mean Yhere is no 
oddperfect number. 8 
Dummett, of course, believes that linguistic expressions have "standard meanings", 
and that no process of interpretation can explain what it is for the hearer or speaker to 
attach a standard meaning to the corresponding linguistic expression. Note that these 
"standard meanings" are not assigned to Dummett's linguistic expressions by a Chomskian 
I-grammar, or by some Fodorean (or relevance-theoretic) input system upon which 
utterances automatically impinge, but by the rules or conventions of a SOCIAL 
PRACTICE. Language for Dummett is "a practice in which people engage" (ibid: 473), 
and a practice is essentially social in that it is "learned from others and is contituted by 
rules which it is part of social custom to follow" (ibid). Being social in nature, linguistic 
8 According to Dummett, even the involvement of both speaker and hearer (as opposed to the 
obviously solitary thinker) in a case of language use does not guarantee that there will be the sort 
of reciprocal theory-construction upon which Davidson's theory of language is based. 111is, he 
claims, is because it is "possible to mean something by an expression without intending one's 
hearer to understand it" (1986: 472). Durnmett gives two examples of this, one where the speaker 
does not address a particular hearer or particular hearers, and one where he does. The first is the 
soliloquizing speaker, who has no intention of being understood by the hearer, "a mere 
eavesdropper" (ibid). The second is the Eric Blore character in the film Top Hat, who utters insults 
in English to the face of an apparently non-English-speaking policeman and -- more importantly - 
thinks that he is actually performing the act of insulting the policeman to his face even though he 
believes that his addressee does not understand a word he is saying. In my opinion, neither of these 
cases can be regarded as direct counterexamples to. claims about communication being 
the basis of theories of linguistic meaning. This is because the speaker-hearer relations in both 
examples appear to be essentially different from those which Davidson considers in 
"Derangement". With regard to the first example, the fact that the eavesdropper is not being 
addressed by the speaker clearly puts him in a different category from Davidson's interpreters. In 
fact it is possible that the first example may be taken as undermining Davidson's case only insofar 
as it involves a speaker who is in effect speaking to himself. So, as a counterexample to 
"Derangement", it is more closely related to Wittgenstein's experiment about saying one thing and 
meaning another. The speaker does address the hearer in the second example, but with what appear 
to be twofold and contradictory intentions -- to insult the policeman to his face, and to not be 
understood (and therefore to escape arrest). One might argue that the latter intention cancels out 
the former - which, of the two, is the truly communicatory intention -- on the grounds that it is impossible to insult someone to his face without being understood by him. 
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expressions do not have meanings "intrinsically, and hence independently of anything 
human beings do" (ibid). They are, however, described by Dummett as having meanings 
"in themselves", and "independently of any particular speakers" (ibid). This means that the 
language user simply uses a linguistic expression to mean what it means, as specified by 
the conventions of the language to which it belongs, without having to form any express 
intention or theory about other language users, the context of use, or the linguistic 
expression/ language itself. Of course he may want to use the linguistic expression to mean 
something else, in which -- "exceptional" -- case the process of interpretation or second- 
order theory construction comes into play. But on the whole language users have a 
"responsibility to the language as a social institution", and one cannot theoretically 
"liberate" them from this "responsibility" as Durnmett thinks Davidson does, by giving 
their intentions and expectations precedence over linguistic conventions (ibid). 
For Dummett, the concept of CONVENTION is fundamental to a theory of language 
-- conventions being "what constitute a social practice" (ibid), and a social practice being 
what Dummett regards language to be. This linguistic role of convention, he maintains, is 
repudiated by the Humpty Dumpty view of language, including Davidson's "refined" 
version. At the end of "Derangement" Davidson asserts that there is "no such thing as a 
language" -- i. e. language as "shared conventions, rules, or regularities" -- "to be learned, 
mastered, or born with" (Davidson 1986: 446). He concludes that convention is either 
related in some other way to language, or perhaps not at all. But at the same time, as 
Dummett observes, Davidson claims that 
... we may know so little about our intended interpreter that we can 
do 
no better than to assume that he will interpret our speech along what we 
take to be standard fines. (ibid: 443, my italics) 
-- an assumption which, in its turn, is based on the assumption that the interpreter 
"belongs to our language community" (ibid, my italics). To Durnmett these references to 
161 
"standard" methods of interpretation corresponding to particular 'language communities" 
indicate that the notion of linguistic conventions, of speaking the same language, is 
absolutely necessary even for Davidson's interpretation-based theory of language. What 
we bring to a successful linguistic encounter with another -- Davidson's prior theory, 
perhaps -- must be something like a common set of rules governing what particular 
utterances mean; otherwise nobody would know what any utterance means, let alone what 
the speaker intended to convey in uttering it. In short, Dummett's argument is that there 
must be something which the speaker and hearer share, without which any of their 
utterances could mean anything to either of them. 
4.4 Language use, literalness and convention 
Davidson's conclusion that knowing a language is the same as "knowing our way around 
in the world generally" (1986: 446) follows directly from his view of language as a theory 
of interpretation. Such a view of language is obviously unacceptable to those who 
distinguish between (i) language as constituted by or involving a fixed and autonomous set 
of rules or principles; and (ii) the uses to which language may be put, involving, as 
Chomsky puts it, "all other capacities of the mind" (1992a: 120). According to this 
distinction, utterance interpretation does not constitute the linguistic, merely the use of the 
linguistic; and it is not language that changes to accommodate relevant contextual 
information, as Davidson appears to believe, but what the language user does with 
language that has to be adjusted. Thus, for Chomsky, language use is the business of 
performance systems, "interfacing" with "other capacities of the mind". For Carston and 
the relevance theorists, it is the universal central systems that carry out the cognitive 
processes of utterance interpretation. For Dummett, language users have second-order 
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theories about linguistic meaning, as well as about other language users' second-order 
theories about linguistic meaning. 
In formulating his passing and prior theories, on the other hand, Davidson appears to 
focus exclusively on communication, on utterance production and interpretation, and in 
doing so could be regarded as needlessly conflating the truly linguistic elements with 
features of how speakers and hearers USE language in respect of one another. Both prior 
and passing theories require at least some constructing on the part of speaker or hearer, 
taking into account certain aspects of the utterance context (especially information about 
the interlocutor) and incorporating what would be contextual implications for relevance 
theorists. Moreover, Dummett adds that the passing theories which interpreters construct 
for specific utterances are not really theories at all: they 
... [bear] only on those utterances for which the 
[prior theory] does not 
yield the correct interpretation. (1986: 466) 
and 
... so viewed, will not be a structured theory, 
but only a collection of 
disconnected propositions. (ibid) 
It is certainly true that Davidson sees language very much as a matter of performance 
rather than competence. This comes across particularly clearly on one of the rare 
occasions in "Derangement" that he actually talks about the speaker's use of linguistic 
expressions. Within the "Derangement" framework, Mrs Malaprop's 'a nice derangement 
of epitaphs' or Donnellan's 'There's glory for you' are expressions belonging to a new, 
passing theory of the interpreter (and, in Donnellan's case, the speaker as well) whose 
prior theory states that 'a nice derangement of epitaphs' means a nice derangement of 
epitaphs, not a nice arrangement of epithets (or that 'There's glory for you' means there's 
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glory for you, not there's a nice knockdown argument for you). There is no doubt that 
Davidson believes this. However, with reference to the two examples, he also remarks: 
There is no word or construction that cannot be converted to a NEW 
USE by an ingenious [i. e. Donnellan] or ignorant [i. e. Mrs Malaprop] 
speaker. (1986: 441, my caps) 
In view of his claim that Donnellan's 'There's glory for you' and Mrs Malaprop's 'A nice 
derangement of epitaphs' belong to new theories of interpretation, Davidson seems to be 
saying here that the new (passing) theory of interpretation is created by the new use of the 
expressions of the old (prior) theory. 
Even his discussions of first, literal, conventional linguistic meaning are based on what 
language users do with that meaning -- in other words, on the intentions and expectations 
of speakers and hearers in respect of that meaning. In "Derangement" he defines first/ 
literal meaning as that which the speaker intends the hearer to access first. In his earlier 
(1981) paper "Communication and convention" he relates the notion of literal linguistic 
meaning to Lewis' 1975 analysis of convention. Lewis defines a convention as a regularity 
R in which more than one person must be involved. The properties of R are as follows: 
(1) Everyone involved conforms to R and (2) believes that others also 
conform. (3) The belief that others conform to R gives all involved a 
good reason to conform to R. (4) All concerned prefer that there should 
be conformity to R. (5) R is not the only possible regularity meeting the 
last two conditions. (6) Finally, everyone involved knows (1)-(5) and 
knows that everyone else knows (1)-(5), etc. (Davidson 1981: 276, after 
Lewis 1975: 5-6) 
This, too, is in terms of the relation between convention and "everyone involved" -- it has 
to do with people conforming to R, rather than the intrinsic nature of R itself 
Futhermore, the intentions and expectations of speakers/ hearers are as central to 
Davidson's application of Lewis' R to language, as they are to the relevance theorists' 
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account of language use in ostensive-inferential verbal communication. For speaker and 
hearer to conform to Davidson's version of a linguistic convention, both must understand 
the speaker's words. Also, 
... [(A)] the speaker must 
intend the hearer to interpret his words in the 
way the speaker intends, and he must have adequate reason to believe 
that the hearer will succeed in interpreting him as he intends. [(B)] Both 
speaker and hearer must believe that the speaker speaks with this 
intention, and so forth; in short, many of Lewis' conditions would seem 
to be satisfied. (1981: 277) 
Note that what I have labelled (A) is similar to the conditions of optimal relevance, while 
(B) seems to correspond to the principle of relevance (i. e. that the presumption of optimal 
relevance, or (A), is ostensively communicated, made mutually manifest). Therefore, what 
bears upon language use and the central cognitive processes for the relevance theorists is 
for Davidson a matter of linguistic convention (or, in terms of relevance theory, linguistic 
encoding and decoding). 
However, there may be more to Davidson's arguments than an apparent externalist 
confusion of language with language use, of the semantic with the pragmatic. Firstly, 
Davidson 1981 concurs vAth Black 1972/3 and Chomsky 1971 that communication is not 
the only activity that involves language. Black observes that 
... a man may outline a lecture, or write a note to remind 
himself of an 
appointment, or simply utter words... in the absence of an audience. 
(1972/3: 264) 
Chomsky claims that the use of language "need not involve communication, or even the 
attempt to communicate" (1971: 19). These last two quotes bear upon Black's and 
Chomsky's denial that 
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... one must always intend to produce some non-linguistic effect through having one's words interpreted. (Davidson 1981: 272) 
Davidson in turn argues that intended (non-linguistic) effects need not necessarily "involve 
someone other than the speaker" (ibid: 273). The important point is that they are supposed 
to arise in some way or other from the literal meanings of the linguistic expressions which 
the speaker (soliloquizing or otherwise), writer or thinker has deliberately chosen, over 
other words with their other meanings, to use. 
Secondly, Davidson does appear to believe that these intended effects -- or "ulterior 
purposes", as he calls them (1981: 272) -- arise from the USE of language. More 
importantly, he posits a principle of the AUTONOMY OF MEANING (ibid: 274-5), 
which states that the literal linguistic meaning of a linguistic expression does not determine 
what ulterior purpose it is used for and vice versa. In response to Davidson's declaration 
that "there is no such thing as a language", Hacking (1986: 447) asks where that leaves 
the Tarski-style theories of truth which Davidson has long taken to account for linguistic 
meaning (e. g. in Davidson 1973). But even in "Derangement", Davidson indicates that 
passing as well as prior theories have finite bases, are recursive, and may be modelled on a 
Tarski truth definition (1986: 437-8). His point concerning the autonomy of meaning is 
that these 
... criteria for deciding what an utterance literally means, given by a 
theory of truth or meaning for the speaker, do not decide whether he 
has accomplished his ulterior purpose... (1981: 264) 
According to Davidson, this is mainly because it is not the meaning of the linguistic 
expression, but the person who utters it, that decides what the ulterior purpose for 
uttering the linguistic expression is: 
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... what is put into literal meaning... becomes available for any ulterior (non-linguistic) purpose -- and even any illocutionary performance. 
(ibid: 275)9 
Once a sentence is understood, an utterance of it may be used to serve 
almost any extra-linguistic purpose. (1975: 164)10 
Davidson also argues that none of these extra-linguistic ulterior purposes will give the 
literal meaning of the linguistic expression used. They may help the interpreter recover the 
literal meaning of the linguistic expression used: 
... it often happens that we can descry the literal meaning of a word or 
phrase by first appreciating what the speaker is getting at. (1986: 435; 
see also Wilson and Sperber 1981, and Sperber and Wilson 1986a/95 
for the relevance theory account of disambiguation) 
But linguistic meaning, being autonomous, cannot be derived from, or defined on the basis 
of, a particular "standard" use -- 
Since the literal meaning operates as well when the use is absent as 
when it is present, no convention that operates only in 'standard' 
situations can give the literal meaning. (Davidson 1981: 275) 
-- or any of the "endless uses to which a sentence, with meaning unchanged, can be put" 
(ibid: 271). 
The question is: does "Derangement" represent a rejection of the principle of the 
autonomy of meaning; and if not, then how are the paper's supposedly Humpty- 
Dumptyesque proposals to be reconciled with Davidson's earlier work? It may seem 
obvious why there is no mention of the autonomy of meaning in a paper concerned with 
9 Davidson adds that an utterance of a sentence with a grammatical mood indicator may "label" 
itself as a certain illocutionary act, but it does not follow that the utterance is that illocutionary act 
(1981: 275). 
10 Page numbers for Davidson 1975 are from the 1984 reprint. 
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the apparent phenomenon of "intended meaning" taking over "standard meaning" (1986: 
434). But the fact is that, in "Derangement", intended meaning does not actually take over 
standard meaning, in the sense of replacing it in the (prior) theory to which it belongs. 
Instead, the intended meaning is conceived of as belonging to a separate, distinct (passing) 
theory brought in by the speaker and/ or hearer. So, in the ordinary case, the intended 
meaning remains the language user's intended meaning, which the standard meaning of the 
linguistic expression used neither determines nor is derived from. But in the case of 
malapropisms etc, the intended meaning becomes a standard meaning in another (passing) 
theory of linguistic meaning, while the standard meaning remains a part of the current 
(prior) theory. Both intended and standard meanings, presumably, are autonomous in the 
way that Davidson in 1975 and 1981 argues that literal linguistic meanings should be. 
Furthermore, although it has a "vanishingly small" field of application (Davidson 
1986: 442), the passing theory is nevertheless a complete theory of interpretation, i. e. 
what Davidson initially regarded as a language. Dummett disagrees with this view of 
passing theories as "massively reduplicating" prior theories (Dummett 1986: 466), arguing 
that a passing "theory" is nothing more than "a collection of disconnected propositions" 
(ibid). Davidson, however, insists that the seemingly small, usually temporary adjustment 
that the language user has to make is not a contribution to what is implicated, but has to 
do with what linguistic expression a meaning is the meaning of, and therefore constitutes 
the difference between one theory of interpretation and another: 
... when a word or phrase temporarily or locally takes over the role of 
some other word or phrase (as treated in a prior theory, perhaps), the 
entire burden of that role, with all its implications for logical relations to 
other words, phrases, and sentences, must be carried along by the 
passing theory. Someone who grasps the fact that Mrs Malaprop means 
'epithet' when she says 'epitaph' must give 'epithet' all the powers 
'epitaph' has for many other people. Only a full recursive theory can do 
justice to these powers. These remarks do not depend on supposing that 
Mrs Malaprop will always make this 'mistake'; once is enough to 
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summon up a passing theory assigning a new role to 'epitaph'. (1986: 
443) 
In view of the principle of the autonomy of meaning and its bearing on 
"Derangement", it is also necessary to take a closer look at Davidson's depiction of 
"words, phrases, and sentences" as having "new roles" in the quote given above. In the 
context of "Derangement" there is something paradoxical about the idea of "new roles" 
and "new uses". On the one hand it implies that Mrs Malaprop's uttering of 'epitapw to 
mean epithet is simply another addition to the "endless [non-linguistic] uses" to which 
'epitaph' meaning epitaph may be put. On the other hand, Davidson makes it quite clear 
that 'epitaph' for Mrs Malaprop and her interpreter actually belongs to a theory which 
states that it is a word that literally means epithet -- this supposedly being the result of Mrs 
Malaprop's intention to use 'epitaph' to literally mean epithet. Tile notion of a linguistic 
expression literally meaning whatever the language user intends or uses it to mean is 
precisely what Chomsky, Carston and Dummett object to. And yet, although the essence 
of this view of language is that the linguistic expression's semantic properties are 
constituted by, or arise from, the use of that linguistic expression, it would seem that 
Davidson does not entirely avoid the implication that what Mrs Malaprop uses when she 
utters 'epitaph' and what, say, Davidson himself uses when he utters 'epitaph' are in some 
way the same entity -- Mrs Malaprop's nels, use, and the new literal meaning epithet, 
notwithstanding. 
That Davidson in fact courts this implication by distinguishing Mrs Malaprop's neis, 
use of 'epitaph' or Donnellan's iiew rise of 'glory' (which involves "merely substitution" 
(ibid: 441)) from the phenomenon of iiess, wortiv ("say in Joyce or Lewis Carroll" (ibid)) is 
symptomatic of the tendency to cling to phoneficform as the individuating feature of a 
linguistic expression, even when its meaning has been "substituted" or is simply a matter 
for doubt. In 4.11 argued that this tendency is evident in Carston's account of "misuse". In 
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"Derangement", however, Davidson ought to have avoided it, as it directly contradicts his 
attempt (via his positing of passing as well as prior theories) to give linguistic meaning the 
central role in his account of malapropisms. For Davidson, Mrs Malaprop's uttering of 
'epitaph' constitutes the use, not of the expression Davidson uses when he utters 'epitaph', 
or some purely formal Humpty-Dumptyesque construction which just happens to have 
previously been used to mean epitaph, but of an expression which literally means epithet 
in accordance with a proper, albeit passing, theory. In other words, in uttering 'epitaph' 
Mrs Malaprop uses a linguistic expression whose literal linguistic meaning she actually 
intends to express, and consequently uses together with the other properties of the 
linguistic expression. Thus "Derangement" could be taken as a response to accounts of 
malapropisms like Carston's in 4.1, in which the literal linguistic meaning appears to play 
no part whatsoever in the language user's "misuse" of a linguistic expression. 
This reading of "Derangement" is consistent with Davidson 1981, in which he argues 
that "an action counts as linguistic only if literal meaning is relevant" (1981: 272), 
indicating that the answer to the question of 
... whether an activity is interestingly considered linguistic when 
meanings are not intended to be put to use. (ibid: 273) 
is tio. In fact he goes beyond the idea that language use must involve the language usees 
cognitive processing and intentional expressing of literal linguistic meaning, making the 
stronger claim that if one utters linguistic expression L, literal meaning M, with no 
intention of expressing M, then to all intents and purposes L does not literally mean M: 
... someone cannot utter the sentence 'Eat the eggplant' with the words literally meaning that someone is to cat his eggplant unless he intends 
the sentence to have that meaning, and intends his audience to interpret 
it as having that meaning-, but if it is uttered with the intention of 
uttering a sentence with that meaning, and it does not in fact have that 
meaning, then it has no linguistic meaning at all. Literal meaning and 
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intended literal meaning must coincide if there is to be a literal meaning. 
(ibid: 271-2) 
In "Derangement" he goes even further, arguing that if one utters L with the intention of, 
and expectation of being interpreted as, literally expressing N, then L does not mean M 
but N, as specified by another (passing) theory -- L with literal meaning M and L with 
literal meaning N being two distinct linguistic expressions, say Ll and L2, belonging to 
two distinct theories. 
Hence Davidson never talks about the ndsuse of language, in Carston's sense of 
incorrectly using the phonological/ phonetic form of LI to express N as its literal meaning 
-- firstly, because this does not involve Ll's literal meaning M, and for Davidson is 
therefore not an instance of the use of Ll; and secondly, because he appears to regard the 
intention concerning N as necessary and sufficient for L2 to be used. In other words, the 
issue of misuse never arises in "Derangement", for if the intention to express N as a literal 
meaning is sufficient for L2 to be used, then obviously one never fails to use L2 
"correctly" since one always intends to express N. 
On the whole I agree with Davidson's view that it is what the language user does with 
the Ihiguisfic meaning, rather than the lVionefic vehicle of that meaning, that counts as 
language use. But the fact remains that the relation between linguistic semantics and the 
non-linguistic cognitive entities (thoughts, assumptions, intentions) involved in language 
use is such that, if one gives meaning precedence over phonetic form, one immediately 
appears to lay oneself open to charges of Humpty-Dumptyism. Whereas phonetic form is 
assumed to be linguistic (and only linguistic), linguistic meaning tends to be rcgarded as 
having been "[drawn] from the resources of other... faculties of the mind" (Chomsky 
1992a: 115-6), or as parts of the "real", truth-theoretic semantics of the central 
representational system which linguistic expressions possess "by inheritance" (Carston 
1998: 64-5). Similarly, any propositional meaning expressed which falls within the 
171 
language user's intentions belongs first and foremost to the realm of the Davidsonian 
"ulterior purpose", as determined by the central cognitive systems, even though it may also 
happen to be the meaning of the linguistic expression used. Thus the linguistic content is 
distinguished from the non-linguistic content of the ulterior purpose solely on the grounds 
of being conventionally associated with a phoiiefic vehicle that is recognisably litiguistic. 
It follows from this that, if the phonetic vehicle is secondary to the meaning in the use of 
the linguistic expression, then there would be no way of telling where linguistic meaning 
ends and non-linguistic ulterior purpose begins. In fact there would be no way of telling if 
the non-linguistic ulterior purpose is all there is. 
That, of course, is precisely Davidson's point in "Derangement". Ile does not deny 
that there is some sort of relation between meaning and vehicle, and that it has the 
property of what he calls autonomy. But literalness for Davidson is ? lot an expression 
meaning what it means -- i. e. it is not autonomy -- but an expression intended to be 
interpreted as meaning what it means. And it is because of its autonomy -- which arises, 
somewhat paradoxically, from its subservient role as input to the central systems which 
actually effect its use -- that a particular vehicle-meaning relation remains within the 
bounds of the theory to which it belongs, and has no bearing on the question of what is 
used or what is literal. Nor does it have any bearing on the possibility that there is some 
other, equally autonomous, system of vehicle-meaning relations which may also be used 
literally. 
This may be what Davidson means when lie remarks that "we must try to pry apart 
what is literal in language from what is conventional or established" (1986: 434) - his 
argument being that what is literal has to do with the particular set of conventions which 
the language user chooses to use, and not with any one dcrinitive set of rules or 
conventions. Thus he ultimately rejects Lewis' F, on the grounds that its most important 
feature is regularity over fime, suggesting instead that 
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It could even happen that every speaker from tile start had his own quite 
unique way of speaking. (1981: 276-7) 
This would be equivalent to Carston's remark about "disparate encodings" (1998: 82, fn 
2), but for the fact that Carston's "disparate encodings" are litiguisfic while Davidson 
concludes that his disparate theories of interpretation are tiol laitguages. I stress once 
again that Davidson is not denying that language exists, only that the linguistic is a matter 
of public and antecedent convention. For a fuller picture of his theory of language it is 
necessary to refer to the conclusion of his 1981 paper (1981: 278-80). Here, he concedes 
that there is an 
... element of the conventional, or of the conditioning process that 
makes speakers rough linguistic facsimilies of their friends and parents... 
(ibid: 278) 
But this, he argues, is purely SOCIAL -- a "practical" matter of "how society bends 
linguistic habits to a public norm" which tells us nothing about the "linguistic habits" 
themselves (ibid). It follows from this that any "standard" or "conventional" system of 
vehicle-meaning relations is the result of social conditioning rather than some genuinely 
linguistic imperative. 
All this is particularly relevant in respect of Durnmett's view of language as a social 
practice. For Dummett, a language is a set of social conventions which link particular 
linguistic expressions with particular meanings, and which language users have a 
"responsibility" to (1986: 473). But it is precisely because Durnmett's "language" is social 
in nature, that there is nothing to prevent the language user from relinquishing the 
responsibility and deviating from the conventions -- or, more importantly, from changing 
the conventions, or setting up new ones. Perhaps Durnmet undermines his own 
supposedly anti-flumpty-Dumpty argument when lie maintains that linguistic expressions 
have meanings "independently of any particular speakers" but, being part of a social 
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practice, tiot "independently of anything human beings do" (ibid). The distinction between 
"any particular speaker" and "anything human beings do" is not absolute, but a matter of 
degree. A few speakers' "imperfect grasp" of a set of conventions could very well lead to a 
different set of conventions for an entire "community" of language users. 
This is especially true if those few speakers happen to be in positions of -- in Carstorfs 
words (1998: 82, fa 2) -- "power and authority": 
Of course, the matter of what gets called an error or a misuse is 
sometimes more a matter of power and authority than anything to do 
with language itself, see, for example, Chornsky (1987,29-30)'s 
discussion of 'livid' which most of us take to encode 'red' or 'flushed' 
while what it "really means" (i. e. what the dictionary tells us) is 'pale! or 
'greyish'. In such a case most of us will (mis)use the word very 
satisfactorily without anyone having to make any interpretive 
adjustment. (ibid) 
What Carston is saying here is that 'livid' may linguistically encode flushed OR pak, but 
whether the use of the expression to expressflushed or the use of it to express pale is the 
misuse depends on whether the "power and authority" resides with the people who take 
'livid' to encode flushed or those who take it to encode pale. Oddly - or perhaps not 
oddly at all -- Carston regards the pale minority as the people with the "power and 
authority", and the others, though constituting the majority, as misusing 'livid' en masse. 
But the main problem, and contradiction, is that 'livid' ENCODES flushed for this 
"powerless" majority -- as Carston's phrase "disparate encodings" implies (ibid) -- and is 
therefore not misused, but used perfectly correctly by them to cxpressflushed. Carston 
also uses the phrase "lake to encode" (my italics), which in its turn rather alarmingly 
implies that the language user, like Ilumpty Dumpty, may get to decide what particular 
linguistic expressions encode. 
In the light of his discussion of malapropisms and convention in Davidson 1981 and 
"Derangement", what Davidson refcrs to as "the conventions of language" and "our 
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standard method of interpretation" (1981: 279) are conventional or standard, not so much 
in Le%ris' sense of regularity over time, as in the sense of determining certain meaning- 
form relations which a reasonably large number of people happen to agree about as a 
result of having been socially conditioned to conform thus. These "conventions", however, 
are no more than a "starting point" or a "crutch" (ibid) -- the most that social conditioning 
ensures is that 
... we may, up to a point, assume that the same method of 
interpretation 
that we use for others, or that we asminie others use for us, will work 
for a new speaker. (ibid, my italics) 
There is, of course, no real guarantee that the prior or even passing theories of any two 
language users will be identical. 
At the end of Davidson 1981, Davidson speculates that it is not convention - or, to 
be more accurate, the social tendency toward convention -- that is a condition or feature 
of language, but the other way around: 
I suggest... that philosophers who make convention a necessary element 
in language have the matter backwards. The truth is rather that language 
is a condition for having conventions. (1981: 280) 
To me this is more interesting and spccific than the conclusion of tile later "Derangement" 
(i. e. that convention either constitutes some crucial feature of language that has nothing to 
do with the vehicle-meaning relation, or is not involved in language at all). Davidson's line 
of argument is this: in order to share a convention with someone else one has to be able to 
attribute beliefs and desires to him; and in order to have, and attribute, beliefs and desires 
one has to have a language. However, if vchicle-mcaning relations are merely social and 
not linguistic, then what and where are the linguistic expressions which are necessary for 
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beliefs and desires, and how exactly are they related to the social conventions which they 
facilitate? Davidson raises the question, but does not answer it. 
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5 
A representational account of "literal meaning" and "language use" 
5 Linguistic semantics without "linguistic" conventions: Burton-Roberts, 
representational conjecture 
Davidson concludes that the linguistic does not consist in theories or systems of 
conventions which govern the relation between literal meaning and that which it is the 
literal meaning of Such conventions, he argues (1981: 278-80), are merely the result of 
social conditioning, and "[do] not explain what is basic to linguistic communication" (ibid: 
280). Burton-Roberts (e. g. 1994,1999a, 1999b) arrives at the same conclusion from the 
opposite direction, starting from the Chomskian view that the linguistic has nothing to do 
with communication, being a natural and entirely internal state of mind/ brain. However, 
his is a far more radically internalist theory of the linguistic than Chomsky's, as their 
respective approaches to phonology clearly illustrate. In chapter 21 argued that the I 
nature of ChomsVs I-language is deeply compromised, chiefly by its interfacing with, and 
being in part determined by, non-linguistic performance systems. With regard to the 
phonology of I-language, Chomsky claims that 
The special properties of the phonological component relate to the need 
to produce instructions for the sensorimotor systems, for production 
and perception [of E-physical utterance phcnomena]. (1995b: 229) 
He concedes that this may be 
... the source of other imperfections of [the computational system of I- language], and in this sense "extraneous" to language... (ibid) 
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BR, on the other hand, insists that the linguistic has no such direct contact with systems 
that facilitate the production/ perception of E-physical utterance phenomena, and, by 
extension, with the utterance phenomena themselves. He also maintains that the indirect 
contact the linguistic does have with performance systems and utterance phenomena is of 
quite a different nature. He makes the conjecture that E-physical utterances are in what he 
calls an M-REPRESENTATIONAL relation to I-linguistic expressions. This 
"representational conjecture" provides an account of the I-E relation while maintaining an 
absolute I-E distinction. Such a distinction is essential to the conjecture's presupposition 
that the linguistic is radically internal and austere. It is also essential to the conjecture's 
refutation of the (somewhat confused and basically externalist) idea that a linguistic 
expression is an abstract and autonomous entity which, in virtue of being used, 
nevertheless becomes or is converted to some physical version of itself, complete with the 
real (propositional, entertainable) semantics in addition to all the original linguistic 
properties. 
BR! s representational conjecture is outlined in section 5.1. The conjecture has 
important implications for the nature and status of phonology. As Chomsky's account of 
the phonological component demonstrates, the phonological tends to be regarded as I. 
linguistic, but also as being determined by non-linguistic elements to do with the 
production and perception of phonetic phenomena. In 5.2 1 discuss DR! s argument that 
the phonological is too closely and inextricably associated with E-physical, non-linguistic 
phonetics to be I-linguistic itself. This, we shall see, leads back to Davidson's rejection of 
convention as the basis of the linguistic. 
The traditional, virtually consensus view is that the phonological in effect constitutes 
the conventional vehicle of linguistic meaning. In other words, its relation with meaning is 
what Davidson's (passing/ prior) theories or systems of conventions govcm. But if the 
phonological and its relation to linguistic semantics/ syntax is, as BR argues, not in fact 
linguistic -- just as the conventions governing vchiclc-mcaning relations are regarded by 
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Davidson to be social rather than linguistic -- then BR! s representational conjecture and 
the radically internalist notion of the linguistic which it is intended to support may provide 
the answer to Davidson's questions about what and where the linguistic really is. 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2 deal with this issue and, more importantly, with its implications for linguistic 
semantics and the notions of literal meaning and language use. 5.3 is concerned with its 
implications for the relation between the linguistic and what Fodor calls the Imiguage of 
thought. 
5.1 The representational conjecture 
Burton-Roberts' 1994 representational conjecture (henceforth RC) is that the relation 
between linguistic expressions and external utterance phenomena is logically of the same 
kind as that between, say, a table and a painting of it. On this view, E-physical utterance 
phenomena are representations of I-linguistic expressions, produced by speakers in aid of 
E-physically representing I-linguistic expressions generated by their mentally-constituted 
grammars. 
BR refers to this notion of representation as M-representation. "M" stands for 
Magritte, and is an allusion to his La Trahison des Iniages, with its slogan Cecl West pas 
une pipe reminding us that the painting contains, not a pipe, but a representation of a 
pipe. "M" is also to distinguish M-represcntation from Chomskys (1995a, 1995b) 
"linguistic levels of representation", or his (1995b) "PF and LF representatiolu" (i. e. 'A 
and %). Chomsky himself explicitly states (1995a: 53) that his use of "representation" is 
"not to be understood relationally, as "representation of.. "" (see footnote 4, chapter 2). 
BR calls this C-reprcsenlaflon - for "Chomsk-y/ constitutive", since such a representation 
is constitutive of what it represents. For instance, a "phonological (C-)rcprcscntation" of a 
linguistic expression simply Is the phonology of the linguistic expression. An hl- 
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representation x of y, on the other hand, is in no way constitutive of what it is a 
representation of, i. e. y. Nor does x constitute "an example, or actuallsation, or 
realisation, or instance, or manifestation, or exponent of y" (BR and Carr 1999: 393). 
More particularly, an M-representation x ofy is not a token ofy. ' 
The RC makes a corresponding and equally uncompromising distinction between the 
production of utterances and the generating of linguistic expressions; between the rules 
that govern the former and the principles that determine the latter (BR 1994: 195, BR and 
Carr 1999: 394). As utterances produced by speakers are not linguistic but merely M- 
representational of the linguistic, so the external behaviour productive of those M- 
representations is guided by M-representational, not linguistic, rules. The truly linguistic 
principles, on the other hand, do not "guide" or "licence" anything. They do not "licence" 
external utterance behaviour. Nor do they "licence" the "production" of linguistic 
expressions, since the grammar generates linguistic expressions only in the internalist 
sense of specifying what they are. 2 So to talk in terms of "producing linguistic 
expressions" or "linguistic behaviour" is, on the representational view, to see the linguistic 
where it is not -- only E-physical M-representations of linguistic expressions are 
produced, and produced through extenial behaviour involving skills, abilities, habits and 
(followable) rules of M-representation, not of language. 
Furthermore, if the E-physical is M-representational of the linguistic, then the relation 
between utterances and linguistic expressions must be ASYMMETRIC and NON- 
NATURAL. M-representation is as)-mmetric in that the representans is logically 
orientated on the representaturn, and not vice versa. According to the RC, E-physical 
1 See Brombergcr 1989 on "types and tokens in linguistics", and BR 1994 (: 186-9 1) and BR and 
Carr 1999 (: 3 89-9 1) for problems with the typc-tokcn account of the rclation bctN%-ccn linguistic 
expressions and E-physical utterance plicnonicna. 2 And, as BR (1994: 195) and BR and Carr (1999: 394) maintain, speakers do not "produce nc%v 
linguistic expressions" - though they may produccAf-rcpmentations of linguistic expressions 
which, like all linguistic expressions, arc defined by the grammar, but have not previously been Nf- 
represented. 
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utterances are produced by humans in aid of M-representing what is radically internal and 
austere, i. e. the linguistic. Linguistic expressions, on the other hand, are not generated by 
the grammar to be objects of M-representation, or to be "implemented" in E-physical 
behaviour (BR 1994: 196) - or, for that matter, to be anything other than their linguistic 
selves. As BR puts it (ibid), the RC reverses the notion that the linguistic is a means to a 
behavioural end, suggesting instead that it is the behavioural and E-physical which is a 
representational means to a linguistic end. This "linguistic end" is 
... 'in there' as a state of mind/ brain, by 
its nature innocent of the fact 
that, 'out there', is behaviour representationally aimed at it as at a target. 
(ibid) 
That there is such behaviour aimed M-represcntationally at the linguistic is, as DR 
and Carr claim (1999: 394), not a fact about the nature of the linguistic. Nor is it a fact 
about the nature of the M-representational utterance phenomena which the behaviour is in 
aid of producing. M-representation is a tioti-natural relation, and the M-rcpresentation of 
y by x on a particular occasion depends on (i) the intentions ofies producer that x M- 
represents y on that occasion; and on (ii) the assumptions of x's perceiver about those 
intentions (ibid). In DR 1994 (: 199), the M-representational character is described as 
being "not irnmanent in" utterances, but " 'read into' " the physical phenomena by 
(rational, relevance-seeking) reader-hearers on the basis of their 6owledge of what they take to be the intended represetilata, the 
content of this knowledge being the mentally constituted constraints 
governing what constitutes an expression in the language. 
Another point about the non-natural M-rcpresentational relation between x and y is 
that x does not have to have any property in common with y. M-rcpresentation can be 
ICONIC -- as in the case of Magritte's painting of the pipe, which shares some perceptual 
(mainly visual) properties with its object, the pipe. But, being non-natural, M- 
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representation can also be CONVENTIONAL. I am using "conventional" here to mean 
RULE-GOVERMED as opposed to the more specific AGREED UPOM (However, see 
sections 6 and 6.1, where I distinguish between rule-govertied M-representation and M- 
representation which is both rule-governed and agreed upon. ) BR observes that M- 
representation must be wholly conventional when there is no overlap of the perceptual 
domains to which x and y belong (e. g. the visual M-representation of musical sounds), and 
wheny is cognitive rather than perceptual (e. g. the representatum of "S", "527", W or "A 
"). As conceived within the representational framework, the linguistic is radically internal 
in virtue of being entirely cognitive, and can have no properties in common with the 
external E-physical utterance phenomena which thereby convvyzlionally M-represent it. 
It follows from the conventional nature of this M-representational relation that there 
can be almost any number or variety of representational systems, both within and across 
perceptual domains (BR and Carr 1999: 395). And since they are all equally M- 
representational and therefore equally non-natural, no representational system could have 
a closer or more "natural" relation to the linguistic - and certainly no representational 
system could be "more linguistic" - than another. In this sense, speech is no more 
"natural" than, say, writing. As Burton-Roberts and Carr argue (ibid: 396), speech has to 
be distinguished from a natural capacity and disposition to vocalise. The latter is naturally 
and inherently productive of certain sounds, but for those sounds to be hl-representations 
(of anything, not just of the linguistic) they have to be intended and/ or assumed to be so 
by their producers and/ or perceivers. Thus speech, in DR and Cares words (ibid), 
involves "the non-natural exploitation of that natural capacity and disposition [to 
vocalise], as a medium of (n[on-]n[atural]) M-representation of the linguistic". 
So on the conjecture that the linguistic is M-represented by external utterance 
phenomena, it is the latter - and the abilities, habits, etc involved in their production and 
perception -- which are brought to bear upon the former. This deployment of the E- 
physical is most obviously for the purpose of providing other non-telepathic humans with 
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indirect -- because merely M-representational - but E-physical access to what is I- 
cognitive, i. e. the linguistic. It has to be stressed that the linguistic is NOT constituted in 
this M-representational relation of the E-physical to the I-linguistic, or in the non-natural 
M-representational conventions which govern it. The property of being conventional 
belongs exclusively to the utterance phenomena! s M-representational relation to the 
linguistic, just as linguistic properties belong to the linguistic and not to utterance 
phenomena. Utterances are cootively significant, but only in virtue of being intended/ 
assumed to be M-representational of the linguistic. In other words, the cognitive 
significance of utterances is purely M-representational, and must not be confused with 
the cognitive value which the M-represented linguistic expressions possess in virtue of 
their linguistic (and especially semantic) properties. 
As BR points out (1994: 194), there may in fact be a tendency to confuse and/ or 
identify M-representations with their linguistic representata. This tendency arises from the 
fact that linguistic expressions (as conceived within a truly interrialist linguistic theory) are 
never physically encountered, while "the [E-physical M-representation of a linguistic 
expression], but not what is represented, is so accessible to the conscious mind" (ibid). 
Whereas E-physical utterances and their representational significance obviously lie within 
the realm of human consciousness, it follows from the interrialist view that the linguistic - 
being an innate state of mind/ brain -- is not something to which we have conscious 
cognitive access (BR and Carr 1999: 399). BR and Carr claim: 
Perceptually and consciously, then, speakers have only the E-physical 
phenomena and their significance to go on. (ibid) 
Thus E-physical M-representations of linguistic expressions are probably the closest that 
humans can cotisciously get to the linguistic -- which, I assume, is not very close at all. 
M-representations are by definition far from transparent with respect to the nature and 
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properties of their representata. As BR and Carr point out (ibid: 397), the M- 
representations of linguistic expressions are not perspicuous enough to be something from 
which a complete account of the nature of the linguistic representata may be obtained. 3 
But they are at least as perspicuous as their compositiotialify allows them to be (ibid, DR 
1994: 198). Conventional M-representation is not wholly arbitrary, for there are 
conventional M-representations which are complex. Unlike simple M-representations -- 
signs consisting only of physical symbols (e. g. (n): one symbol, one sign; (d-o-g): three 
symbols, one sign), complex M-representations are signs composed of signs (e. g. ((a- 
1)(w-o-r-kffl. Their composition is not arbitrary but governed by a system of 
representational rules - i. e. a CONVENTIONAL SYSTEM OF PHYSICAL 
REPRESENTATION (CSPR) (DR and Carr 1999: 397). The composition of a complex 
M-representation is "representational of [some but not all] aspects of the composition of 
the linguistic expression represented" (BR 1994: 198). So, as far as their compositionality 
is concerned, M-representational utterances are perspicuous to the extent that we may 
make inferences about linguistic compositionality from the system of rules which governs 
representatiotial compositionality. 
More obviously, M-representational utterance phenomena must be perspicuous 
enoughto 
... afford some kind of cognitive access to what is represented and to 
allow for acquisition of that kind of access. (ibid) 
Furthermore, it would appear that an M-representational utterance reveals enough about 
its linguistic representatum for reprcsentans to be mistaken for rcpresentatum, and for 
properties of rcpresentatum to be mistakenly attributed to reprcsentans. In DR 1994, DR 
1999b and DR and Carr 1999 (: 397-8), it is claimed that the notion of linguistic 
Hence the theoretical nature of theoretical linguistics. 
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ambiguity arises from the confusion of linguistic semantics with representational 
indeterminacy. 
Before I discuss the representational account of so-called "linguistic ambiguity", 
however, let me review and revise the notational conventions I have been using thus far. I 
have been using double quotation marks to indicate utterances, single quotation marks to 
indicate linguistic expressions, and italics for the semantics of linguistic expressions. I 
subscribe to BR! s representational conjecture, and believe that E-physical or E-instantiable 
utterances -- e. g. "bachelor" -- are M-representations of linguistic expressions. 
Furthermore, bearing in mind the nature of the M-representational relation, I take it that 
the linguistic expression M-represented by an utterance "bachelor" need not necessarily be 
the linguistic expression which means unmarried male. It just so happens that, according 
to the particular CSPR which I am using at the moment, "bachelor" does M-represent the 
linguistic expression 'bacheloe. In order to avoid the implication that the utterance 
"bachelor" is somehow inextricably associated with the linguistic expression 'bacheloe, 
and to distance the I-linguistic from the E-physical and M-rcpresentational, I shall use 
braces to indicate M-representations (e. g. (bachelor)). Note that these braces and their 
contents constitute citations of M-representations and not of ulterances. 4 An M. 
representation in itself is not an utterance. It can, however, be uttered. More importantly, 
it is the M-representation of a linguistic expression - and never the linguistic expression 
itself -- which a so-called "utterance of a linguistic expression" is an utterance or 
Returning to the topic of "ambiguity", DR rejects the notion of a linguistic expression 
being "ambiguous" in the sense of having more than one meaning, e. g. 'flying planee 
meaning the j7yMg of planes or planes which are J7)*Ig. lie suggests instead that the 
flybig of platzes constitutes the semantics of a linguistic expression 'flying planes I', and 
platies which are flying, the semantics of another linguistic expression 'flying planesi. 
4 In fact, strictly speaking, the braces and their contents constitute "citation[s] of ale alphabetical 
strings conventionally employed to represent linguistic expressions" (DR 1994: 203, my italics). 
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This rejection of linguistic ambiguity is motivated by the view that, in the individuation of 
linguistic expressions, the semantic has as significant a role as any other linguistic property 
(BR 1994: 182-3, DR and Carr 1999: 397-8). Thus the idea that there is a single 
"ambiguous" linguistic expression meaning the flying of planes OR planes which are 
flying arises from the attributing of linguistic, semantic properties to the non-linguistic, 
non-semantic M-representation (flying planes). This leads to the single M-representation 
(flying planes) - with its M-representational indeterminacy as to which of the two 
linguistic expressions 'flying planesl' and 'flying planes2' is being represented - being 
taken for a single "ambiguous" linguistic expression *flying planes. 
Another of BR! s examples of the confusion/ conflation of representational and 
linguistic properties has to do with syntax (DR 1994: 199, DR and Carr 1999: 398, DR 
1999a). DR argues that linear precedence does not constitute a syntactic property of 
linguistic expressions, but is in fact the intrinsic spatio-temporal linearity of the E-physical 
phenomena used to M-represent the linguistic (and of E-physical phenomena in general, 
M-representational or otherwise). To state the argument in another way, using the 
linguistic instead of the representational as the starting point: entirely I-linguistic entities 
like Heads and Complements cannot be identified with E-physical objects occuring in E. 
physical strings, just as the I-linguistic H-C relation cannot be regarded as a geometric 
relation involving E-physical phenomena linearly ordered in respect of one another. 
It is not just the obvious (M-representational) relevance of M-representations to their 
linguistic representata, but also the fact that the latter is actually inaccessible to perception 
and consciousness, that fuels the inclination to identify the M-representational with the 
linguistic (BR 1994: 194-5, BR and Carr 1999: 398-9). While the distinction between a 
painting of a pipe and its equally E-physical representaturn is perceptually manifcst, the 
fact that the linguistic is cognitive and therefore never physically encountered means that 
it is only its M-rcpresentations, what we do with those hl-rcprescritations and how we do 
what we do with them, that are evident to us. In this E-physical absence of rcpresentata, 
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the very fact of M-representation as such, and of specifically M-representational skills and 
conventions, tends not to emerge. On the other hand, how the painting of the pipe is 
produced, and what we do (or can do) with it, is obviously not the same as the 
manufacture and function of the pipe, and therefore easily perceived as being M- 
representational. Furthermore, the painting may be of value and interest in itself, 
regardless of its M-representational nature. In contrast, the utterance is more easily 
confused with its linguistic representaturn because the M-representation in this case is of 
interest to its producers and perceivers primarily (and indeed only) for its M- 
representational relation to the linguistic. 
5.2 What is linguistic semantics the semantics or.: the nature and status of 
phonology within the representational framework 
The representational conjecture (RC) bears upon the issues of literal and linguistic 
meaning mainly through its implications for phonetics and phonology. The traditional idea 
of linguistic expressions as sound-meaning pairs (taking the form of (n, %) pairs in 
Chomsky 1995b, for example) appears to have given rise to a certain ambiguity with 
regard to the question of what linguistic semantics is the semantics of On the one hand, 
the linguistic semantics is regarded as the semantics of the finguisfic expression, in the 
sense of being the "meaning" part of the sound-mcaning pair which the linguistic 
expression is supposed to be constituted by. On the other hand, and yet by the same 
token, it is also regarded as the semantics of the lVionakform, in the sense of being the 
"meaning" which the "sound" carries or constitutes the vehicle oC For example, Chomsky 
(1995b: 2) explicitly refers to "sound with a meaning". In fact this notion of the "meaning" 
carried by some vehicle appears to be fundamental to the concept of literalness. Linguistic 
expressions may be described as having literal meanings, but strictly speaking it is the 
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"sound" (phonetic form) or the vehicle -- rather than the linguistic expression, the entire 
sound-meaning pair - which the literal meaning is assigned to (by a particular linguistic 
system), and literally the meaning of. 
Of course, according to the RC, sounds can in no way belong within the wholly I- 
cognitive domain of the linguistic. Assuming that it has to do with "the acoustic and the 
articulatory behaviour usually required to produce it" (Burton-Roberts and Carr 1999: 
399)5 - i. e. E-physical utterance phenomena and utterance behaviour - the phonetic is, in 
RC terms, not linguistic but M-representational of the linguistic. Whether phonology is of 
the linguistic or the M-representational is a more complex issue. The position which 
Burton-Roberts ultimately takes - in BR and Carr 1999 as well as BR 1998 and 2000 - 
is that the phonological is not I-linguistic but is, together with the phonetic, M- 
representational of the linguistic. The implications of this position for the concept of 
literal meaning and the nature of the linguistic will be discussed in the remaining sections 
of this chapter. This section is mainly concerned with the BR and Canes 1999 discussion 
of, and arguments against, the notion of an I-linguistic phonology. 
It is stated in BR and Carr 1999 (: 399), however, that the RC "does not, of itself, 
deliver a decision on [questions about the nature and status of phonology]". The common 
assumption is, of course, that the linguistic does include the phonological. The other 
common assumption is that the phonological in particular (as opposed to the syntactic or 
the semantic) is associated with the phonetic. DR and Carr 1999 take these assumptions 
seriously enough to discuss them in connection with the RC, concluding that aphonolosy 
which is Minguislic would have to be regarded as CONVE NTIONA LL Y Af-rej)resenled 
by the phonefic. In other words, on the view that the linguistic includes the phonological, 
5 Articulatory bchaviour is usually but not necessarily required for the production of die acoustic. 
As BR and Carr point out (1999: 395), it is not thc articulatory bchaviour but the acoustic which 
actually M-reprcscnts the linguistic, and "how [acoustic M-rcprcscntationsj are produced (be it by 
vocal articulations, including those of vcntriloquists, or by kcy-prcssing on a speech synthesiscr) is 
irrelevant". 
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the phonetic would be M-representational of the linguistic in virtue of specifically M- 
representing its phonological elements. 
However, the notion of a phonology which is I-linguistic and conventionally M- 
represented by the (clearly E-orientated, non-linguistic) phonetic has two problematic 
implications. Firstly, such a phonology must be entirely lacking in phonetic content. It 
certainly would not be phonology, in the sense of involving E-physical phones (or even 
abstractions from E-physical phones). Nor would it be mentalistic phonetics, or 
phonetically interpretable. As BR and Carr point out, a radically internal and austere 
phonology that is conventionally M-represented by the phonetic must be 
... 'abstract' beyond anything 
dreamed of even in the most 'abstract' 
phonology. (1999: 400) 
Secondly, an I-linguistic phonology would not only be in a conventional relation with the 
M-representational phonetic, but also with the I-linguistic syntax and semantics. The 
particular relations between phonological objects, syntactic rules and semantic forms 
constitute the main individuating feature of a "particular language" (e. g. English or 
Swahili, following Chomsky 1995a: 13). So the way in which the phonology is aligned 
with the syntax and semantics must be as arbitrary as is consistent with the diversity of 
"particular languages". In short, there must be different sets of phonology-syntax. 
semantics tuples for different "particular languages". 
One obvious probem, arising from the first implication, is this. Apart from the fact of 
the I-linguistic phonology's conventional relations with the other I-linguistic (syntactic/ 
semantic) elements, only negative inferences - mainly to do with there being absolutely 
nothing phonetic about such a phonology - can be made about its I-linguistic nature and 
rationale. Certainly there is nothing that can be ascertained about what distinguishes it 
from the syntax or semantics, and especially about what sets it apart as the specific M- 
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representaturn of the phonetic. Even more problematically, what caii be ascertained about 
an I-linguistic phonology -- i. e. the conventional nature of its I-linguistic relation to the 
syntactic/ semantic as well as its non-linguistic relation to the phonetic - is precisely what 
makes it seem less than L The non-naturalness of the linguistic relation to the syntax and 
semantics is at odds with the notion of the I-linguistic as a natural object, a state of mind/ 
brain. As for the non-linguistic relation to the phonetic: that the phonological happens to 
be the one element of the linguistic which the phonetic is assumed to M-represent - or 
which, if a "particular language" has no phonetic M-representational medium (e. g. "sign 
languages"), is not M-represented at all - suggests that it is more closely associated with 
the E-phonetic than an I-linguistic phonology is supposed to be. 
BR and Carr claim that there are other factors, quite apart from RC considerations, 
which support the argument that the phonetic would have to be conventionally related to 
the phonological if the latter is linguistic (1999: 400). One has to do with the substantive 
universals of such a phonology. BR and Carr argue that only the Strotig notion of 
universal applies in this case. The reason is as follows. In the words of BR and Carr, a 
weak notion of universal is 
... the idea of a universal bag of properties from which "particular languages" may differentially select. (1999: 40 1) 
and a strong notion of universal is 
... the idea of a highly constrained set of propcrties, not given in 
advance of enquiry, actually attested in all "particular languages". (ibid) 
DR and Carr claim that there cannot be weak finguistic universals in the phonological 
domain, because it is specifically and peculiarly in the phonological domain that the weak 
universals are obviously not linguistic at all. As DR and Caff point out, weak universals 
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like 'ingressive' and 'pharyngeal, are clearly determined by "human physiology between 
nose and larynx" (ibid). In short, they are universals "not of language but of human 
physiology" (ibid). This leaves us with the strong notion of universal, and the exclusion 
from the phonological of physiologically orientated properties like 'pharyngeal' which are 
not attested in all "particular languages". The nature of the phonological, if linguistic, 
must therefore be so absolutely different from that of the phonetic that the relation 
between the two can only be conventional. 
Furthermore, any natural or more fundamental relation between the phonological and 
the phonetic is ruled out by the fact that, whereas the phonological is - on the view that 
phonology is linguistic -- a feature of every "particular language", not all of these 
"particular languages" have a phonetics. As I mentioned above, what we call "sign 
languages" are clearly non-phonetic. Thus the so-called "strong universals" in the phonetic 
domain are simply not strongly universal -- the phonetic is just one of the several media 
of M-representation, and therefore in no position to correspond to or determine 
"phonologically" strong universals attested in all "particular languages". 
All these problems and difficulties may be due to the strong possibility that the very 
idea of phonology -- and of various "particular languages" arising from the permutations 
and combinations of the phonological with the syntactic and semantic - actually has an 
externalist basis, and is therefore completely at odds with the internalist theory in which 
DR and Carr 1999 attempts to incorporate it. Thus the discussion of the difficulties of 
locating and defining phonology within the intemalist framework in DR and Carr 1999 
could be said to pave the way for DR 2000, which makes no attempt to 
keep the notion of an I-linguistic phonology. Instead, it starts from the position that the 
notion of phonology is only compatible with what DR calls the essentialist or gelleric 
view that the linguistic is constituted by a variety of "languages" (with a small "I") - i. e. 
"particular languages" like English or Swahili. Each of these "languages" has a phonology 
in order that its "expressions" may be E-physically instantiated for the purpose of 
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communication. In other words, the phonology of a "particular language" is quite literally 
a phonology involving E-physical phones, and therefore necessary for the "language" to 
function as an E-physical medium for communication. 
On the other hand, there is the naturalist view, according to which the linguistic is 
completely internal in virtue of being a natural, innate state of mind/ brain - i. e. Language 
(with a capital "L") rather than "(particular) languages". Unlike "languages", Language is 
only E-physically instantiated as states of brain in individuals. It is not functional - not for 
being used, notfor anything. BR subscribes to this truly internalist view of the linguistic; 
and to the notion that phonology, being E-realisable for the particular function of 
carrying/ conveying meaning, cannot be I-linguistic. As BR and Carr point out: 
On this alternative, there is no reason why the phonological should not 
be (unschizophrenically) phonological - "mentalistic phonetics", to do 
with the production/ perception of "sounds as sucW'. (1999: 402) 
In other words, this leaves the phonological free to be as closely related to the phonetic as 
it can get, to be orientated toward the phonetic rather than the other M-representational 
way around. In short, on these terms phonology is not linguistic but M-rcpresentational. 
On this view, the phonological is internal only in the sense of being 
... an internalised attitude to the acoustic phenomena produced 
by 
fellow humans in the local community in aid of M-reprcsenting the 
linguistic. (BR and Carr 1999: 402) 
That is, a phonology consists in regularities and categories abstracted from what acoustic 
phenomena are used, and how they are used, by a particular group of people to M- 
represent the linguistic. DR and Carr 1999(: 402) concludes that a phonology is in fact a 
Conventional System of Physical Representation (CSPR) for Af-representational media 
which are phonetic. DR 1998 is more spccific: it states that phonology concerns the 
192 
categories abstracted from the M-representational use of the acoustic medium; and 
morphology, the M-representational conventions defined in terms of those categories. 
What is more, BR argues that a "particular language" with a phonetics does not just 
include, but IS, a morphophonological system -- i. e. a CSPR consisting of conventions 
abstracted from, and governing, a particular use of a particular set of acoustic phenomena 
to M-represent the linguistic. This means that a "particular language" with a phonology 
and phonetics bears exactly the same relation to the linguistic as, say, "sign languages" or 
systems of writing (even those which are acquired after, and parasitic on, a phonology): 
all are CSPRs, though involving different E-physical media, used for the M-representation 
of a unique cognitive system, namely Language. 
BR! s proposal that "particular languages" are CSPRs is also consistent with the 
notion of "language acquisition". That the linguistic has to be learned or acquired is 
obviously incompatible with the internalist view of it as natural and innate. For DR and 
Carr 1999 and DR 1998, however, what is learned/ acquired is not Language in the 
naturalist sense but "particular languages", i. e. conventional systems of physical 
representation (CSPRs) for the external M-representation of a unique Language. Since it 
is an internallsed attitude to M-representations, a CSPR or "particular language" can only 
be acquired (mentally internalised) when the relevant (NI-representational) E-physical 
phenomena are actually encountered or experienced. Even before that, however, the I. 
linguistic representatum - i. e. Language - must be cognitivcly accessed in some 
unconscious way, in order for the individual to be able to ascribe representational 
intentions and thereby pick out those E-physical phenomena which are (or are assumed to 
be) intended as M-representational of the linguistic. 
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5.2.1 M-representation and the conventional vehicle-meaning relation 
In my opinion, the naturalist view and the representational conjecture (RC) provide some 
answers to the questions raised in Davidson 1981 and 1986 about how conventions 
governing sound-meaning (or vehicle-meaning) relations bear upon the linguistic and vice 
versa. Davidson rejects the view of the linguistic as including systems of such conventions 
(i. e. prior and passing theories), learned in advance and shared by speakers. His grounds 
are that speakers are constantly constructing different systems of conventions for different 
circumstances (e. g. different interlocutors). Thus the main argument of Davidson 1986 is 
that the term "language" should not be used to distinguish something - i. e. the setting up 
and application of supposedly "linguistic" conventions -- which he regards as 
indistinguishable from "knowing our way around in the world generally" (1986: 446); and, 
more specifically, from the socially conditioned tendency to "speak much as [one! s] 
neighbours do" (1981: 278). Furthermore, he suggests that it is not the conventional that 
is a feature of language, but the linguistic that is necessary for the establishing and sharing 
of conventions. 
So Davidson does assume that there is something that the term "language" refers to, 
but argues in Davidson 1981 and 1986 that, whatever it is, it is independent of - though 
necessary for - the sociocultural phenomena which he considers prior and passing 
theories to be. This may not seem particularly interesting for someone who subscribes to 
the internalist view of the linguistic. On this view there is a distinction between the 
linguistic and the use of it in the production/ interpretation of utterances. Prior/ passing 
theories obviously arise from the latter rather than constitute the former. Thus Chomsky 
remarks (1992a: 119) that Davidson 1986 "[does] not seem to show very much". For 
Chomsky there is of course an I-language, a generative procedure, distinct from the 
interpretation faculty which involves all the capacities of the mind, and is involved in 
"everything that people are capable of doing" (ibid: 120). 
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However, the fact remains that the non-natural sound-meaning relations governed by 
Davidson's systems of conventions are also crucial to, and problematic for, ChomsWs I- 
language. In the I-linguistic lexicon, lexical items have entries containing information 
about the "sound-meaning relation" (Chomsky 1995b: 236), upon which the 
computational component computes to give (7r, %) pairs that determine "the phenomena 
of sound and meaning for [a particular I-language L]" (ibid: 224). Most importantly, the 
supposedly I-linguistic (7r, %) is what it is, a sound-meaning pair, in virtue of being 
specifically acconunodated to the A[rticulatory]-P[erceptual] and C[conceptual]. 
I[ntentional] performance systems which effect the process of ulteraiwe Inferpretalloit. 
Furthermore, although it is supposed to be the basis for the construction of prior/ 
passing theories during utterance production/ interpretation, Chomsky's I-language is 
similar to those very theories in two ways. Firstly, Chomsky and Davidson seem to agree 
that systems of sound-meaning relations -- prior theories for Davidson, I-linguistic for 
Chomsky -- differ from speaker to speaker. Davidson suggests: 
It could even happen that every speaker from the start had his own 
quite unique way of speaking. Something approaching this is in fact the 
case, of course. Different speakers have different stocks of proper 
names, different vocabularies, and attach somewhat different meanings 
to words. (1981: 276-7) 
The "unique way of speaking" and "different stocks of proper names" may be regarded by 
Chomskians as obviously having to do with so-called "language rise", but "different 
vocabularies" and attaching "different meanings to words" is consistent with tile fact that - 
- the "I" in "Manguage" being also for "individual" -a "particular I-language" for 
Chomsky is the I-language of a particular person. Therefore a "particular I-language" is 
not the same as the "particular languages" -- e. g. English, Swahili - of DR and Carr 1999. 
Chomsky claims that 
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In the empirical study of language, it has long been taken for granted 
that there is nothing in the world selected by such terms as "Chinese", 
or "German", or even much narrower terms. Speaking the same 
language is much like "living near" or "looking like"... (1995a: 48-9) 
_English, 
Chinese, etc are "community norms" or "social practices", not I-languages. or is 
any other "standard language" or system of terms invented by authority figures or experts 
like dictionary writers and scientists. A particular I-language is what Chomsky says he has 
- one that is different from the particular I-language of Boris, "a monolingual speaker of 
some variety of Russian" (1992a: 123); and even from the particular I-language of Jones, 
although "I can understand Jones, within limits, because my I-language is not too different 
from his" (ibid). 1 
The second feature common to I-languages and passing/ prior theories has to do with 
Chornsky's claim that the I-language is a "steady state" of the language faculty: 
... the cognitive system of Jones's language 
faculty is modified in 
response to linguistic experience, changing state until it pretty much 
stabilizes, perhaps as early as six to eight years old, which would mean 
that later (non-lexical) changes that have been found, up to about 
puberty, are inner directed. (1995a: 13) 
Whereas "later (non-lexical) changes" are described here as "inner-directed", the "steady 
state" (i. e. I-language) does undergo later lexical changes, and does so in response to 
what Chomsky calls "linguistic experience". For instance, the modifications made by an 
individual to his usage of particular expressions to coincide with the usage of other 
individuals is described by Chomsk-y as "marginal changes of Maitguage" (1992b: 217, 
my italics) and "marginal and rather arbitrary variations of Manguage" (ibid: 228, my 
italics again). No doubt these are "marginal" and very small changes; but so are those 
6 For problems with admitting "individual languages" but not English, Swahili. ctc as I-linguistic, 
see BR and Carr 1999(: 3 88-9). 
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which, for Davidson, amount to the replacing of prior theories with passing theories (or 
other prior theories). 
From his 1998 and 2000 position on the nature and status of phonology, Burton- 
Roberts'views on "lexical change" and the lexicon (as usually -- morphophonologically - 
understood) may easily be deduced. The representational conjecture (RQ situates E- 
instantiable phonology, as well as the conventionality of its association with linguistic 
semantics (i. e. "the sound-meaning relation"), in the domain of the M-representational. So 
according to the RC and the naturalist view, the linguistic 
... cannot be thought of as 
including "lexical items" as generally (i. e. 
morphophonologically) understood. On the contrary, so understood, 
the lexicon precisely is the locus of extralinguistic, M-representational 
(local, culture-bound) arbitrariness. It has to be acquired and stored. 
(Burton-Roberts and Carr 1999: 404)7 
And with regard to Chomsky's and Davidsotfs problem: by excluding the conventional/ 
arbitrary from the linguistic, the RC makes it possible for the linguistic to be regarded as a 
completely internal and natural state of mind/ brain, "universal" in the sense of ranging 
over all the individuals innately endowed with such a mind/ brain state, and entirely 
7 Note that in 1994 13R had yet to conclude that phonology and the (morphophonological) lexicon 
are M-rcpresentational rather than linguistic. Ilius he assumed that words were the basic units 
from which sentences and phrases were composed, and that the complexity of hl-rcprcscntations 
was M-rcpresentational of this lexical compositionality: 
the usual convention - common to orthographic and acoustic representation 
is that the physical representation of a complex cxpression is composed of 
ordered physical representations of the words that the sentence or phrase 
contains. As a representation of a sentence (or phrase), thcn, an uttcrancc is 
representational of at least (and perhaps at most) the lexical properties of the 
linguistic expression it is a representation of. (1994: 198) 
But it follows from the exclusion of morphoplionology from the linguistic that words, and die 
complex structures constructed from words, cannot be linguistic. Besides, it is clear that what 
constitutes a word varies from particular language to particular language, i. c. from CSPR to 
CSPR; and that the syntactico-scmantic object to which a particular word (NI-rcprcscntationally) 
corresponds may be conceptually complex, and far from being a basic linguistic unit. 
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independent of the external behaviour and sociocultural circumstances which necessitate 
the construction and implementation of so-called "linguistic" (actually M-representational) 
conventions, and which also cause variations in, and changes to, those conventions. 
More specifically, the RCs removal of phonology and (morphophonological) lexicon 
from the linguistic means that linguistic expressions -- i. e. what is generated by the innate, 
unique grammar which constitutes the linguistic -- are in fact exclusively S)7itactico- 
semantic I-linguistic objects (BR and Carr 1999: 4034). 8 Note that syntax in this 
naturalist sense excludes many properties that are traditionally regarded as syntactic - 
namely those which are associated with the E-physically instantiable morphophonology. 
These properties are consigned by the RC to the domain of M-representation. 
This shift of the phonological and its associated morphosyntactic features from the 
linguistic to the M-representational may be described in terms of Chornskys Minimalist 
Program, perhaps as a way of converting Chomsk-/s "Wanguage" -- which, as it is, seems 
very much like a CSPR -- into something that is consistent with the internalist standards 
of BR! s (and, ideally, Chomsky's own) naturalist view. A grammar without a phonology is 
one without a phonological component, And without the phonological part of CIIL there 
would also be no Spell-Out: the operation which applies at the point of the computation 
where the overt component splits into the phonological and covert components, and 
which strips away from the structure formed by the overt component the elements 
relevant to the PF representation and the phonological component. It follows from this 
that morphosyntactic properties -- i. e. overt PF syntax -- would share the non-linguistic, 
81 have argued that the lexicon, as the locus of the Saussurcan arbitrariness of vchicle-mcaning 
pairs, is in fact an M-rcprcscntational plictioniction. I lo%%-cvcr, it is necessary to distinguish the 
lexicon of a particular CSPR - or a vocabulary, as DR (2000) calls it - from the unique Lcx1con 
of the 1-cognitive, vchicle-icss linguistic. Mic Lexical items of the Lcxicon are vchic1c-1css 
syntactico-scmantic objects generated by die grammar. Note that the characteristics of lexicons/ 
vocabularies must not be projected onto the Lexicon. For a start, conccpts of what is simple and 
what is complex, as applied to E-Instantlable words and scntcnccs, c1carly cannot be brought to 
bear upon 1-cognifive syntactico-scmantic objects. DR also points out (ibid) that thcro is no reason 
to expect the (M-rcprescntational) rclation between vocabulary itcnis and Lexical items to be 
necessarily isomorphic. 
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M-representational status of phonology, morphology and the (morphophonologiical) 
lexicon. 
Exactly what these properties are is the subject of ongoing research, although there is 
some relevant material in BR 1999a (on linear precedence, mentioned in 5.1) and BR 
1998 (which argues that case and agreement are not interpretable at LF precisely because 
they are not linguistic but M-representational). What I am concerned with here, however, 
are the syntactico-semantic objects which the RC reduces linguistic expressions to, their 
bearing on the notion of linguistic semantics, and associated issues involving the notions 
of "literal meaning" and "language use". 
If syntax consists only of covert LF syntax, i. e. syntax serving the linguistic semantics 
- or what Davidson (1981: 279) describes as "the pattern of inference and structure 
created by the logical constants" -- then the linguistic expressions generated by BR! s 
innate, unique grammar would in effect be Chomsky's Xs untrammelled (as it were) by 7[s, 
Alternatively, they could be regarded as logical forms which - contrary to Sperber and 
WilsoWs relevance theory - are never encoded, because there would be no place for the 
notion of "linguistic encoding". It follows from this that linguistic semantics is, strictly 
speaking, not meaning in the sense of being the meaning Af of some vehicle U. Or rather, 
it is not meaning in any relational sense of "meaning". 9 Furthermore, linguistic semantics 
is not the basis of LITERAL MEANING (whether of "linguistic expressions" or 
"utterances"), since the very idea of literalness has to do, not with M alone, but with M 
being -- and being taken to be -- the meaning of what it is literally the meaning of, i. e. U. 
What the RC highlights is the fact that the U-M relation is the locus of non-natural 
9 Nevertheless, I will have to continue on the lines of linguistic expressions having meanings, or 
meaning whatever they mean, until flic controversial issue of whether linguistic expressions in 
fact constitute meaning (in a non-rclational sense) is addrcsscd in section 5.3. 
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Saussurean arbitrariness and convention. No natural object is inherently a Saussaurean 
signifier. Objects are linked with concepts or ideas in Saussurean signs if and only if they 
are intended, or assumed to be intended, to "signify" those concepts or ideas. 
So a more precise way of putting Davidson's rather confused 1981 claim - 
Literal meaning and intended literal meaning must coincide if there is to 
be a literal meaning. (1981: 271-2) 
-- is to say that "intended literal meaning" is the only sort of literal meaning there is. Much 
closer to this non-natural notion of literal meaning is Davidson's 1986 argument that the 
intention to express M with "expression" U is necessary and sufficient for "expression "U 
with literal meaning M to be used -- bearing in mind Davidson's conclusion that the 
passing and prior theories which determine U-MI vehicle-meaning relations do not 
constitute the linguistic. The RC manages to explain what these non-linguistic, non- 
natural vehicle-meaning relations involve, and especially how they bear upon linguistic 
expressions generated by a natural, mentally constituted grammar. According to the RC: 
(1) What is generally assumed to be an E-physical vehicle U of meatzing U- or 
signifier U, or whatever M is literally the meaning of -- is actually all E-physical 
object that is produced, or assumed to be produced, Will the Intemloil of 
conventiotially M-represetifing a litiguislic expressiolt, 
(2) What is generally assumed to be the LITERAL MEANING M of U is actually 
the particular cognitive value whicli the E-physical Upossesses, or Is assumed to 
possess, ih virtue of H-representing a linguistic expressloii Wilt a particular 
semantics. 
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Thus it follows from the RC that the concept of literalness and literal meaning - 
together with the U-M relation upon which it is based -- actually has to do with non- 
natural M-representation rather than with the linguistic. For the RC, an E-physical object 
U cannot strictly be regarded as "a vehicle of meaning M" or as "having meaning M", if 
only because this relational notion of "meaning" seems to imply that U is naturally and 
intrinsically possessed of meaning. The fact is that U is not naturally and intrinsically 
possessed of meaning. To think that it was would be to project onto the M-representation 
that which is only true of what it M-represents. 
On the other hand - as I have already pointed out - linguistic expressions cannot be 
regarded as "having meanings" either. Linguistic expressions are naturally and intrinsically 
possessed of a semantics, in virtue of being at least partly (and possibly wholly) 
constituted by that semantics. So, even within the RC framework, it does seem reasonable 
to retain a notion of literal meaning M of vehicle U, as long as it is clear that M is NOT 
the semantics of a linguistic expression U, but the non-natural M-representational 
significance of an M-representation U of a linguistic expression. 
It also follows from (1) and (2) that: 
(3) What, for Chomsky or Carston, is the literal USE OF A LINGUISTIC 
EXPRESSION to express its literal meaning is - according to the RC - Me use of 
a noti-natural E-physical M-representalimi ofsome fingulstic expressiom 
More specifically: what tends to be regarded as. the literal use of a linguistic expression is 
(for the RC) the production and manipulation of an E-physical M-rcprescntation of some 
linguistic expression, in aid of E-physically M-represcnting that very linguistic expression. 
This is consistent with my argument in 4.1, that what "linguistic expression" is used is 
generally taken to be the "linguistic expression" idiose (E. '-physical) photielic form Is 
produced rather than the "linguistic expression" whose meaning is intended to be 
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"pressed. On the RC the phonetic form which is uttered is not of course linguistic but M- 
representational of the linguistic. Furthermore, what linguistic expression this phonetic 
form M-represents depends on what Conventional System of Physical Representation 
(CSPR) its utterer is using. Therefore the literal meaning (i. e. M-rcpresentational 
significance) of the phonetic form, and the literal use of the phonetic form to express its 
literal meaning, are both determined by M-representational convention. 
Although I have been using "conventional" in the sense of rule-governed, the term 
also indicates consensus. In an ordinary social context, what is generally regarded as 
constituting the literal meanings of the expressions of a "language" has to be agreed upon, 
or at least assumed to be agreed upon, by the members of the social group which uses that 
"language". Thus CSPRs and the "literal meanings" which they govern tend to be shaped 
by what Davidson calls the socially conditioned tendency to "speak much as [one's] 
neighbours do" (1981: 278), and other sociocultural factors. 
It is from this sociocultural aspect of M-representation that Chornsky's and Carstows 
concept of "language MISUSE" arises: 
(4) What Chomsky and Carston regard as the MISUSE OF A LINGUISTIC 
EXPRESSION is, on RC terms, the misrepresentatimi of a finguisfic exi)ressioll, 
where "misrepresentation" means an M-representation that does not conforrn to 
the CSPR agreed upon by the members of the relevant social group. 
In other words, what is actually being mýisused is not a linguistic expression but an M- 
representation. The important point is that it is only with respect to a particular CSPR of 
a particular community - especially one which is endorsed by authority figures, and 
recognised (if not actually strictly adhered to) by a large proportion of tile community 
members -- that M-representations of linguistic expressions can be said to be misused, or 
that linguistic expressions can be said to be misrepresented. To misuse an M- 
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representation of a linguistic expression is in effect to deviate from some CSPR -- to use 
an E-physical object which, according to that CSPR, conventionally M-represents one 
linguistic expression, to M-represent another linguistic expression. 
Actually I am not sure if ýdrs Malaprop, for example, could be said to have deviated 
ftom an M-representational rule which she appparently has no knowledge of, or to have 
misused an M-representation which she has not in fact used. According to the CSPR 
which she chose to use on that occasion, (derangement) IS the M-representation of 
&arrangement'. Strictly speaking, that is the M-representation which Mrs Malaprop 
intended to (and did) use, and the convention (and corresponding CSPR) which states 
that (derangement) M-represents 'arrangement' is the convention (/ CSPR) which Mrs 
Malaprop intended to (and did) follow. Similarly, Humpty Dumpty does not deviate from 
or misuse one CSPR so much as choose to use another. Unlike Mrs Malaprop, however, 
he is aware of the M-representations and M-representational rules which he is expected to 
(but deliberately does not) use. So my point is this. A person always uses an M. 
representation "correctly", i. e. in aid of M-representing what that M-representation M. 
represents, because what the M-representation M-represents - what Al-representation it 
is - is determined by the CSPR which he himself chooses to adhere to on that particular 
occasion. 
What I have been arguing so far is that the concepts of literal meaning and usel 
misuse, as usually understood, are actually 10-rcprcsentational concepts rather than 
linguistic concepts. Furthermore, what constitutes the "litcral meanings" of M- 
representations of linguistic expressions, and what constitutes the use or misuse of those 
M-representations, is determined by M-representational conventions which tend to have a 
sociocultural basis. Linguistic expressions, on the other hand, are (I argue) naturally and 
at least partly constituted by their semantics. As purely I-cognitive objects IT IS 
OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS TO BE UUM IN 
THE SAME SENSE AS THEIR E-PHYSICAL M-REPRESENTATIONS ARE USED 
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(if, indeed, linguistic expressions can be said to be used at all). And it follows from this 
naturalist view of the linguistic (Burton-Roberts 1998, BR 2000), and from the RC, that 
IT IS ALSO IMPOSSIBLE FOR LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS TO BE MISUSED. In 
another context, BR remarks (1994: 184) that a so-called "ambiguous" linguistic 
expression which a speaker utters is actually not ambiguous at all: 
After all, the speaker knows which (necessarily unambiguous) linguistic 
expression she is uttering. 10 
For the same reason, there is no way a speaker can misuse a linguistic expression. She 
may misrepresent a linguistic expression by using what - according to some Conventional 
System of Physical Representation (CSPR) -- is the wrong M-representation. But the 
linguistic expression which she actually M-represents (whatever E-physical object she 
uses or misuses as the M-representation) is always the linguistic expression which she 
intends to M-represent, since she cannot but know exactly what linguistic expression she 
intends to (and does) produce an M-representation of. If she did not know what linguistic 
expression she intended to M-represent, the E-physical phenomena she produces would 
not be M-representational of any linguistic expression. 
The accounts of "misuse" and "ambiguity" set out above would be Humpty. 
Dumptyesque -- centring as they do on speaker's Intentions - were it not for tile fact that 
the putative "expressions" which mean what one intends them to mean are not linguistic 
expressions but E-physical phenomena used in aid of M-representing linguistic 
expressions. The RC account of ambiguity may seem less Humpty-Dumptyesque because, 
whether it is 'flying planesl' or 'flying planes2' which she intends (flying planes) to M. 
represent, the speaker would be abiding by the convention - established by a certain 
10 Here, "to utter linguistic expressions" is of course elliptical for "to produce E-physical, non- 
linguistic utterances in aid of NI-rcprcscnting linguistic expressions". See Burton-Roberts 1994: 
196-7. 
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group of people and endorsed by the relevant authority figures - which in effect states 
that (flying planes) is the M-representation of both 'flying planes I' and 'flying planes2'- 
Though she does not know it, Mrs Malaprop's intentions are directed towards a 
CSPR which is different from the CSPR being employed by her interlocutor (and by the 
audience/ reader of the play) -- i. e. the CSPR which states that (derangement) M- 
represents 'derangement' and not 'arrangement'. This disjunction between two different 
CSPRs creates the impression that what (derangement) "means" can be bent, Humpty 
Dumpty fashion, to Mrs Malaprop's will, as a result of Mrs Malaprop's use of 
(derangement) to "mean" arrangement. But this is actually a perfectly ordinary, expected 
and not very serious occurrence in M-representational terms. According to the RC, what 
(derangement) "means" is merely the M-representational significance of the E-physical 
object (derangement), and Mrs Malaprop is simply using a CSPR according to which 
{derangement) M-represents the linguistic expression whose semantics is constituted by 
arrangement. Besides, Humpty Dumpty himself is guilty of nothing more serious than 
deliberately using a CSPR which he knows is not the CSPR which Alice adheres to. 
Actually, there is a sort of circularity about the above argument: namely, that in order 
for a linguistic expression to be M-represented by some E-physical object, it is necessary 
and sufficient that the E-physical object is intended to be M-reprcsentational of that 
linguistic expression. This is because what one "knows" about the linguistic expressions 
which one intends to produce M-representations of -- how one knows which linguistic 
expression is M-reprcsented on a particular occasion - is in fact a matter of what we 
deduce from the M-representations and CSPRs themselves. So when I (and BR) say that 
Mrs Malaprop Ibiows what linguistic expression she produces an M-representation of, I 
am using "knows" in a rather broad sense. As I mentioned in S. 1, any direct cognitive 
access a person has to the mentally constituted grammar and what it generates" is not 
11 An innate, mentally constituted grammar is what the linguistic is assumed to consist of. But thc 
linguistic expressions which this grammar generates are not mentally constituted - or at least not 
205 
ý) 
6,1 )tA -I 
(koý ý- Yr,, 1ý 
-V/ CýO\JU-J-J, ýJ) )ýtI. 
-, 
conscioUS. What is directly accessible to the consciousness is the E-physical and E- 
perceptible. E-physical objects are what humans can consciously perceive and identify, as 
well as mentally represent. We cannot consciously pick out the linguistic expressions 
generated by the grammar, but we can voluntarily manipulate the E-physical M- 
representations of those linguistic expressions. We can do this physically, and in doing so 
engage in an activity which is traditionally regarded as the use of "linguistic expressions" 
(actually M-representations) in external behaviour (especially cornmunication). We can 
also do this mentally, which is what Dummett (1986: 470-1) describes as the use of 
"linguistic expressions" as "vehicles of thought". Durnmett observes that "language" 
... is a vehicle of thought 
because it is an instrument of communication, 
and not conversely. (ibid) 
This idea, for which Dummett (in my view) fails to provide a coherent theoretical basis, is 
given substance by the representational conjecture. In M-representational terms, what 
serves as an "instrument" or "vehicle" for Dummett is first and foremost an E-physical M- 
representation which can be used in E-behaviour as an "instrument of communication", 
before being mentally intemaliscd as a "vehicle of thought". 
Thus BR and Carr (1999: 403) argue that the acquisition of conscious cognitive 
access to the linguistic and the acquisition of a CSPR are "mutually dependent". And on 
the assumption that in order to la)o)v something one has to be in a state of consciousness: 
one's kiowledge of the nature of the linguistic expression which one intends to M- 
represent, as determined by the conscious cognitive access which one has to its 
properties, is necessarily mediated by the E-physical M-representation of tile linguistic 
expression, and is therefore only as comprehensive and exact as the NI-rcpresentation (and 
in the way that the grammar, as an element of die brain, is mentally constituted. As DR puts it 
(1994: 209 fn 17): "Thcy arc cognitive only in virtue of being constituted in Oic generative 
capacity of a grammar and of my assumption that grammars arc mentally constituted. Linguistic 
expressions are the gcncmtvc cpiphcnomcna of a grammar (but not less real for fliat). " 
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the CSPR to which it belongs) is perspicuous. In other words, I am assuming that it is in 
fact very limited and indirect (as I mentioned in 5.1). In contrast, the individual's innate 
(pre-CSPR) and unconscious cognitive access to the linguistic is very possibly complete 
as well as direct. This sort of cognitive access is necessary for CSPR acquisition, the 
reason (as I mentioned in 5.2) being that the individual is only able to assume that 
particular E-physical phenomena are (intended to be) M-representational of the linguistic 
if he has some sort of prior access to the representata. In short: innate, unconscious but 
direct cognitive access to the linguistic is necessary for the acquisition of CSP4 while 
CSPRs and E-perceptible M-representations are necessary for the acquisition of conscious 
but indirect (because conventionally M-representational) cognitive access to the linguistic. 
Note that the more obvious uses of M-representations in communication and thought 
may be characterised in terms of their basic function as a conscious cognitive route to 
their linguistic representata. With regard to communication, the M-representational could 
be said to provide an individual with conscious cognitive access to linguistic expressions 
whose M-representations he E-perccives, and to linguistic expressions whose M. 
representations he E-produces for another individual to E-pcrceivc. As for the use of M. 
representations in thought, the M-rcprcsentational could be said to provide the individual 
with conscious cognitive access to linguistic expressions whose M-reprcsentations he uses 
introspectively, as it were -- either by E-producing them (i. e. "speaking to himself'), or by 
mentally entertaining and manipulating mental representations of them (i. e. thinking in the 
medium of intemalised E-physical M-representations). 
My view is that there are no significant ditTerenccs between all the above uses of the 
M-representational. The remarks of Carston and Sperber and Wilson about the 
advantages of "linguistic codes" (in my terms, Conventional Systems of Physical 
Representations) for communication -- namely, that 
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... the most striking feature of linguistic communication is that it can 
achieve a degree of precision and complexity rarely achieved in non- 
verbal communication. (Sperber and Wilson 1986a/ 95: 174) 
A linguistic system... allows us to achieve a degree of explicitness, 
clarity and abstractness not possible in non-verbal communication... 
(Carston 1998: 56) 
-- could as well be applied to the role of M-representations in thought. What distinguishes 
the sort of thought which involves the use of M-representations is that the thinker has 
much more conscious -- in fact self-conscious -- control over the course of it. This is 
because it has a medium which the thinker is able to consciously access and manipulate. 
Furthermore, the medium is in the form of a recursive system of what is therefore an 
infinite number of M-representations, the most simple and less complex of which are in 
specific M-representational relations to certain syntactico-semantic objects (i. e. linguistic 
expressions) which appear to constitute units of thought smaller and more basic than 
those which an individual would otherwise have access to. A briefer (though probably 
more cryptic) way of putting what I have just written is: the sort of thought which 
involves internalised E-physical M-representations is more "explicit", "precise" and 
"complex" because it is -- in virtue of having an M-representational medium - more 
perspicuous than any other sort of thought as far as conceptual composillonality is 
concerned. 
Another question about the use of the M-representational is whether it is its role in 
communication or in thought that is primary. Since the CSPR, whose acquisition goes 
hand in hand with the acquisition of conscious cognitive access to the linguistic, tends to 
be regarded as an essentially sociocultural phenomenon, to do with people interacting 
with one another, I am inclined to assume (with Dummctt) that it is the use of M. 
representations in communication that is their primary role. On the other hand it is not 
inconceivable that even the smallest and most rudimentary system of Saussurcan signs, 
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with any available E-physical phenomena serving as the signifiers or M-reprcscntans, 
might constitute a CSPR; and that such a CSPR may be acquired by someone isolated 
from society. Also, the very process of CSPR acquisiiion presupposes a pre- 
communicatory ability to internalise, and to attach conventional M-rcpresentational 
significance to, E-physical phenomena - an ability which may be sufficient for an 
individual to think in an internalised E-physical medium. In short, I am suggesting that it 
may not be a matter of conceptual necessity that the conventional arises from the social, 
even if that is how it generally arises as a matter of empirical fact. This is an issue which 
requires further discussion and research. 
5.2.2 M-representations, Carruthers and conscious thought 
At this point I have to stress once again that, although E-physical M-representations of 
linguistic expressions provide conscious cognitive access to the linguistic, they do not In 
themselves constitute conscious thoughts. With regard to this, a comparison with 
Carruthers 1996 may prove useful. Carruthers claims that some - possibly most -- kinds 
of conscious thought are constituted by what he calls "natural language sentences" 
(henceforth NLSs). 
There are three points about his thesis which require stating and some elucidation. 
Firstly, his view of the linguistic is clearly extcrnalist. His "natural languages" are "public 
languages", while his NLSs are "spoken/ heard/ written", and interchangeable with 
"utterances" and "inner speech/ dialogue". In short, the NLSs which lie claims conscious 
thought involves are, in RC terms, actually E-physical hi-representations of the linguistic. 
Secondly, Carruthers' NLSs are not involved in all conscious thought. In his section 
8.8 he argues that they are required for conscious thoughts about anything "beyond 
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immediately perceptible aspects of the spatial environment", and certainly for "complex" 
and "sophisticated" concepts like personal Identify and objeclNe Inith. 
Thirdly and most importantly, Carruthers' argument is that "natural languages" 
constitute not just the media or "representational systems" in which (some) conscious 
thoughts are formulated, but also the content of those thoughts. In his section 4.6, 
Carruthers asserts that to argue this successfully is to vindicate Chornsky's position on 
"natural languages" being as essential to cognition as it is to communication. Ironically, 
Carruthers' notion of NLSs as constitutive of (some) conscious thoughts seems much 
stronger than Chornsky's views on the subject. Carruthers believes that such NLSs should 
have a completely language-based semantics - one that is independent of thought-based 
conceptual systems -- in order for those conscious thoughts which they constitute to be 
wholly, obviously "linguistic". But what Carruthers wants to avoid - the notion of a 
linguistic semantics that is derived from the semantics of some pre- and non-"linguistic" 
cognitive system - is precisely what Chomsky (not to mention relevance theorists) seems 
to endorse. As I pointed out in footnote II of my section 2.1.2, Chomsky maintains that 
there is an innate stock of concepts (I 992a: 115,116), and that I-language acquisition is 
merely the discovery of the "labels" of these innate concepts (ibid: 113,116). (In RC 
terms, these "labels" are clearly E-physical M-rcprescntations. ) Furthermore, Chomsky 
suggests that the innate concepts are "[drawn] from the resources of other genetically 
determined faculties of the mind" (ibid: I IS). Even more explicitly and categorically, he 
states that 
Yhe a priori frameivork of huntaii Mouglit within which language is 
acquired, provides necessary connections among concepts, reflected in 
connections of meaning among words, and more broadly, among 
expressions involving those words... (1992a: 114, my italics) 
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In any case, it seems to me that Carruthers does not manage to state his case 
coherently, let alone argue it successfully. For a start, he refers to "natural languages" as 
the primary vehicle of conscious thought (e. g. in his section 2.3), as a higher level of 
(obviously not M-) representation (e. g. section 8.1), and as being used in tile expression 
of thought (e. g. section 3.3) -- as if NLSs and the conscious thoughts they are supposed 
to be were two separate things. Furthermore, just as Chomsky's "linguistic expressions" 
have to interface with the performance systems, and the information provided by Fodoes 
linguistic module has to be operated upon by the central processes, so Carruthers himself 
concedes (in section 8.2) that his NLSs must be accessed, selected and manipulated by a 
higher cognitive system like Gathercole and Baddeley's (1993) "central executive". 12 
Thus Carruthers! reasoning appears to proceed along these lines: being inherently and 
independently possessed of a semantics, NLSs can be accessed and manipulated by a 
higher "central executive" -- i. e. USED -- to express what conscious thoughts express, 
and can therefore constitute conscious thoughts. I have two objections to this. Firstly, if 
an NLS is a vehicle which has to be used to express/ become a conscious thought, then 
the NLS by itself is neither sufficient for, nor constitutive of, that conscious thought. 
Secondly, the natural language semantics which is supposed (by Carruthers) to constitute 
the propositional content of the NLS-involving conscious thoughts - and in virtue of 
which the NLSs themselves are supposed to be at least as necessary an element of those 
conscious thoughts as the use of the NLS by the "central executive" - is not intrinsic to 
the NLSs at all. The upshot of these objections is a sort of inversion of Carruthers' 
arguments: in my view, his NLSs are nothing more than E-physical phenomena; but being 
E-physical and therefore the most immediate and graspable/ manipulable objects of 
12 Actually, Carruthers presents Chomsky and Fodor as dianictrically opposed in dicir respective 
views of the role ofthe linguistic in cognition - and it is truo that Chomsky belic%, cs that his 
"linguistic expressions" can be used in thought, while for Fodor thought is die cxclusive business 
of the central systems and Mentakse (or "die language of thought"). My point hcrc, on die othcr 
hand, is that their respective views on how cognition bears upon the linguistic do appear to 
coincide. 
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conscious thought, they can be internalised and used as a medium of conscious thought, 
and for that purpose are conventionally endowed with meanings (and refcrred to as 
"NLSs"). 
It follows from tlýs that the propositional significance and conscious nature of 
thoughts which involve NLSs are not constituted by the NLSs, but by Me cognitive 
response to the NLSs. Even Carruthers admits as much when he claims (in his section 7.1) 
that consciousness consists in an "accessibility-relation" to the NLS-vehicles of 
thoughts. 13 More generally, my point is that it is hardly controversial to claim that a great 
deal of conscious thought consists in the mental representing and manipulating of E. 
physical Saussurean signifiers. The E-physical and E-perceptible can be (consciously) used 
as signifiers or vehicles in conscious thinking (as well as in communication), precisely 
because they are accessible to conscious thought. It is for the same reason that they 
cannot themselves constitute conscious thoughts. 
5.3 A naturalist view of the relation between the linguistic and the "language 
of thought": the linguistic as "language of thought" 
When I say that Carruthers' NLSs are "signifiers or vehicles" I of course mean that they 
are non-natural M-representations of linguistic expressions, and that their "meanings" are 
constituted by their cognitive significance as NI-representat ions of linguistic expressions. 
This cognitive significance arises, not only from theAl-relwesentallonal nature of the U- 
representations, but also from the semanfic tuiture of their lingwisfic M-rej)resenlata. So 
13 In his section 4.6 Carruthers does, however, equate an NLS's scn=tics %vidi die contents, and - 
astonishingly - the NLS's (internallsed) 1". 7-ph)-sicalform with Ole conscious state, of die 
corresponding conscious thought. Lc lie sccnis to be saying here that the state ofbeing conscious 
ofE-physical U is constituted by U (whether U is the non-natural E-physical vchicla of mexiing 
M, orjust any E-physical object). That seems to nic do%%mright wrong, not to mcntion bizarre. 
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far I have been discussing the E-physical vehicles of what is traditionay regarded as 
linguistic -- Carruthers' "natural languages", Sperber and Wilson's "linguistic codes", 
Chornsky's "Manguages". I have also been assuming, in the process, that the Oitcral, 
conventional) meanings of the M-representational vehicles ARE the M-reprcscntcd 
syntactico-semantic objects (i. e. the linguistic expressions). In 5.3.1, for example, I took 
Mrs Malaprop's use of the E-physical (derangement) to literally mean arrangement to be 
the same as Mrs Malaprop's use of the E-physical (derangement) to M-represent 
'arrangement'. 
All this requires my system of notational conventions to undergo another adjustment. 
I have been using single quotes and italics to distinguish between linguistic expressions 
and their (structured) semantics. In the previous paragraph, however, I equated the 
contents of the single quotes (the linguistic expression 'arrangement') with what is 
italiciscd (its linguistic semantics arrangement). For the rest of this chapter, my view of 
linguistic expressions as vehicle-less syntactico-semantic objects will be rcflected by my 
use of italics rather than single quotes to indicate linguistic expressions. In other words: to 
show that a structured concept like arrangement is in itself a linguistic expression, the 
italics will henceforth take over the role of the single quotes. So instead of distinguishing 
between the linguistic expression 'arrangement' and its semantics arrangement, I take 
arrallgement to be the vehicle-less syntactico-semantic object which CONSTITUTE S the 
linguistic expression, and which is M-represented by (arrangement). 
However, recall that the semantics of a linguistic expression as discussed in chapters 
2 and 3 -- ChomsVs LF representation, the linguistically encoded logical form of Sperber 
and Wilson -- not only is separate from, but also falls short of, tile truth-conditional, 
propositional meaning expressed through the use (even tile litcral use) of that linguistic 
expression. Hence the distinction between linguistic semantics and tile truth-theorctic or 
"real" semantics of the central cognitive systems. Ilencc also thc assumption that tile 
former is inherited or drawn from (and somehow less than) the lattcr, and distinguished as 
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linguistic by its labels (Chomsky 1992a: 116) or by its being encoded by sentences or 
utterances (relevance theory). However, I concluded in chapter 3 that linguistic semantics, 
being logically related to the "real" semantics from which it is "drawn", has to be as truth- 
conditional as, and ontologically identical to, the "real" semantics of what is 
communicated or thought. And according to Burton-Roberts' representational conjecture 
(RC): labels, sentences and utterances are not linguistic but M-reprcsentational of the 
linguistic; ChomsVs I-languages and Sperber and Wilson's linguistic codes are 
Conventional Systems of Physical Representation (CSPRs); and linguistic expressions are 
exclusively syntactico-semantic objects. The question that remains is: what is the 
distinction -- if there is indeed a distinction -- between linguistic semantics and "real" 
semantics? In other words, what is the distinction between 
(i) the linguistic expression, with its structured linguistic semantics, which one 
intends a particular E-physical phenomenon to M-rcprescnt, and 
(ii) the "language of thought" (or I'mentalese") expression, whose "real" semantics 
constitutes the proposition or propositions which one intends to express through 
the use of the M-representation of the linguistic expression? 
In this section I argue that, with the RC's elimination of the conventional (Saussurcan) 
vehicle-meaning relation from the linguistic, linguistic semantics as a whole is at least 
partly constitutive of "real" semantics. I also argue that the traditional notion of 
"language" USE -- in communication or thought - is inapplicable to the truly Winguistic 
(as conceived of in RC terms) and to the "language of thought" (henceforth LOI). 
Finally, I discuss the implications of my claims for theories of thought and consciousness. 
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According to Fodor (1975,1987), there is a fundamental, even physiological 
distinction between the LOT and what are generally referred to as "natural languages" 
(e. g. the relevance-theoretic linguistic codes, Chomsky's I-languages). This distinction is 
supposed to be coextensive with that between the central systems and "linguistic" input 
systems. 14 As I mentioned in chapter 3, the notion of the LOT is presupposcd by the 
computational-representational theory of thought which Fodor and the relevance theorists 
subscribe to, and according to which thought has to do with the computations of the 
central cognitive processes over the formulae of some internal language. This internal 
language or LOT is also presupposed by my (and of course Carston's) discussion of a 
"real" semantics -- i. e. the semantics of what humans express in thought or 
communication, as opposed to the semantics of so-called "natural languages". The very 
notion of a "real" semmilics indicates that there is some language which it is the semantics 
of, just as a linguistic semantics is the semantics of a "natural language". 
Fodor offers two relatively independent reasons for an LOT separate from "natural 
languages". Firstly, he points out that "there are non-verbal organisms that think" (1975: 
56). "Infrahuman organisms" and "preverbal children", he argues (ibid), are capable of 
mental processes involved in considered action, concept learning and perceptual 
integration. If such mental processes are computational, then there must be a 
representatiotial system for representing what they compute over. Note that 
"REPRESENTATION" or "representational system" in the general Fodorcan (and 
relevancc-theorctic) sense is quite different from, and much vaguer than, Burton-Roberts' 
"M-REPRESENTATION" or "Conventional System of Physical Representation". It is not 
clear if the Fodorean "to represent" means to symbollse or to emb&ly. To be more 
precise, it is not clear if Fodorcan "representation" corresponds to BlVs "Nf- 
14 It does not seem quite right to distinguish bct%vccn die LOT and "languages" (e. g. relevance- 
theoretic codes) by refcrring to die latter as "NATURAL languages". AfIcr all. the LOT is at least 
as natural as, if not niorc natural than, "natural languages". More on this below. 
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representation" or "C(onsitutive)-representation" (see section 5.1). On the one hand, 
Fodorean representations appear to be the vehicles of what the mental processes compute 
over. On the other hand, there is Fodoes use of "representation" in the following passage: 
It is nomologically necessary that the internal representation of the 
grammar (or, equivalently for those purposes, the internally represented 
grammar) is causally implicated in communication exchanges between 
speakers and hearers... (1985: 149, my italics) 
That it is the "internal representation" of the grammar which is "causally implicated in 
A 
commuication exchanges" appears to indicate that the "internal representation" of the I 
grammar is constitutive of (rather than the vehicle or medium for) the grammar. 
The second independent reason given by Fodor for a distinction between "natural 
languages" and the LOT has to do with the issue of first language (i. e. "natural language") 
acquisition. Fodor argues that 
... you cannot learn a language whose terms express semantic propcrtics 
not expressed by the terms of some language [i. e. the LOT) you are 
already able to use. (ibid) 
As I mentioned in the previous section, this appears to be consistent with ChomsWs 
suggestion that "language" is acquired within an "a priori framework of human thought" 
(1992a: 114). 
I must stress that, although the LOT is conceived by Fodor and relevance theorists as 
distinct from "natural languages", it is as much of a "(1--odorcaii) relwesentallolial *, stells" 
as any "natural language". That the LOT and "natural languages" are in fact "languages" 
in exactly the same sense is a point that is explicitly made by Sperber and Wilson (1986a/ 
95: 1734). For Sperber and Wilson, languages are tools for both communication and 
thought -- the main difference between the LOT and "natural languages" is that the former 
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is an internal language used for "the processing and memorising of information" (ibid: 
173) while the latter is an external language used for communication. 
Furthermore, Fodor appears to believe -- with Chomsky (1992a: 113-6) and Carston 
(1998: 64-5) - that a "natural language" shares (at least a substantial part oo its 
semantics with the LOT, as his 1975 (: 109-15) concept of "messages" clearly 
demonstrates. On the one hand, what Fodor calls "messages" constitute "linguistically 
carried information" (ibid: I 11) -- i. e. what hearers recover or speakers convey during 
verbal communication by mapping wave forms to messages or vice versa. On the other 
hand, messages are also "formulae in the language of thought", since linguistically carried 
information is processed by the central systems, and the central systems are supposed to 
operate only over internal language formulae (ibid: 115). 
However, Fodor claims that the nature of the LOT must be different from that of 
"natural languages", in order for the problem of infinite regress to be circumvented. As 
described by Fodor himself (ibid: 65), the problem is: if the understanding of a language 
predicate involves representing the extension of the predicate in some metalanguage, then 
presumably the understanding of a metalanguage predicate would involve representing its 
truth-conditions in some meta-metalanguage, and so on. For Dennett (1969: 86-7), the 
problem of infinite regress arises from the very notion of a "language of thought" - and, 
more specifically, from the notion of "sentence-analogues in the brain" (ibid: 86). Dcnnett 
argues (ibid) that it is the "syntactic features" of a "sentence", and the "reading on" and 
analysis of these syntactic features, which determine the "function" which the "sentence" 
has "within a particular system*. The problem is that a syntactically analysable "sentence" 
of the LOT would be syntactically analysed by a mechanism which may itself have 
syntactically analysable internal states. Thus Dennctt concludes that "the regress must end 
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eventually with some systems which store, transmit, and process information in non. 
syntactic form". 15 
But according to Fodor (197S: 6S-8), there is no such regress because the predicates 
of the LOT are used and understood differently from the expressions of "natural 
languages". Whereas the (Fodorean) representation of the extension of a "natural 
language" predicate is used/ understood in virtue of being given in some other language 
which we already understand (i. e. the LOT), the understanding of an LOT predicate 
"might just be that one's use of the predicate is always in fact conformable to the truth 
rule" (ibid: 6S). Or, an individual is "so constructed that its use of the [LOT] predicate 
(e. g., in computations) comport with the conditions that such a representation would 
specify" (ibid: 66). 
Fodor provides an analogy in the form of computers' machine (as opposed to input/ 
output) language. Formulae in the machine language 
... correspond directly to computationally relevant physical states and 
operations of the machine: The physics of the machine thus guarantees 
that the sequences of states and operations it runs through in the course 
of its computations respect the semantics constraints on formulae in its 
internal language. (ibid) 
15 From Dennett 1969 it would appear that Dennat's notion of syntax is inextricably linked %vith 
the notion of morphology. For example, he writes of "brain-word tokens" (1969: 87, my italics) 
which are, presumably, the units from which "scntcnce-analogucs in die brain" are constructed. Ile 
also rcfers (ibid: 86) to the s)mtactic structure of a "sentence token" as "die ordering of the word 
tokens". In the context of the LOT, it is not clear what this "ordering" entails, and how it is 
different from the sort of spatial or temporal order which applies to E-physical utterances (i. e. M. 
representations) of linguistic expressions. Or radicr, it is not clear what Dcanctt thinks die 
morphosyntactic aspects of an obviously non-phonological LOT involve. For die RC, of course, 
even linguistic syntax is semantic structure; and die units ftom which linguistic expressions are 
constructed arc not "words" in die morphophonological sense, but concepts (or what Chomsky 
might call "logical forms"). But %%, Iiatcvcr Dennett really means by "s)mtactic" or "non-s)mtactic", 
it is quite clear that he regards die "syntax" of a "sentence" asfunctional - as a sort of structural 
complexity whose ralson d01re is to be analysed as part of die process of "reading" and 
"understanding" the "sentence". 
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Therefore the "truth definition" of the machine language is not a function that maps 
machine language formulae onto formulae of an internal code, but a set of engineering 
principles which guarantees the "direct correspondence" between formulae and physical 
states/ operations. Similarly, the formulae of Fodoes LOT are "assigned" to neurological 
states of the organism 
... in such a fashion that (some, at least) of the sequences of states that 
are causally implicated in the production of behaviour can be interpreted 
as computations which have appropriate descriptions of the behaviour 
as their'last line'. (ibid: 73) 
In other words, there is no further regress for Fodoes LOT because the LOT formulae are 
"interpretations" or "descriptions" which directly correspond to (physical) neurological 
events with causal properties. As Fodor stresses (ibid: 74 fn 14), a certain LOT formula is 
not read as commands for activating a particular system E -- it IS the physical event of 
type P which is causally sufficient for activating E, interpreted as an internal code 
message with E-activating properties. 
However, in order for an LOT formula to actually constitute a particular mental state 
of an organism, it has to be in a particular computational relation to that organism (ibid: 
75-7,198). In Fodor's words: "To have a certain propositional attitude is to be in a certain 
relation to an internal [Fodorean] representation" Cibid: 198). For each propositional 
attitude there is a relation between an LOT formula and the organism which is 
"nomologically necessary for (or nomologically identical to)" having the propositional 
attitude. I assume that being in a computational relation to an internal (r. odorean) 
representation is to have one's central processes operating on tile internal representation in 
a certain way. 
Fodor also claims that humans can use LOT formulae (ibid: 1724) - i. e. that internal 
(Fodorean) representations can themselves be represented for certain cognitive purposes - 
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- and that "the intelligent management of internal representations" is "a fundamcntal and 
pervasive feature of higher cognitive processes" (ibid: 164) Ile argues that humans can 
control what Fodorean representations get assigned to what inputs and outputs, and that 
an individual would have to be able to represent the different ways of representing inputs 
and outputs in order to choose between them. Another way in which LOT formula may be 
manipulated, Fodor suggests, is when an individual incorporates ("external") natural 
language terms into the ("internal") LOT: 
It does not follow that for every natural language predicate that can be 
entertained there is an entertainable predicate of the internal code. It is 
no news that single items in the vocabulary of a natural language may 
encode concepts of extreme sophistication and complexity. If terms of 
the natural language can become incorporated into the computational 
system by something like a process of abbreviatory definition, then it is 
quite conceivable that learning a natural language may increase the 
complexity of the thoughts that we can think. (ibid: 85) 
The question is, are these notions of enterlainingl using LoTformulac and adding 
new representations to the LOT compatible with the idea of representations which 
correspond directly, and are in a causal relation, to neurological states? According to 
Fodoes own description of the LOT, LOT formulae appear to be "neurally hardwired" .. 
each formula is a particular neural structure, and its semantic content is directly dependent 
on, and possibly constituted by, its neurological aspects. Thus LOT formulae are (at least 
partially) constitutive of the mental states which have to do with the use of Fodorean 
representations. My argument is that new LOT formulae cannot be created if the LOT is 
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regarded as part of the neural architecturcý'and, more importantly, that LOT formulae 
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which is in turn dependent on a prior understanding of meta-metalanguage predicates, and 
so on. I argue that infinite regress also arises from the notion of rise - Or, more 
specifically, the use of a "language" as a vehicle or Fodorcan representational system in 
thought and communication. This presents a problem for Fodor as well as for Sperber and 
Wilson. The use of Sperber and Wilson's external languages (i. e. "natural languages") as a 
medium for communication is effected by the cognitive processes of the central systems, 
and also by the use of the internal language as a medium for this cognitive processing. But 
then the use of the internal language as a medium for cognitive processing would involve 
further cognitive processing, presumably in an even more internal language. Thus it would 
appear that the notion of the LOT or internal language is simply incompatible with the 
notion of use -- and, by extension, with the notion of vehicles that hme to be used. In 
other words, the LOT cannot be a Fodorean representational system like a "natural 
language", consisting of Fodorean representations or vehicles which are used in virtue of 
the "meanings" to which they are conventionally related. 
In my view, the infinite regress problem originates in the fundamentally extenialist 
nature of the computational-representational theory of thought, and of the Fodorean (and 
relevance-theoretic) claim that the LOT is a usable (Fodorean) representational system 
like "external/ natural languages". 16 These "wernal/ natural languages" are systems of E. 
physical (but actually non-natural) vehicles which are selected and manipulated, decoded 
and interpreted 17 ._i. e. USED -- in external behaviour (and especially in communication). 
However, E-physical vehicles can also be mentally Af-reprcsented and mentally used, and 
it is this (conscious) "processing" of E-physical Fodorcan representations which 
constitutes the only sort of mental activity to which humans have conscious access. As a 
16 Even more cxtcrnalist in nature is Carruthcrs'claim that A PARTICULAR LOT - as opposed to 
771E LOT of Fodor - is in fact constituted by an cxtcmalist "natural language". 17 "Interpreted" is used rather loosely here, Tlic fact is that E-pliysical objects - including those 
which are generally referred to as "utterances" - arc intrinsically meaningless, and tbcrcrorc 
cannot actually be said to be "intcrprctcd". 
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result, the computational-representational properties of this extemally-oricntatcd use of 
E-physical vehicles tend to be projected by humans onto those other cognitive processes 
which are inaccessible to consciousness. 
One of the representational conjecture's most important points is that the rclation 
between the intrinsically E-physical and the intrinsically I-cognitive is merely M. 
representational, emphasising the fact that there is absolutely no necessity - indeed, that it 
is downright impossible -- for the E-physical and the processes in which it is involved (i. e. 
what we can consciously access) to be anything like the I-cognitive (i. e. what we cannot 
consciously access). Thus my argument is that a "natural language" is a usable but non- 
linguistic and exterrially-orientated Conventional System of Physical (M-) Representation 
(CSPR). In contrast, neither the wholly internal and cognitive linguistic representatum nor 
the wholly internal and cognitive LOT is designed for use. Within this intemalist/ 
naturalist framework (as conceived by Chomsky and Burton-Roberts), the only thing that 
is usable is the E-physical M-representation with its conventional relation to some 
7 
linguistic expression. The linguistic, being a naturalltate of mind/ brain, predudes the E. 
physical, the use of the E-physical to M-represent the linguistic, and the non-natural 
relation between E-physical vehicles and their meanings. The same can be said of the 
LOT, even independently of the fact that the idea of using the LOT leads to infinite 
regress. 
With the whole idea of a vehicle-meaning relation eliminated from both the linguistic 
and the LOT, the consequences are (I suggest) as follows. Firstly, there would be nothing 
to distinguish vehicle-less linguistic expressions from the equally vehicle-less LOT 
formula. More specifically, the linguistic semantics -- which is anyway supposed (by 
Carston (1998: 64-5), for example) to be "inherited" from "real" semantics - would flot 
have the phonological (or other E-inslanfiable) "ivhlcles" to disfinglils1i it from Me 
L07's "real" semantics. Hence: 
222 
(5) The vehicle-less linguistic would be at least partly constitutive of -- rather than 
the medium for (some of the "real" semantics oo - the vehicle-less LOT. 
Secondly: whereas "natural languages" and "linguistic" input systems are merely M- 
representational of the linguistic, both the linguistic and the LOT are directly, immediately 
of the central cognitive systems. And whereas "natural languages" are used by the central 
cognitive systems to M-represent the linguistic, 
(6) Both the vehicle-less LOT and the vehicle-less linguistic are (at least partly) 
constitutive of -- NOT the medium for, or used by -- the central cognitive 
processes (including those which effect the M-representational use of "natural 
languages"). 
And finally: 
(7) On the assumption that (i) the central cognitive processes give rise to 
consciousness and conscious thought, and that (ii) the linguistic and the LOT are 
at least partly constitutive of the central cognitive processes: finguistic expressions 
and LOTformulae would themselves be inaccessible to conscious thought. 
Under the computational-representational view and the associated notions of %VhIcIeS 
and use, thought is unavoidably seen as consisting of two separate parts: (i) the Fodorean 
representation, which tends to be regarded as a "thought" in itself (in Carruthers 1996 and 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/95 (: 2), for example); and (ii) the cognitive processes which 
compute over the Fodorean representation. In contrast, (5) and (6) make tile following 
points: the Fodoreati represemalions whicli are "contputeil olvr" by Me cognillm, 
processes are tiefther ? ialural tior intrinsically 1-cognit1tv, while the Insly tiatural and I- 
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cognitive linguistic expressions and LOTformulde are not computed over AY cognitive 
processes. Instead, I suggest, the Fodorean representations are (internalised) non-natural 
M-representations of linguistic expressions, while linguistic expressions and LOT 
formulae are (at least partly) constitutive of the central cognitive processes. My argument, 
therefore, is that it is (ii) and (ii) alone -- including the linguistic and LOT constituents of 
(ii) -- which thought consists of 
However, I am not denying that there are more ways than one of thinking. Nor am I 
denying that at least one way leads to, and then proceeds via, computations over vehicles 
or Fodorean representations (i. e. the use of M-representations of linguistic expressloig). 
What I am suggesting is that it is the computations, not the vehicles or Fodorean 
representations, which constitute thought; and, furthermore, that vehicle-less linguistic 
expressions and LOT formulae are (at least partly) constitutive of such computations. 
The linguistic and the LOT are also, I argue, (at least partly) constitutive of the sort 
of thought which has nothing whatsoever to do with M-representations and their use. This 
vehicle-less sort of thought appears to be as involuntary and as inaccessible to 
consciousness as the digesting of food by the alimentary canal, or the circulation of blood 
by the circulatory system. Perhaps it is less likely to be accessible to consciousness than 
the workings of the stomach or the heart, in virtue of Itself being constitutive of 
consciousness. 
In my view, to be conscious is simply to have a mental as well as a physical life - to 
be able to be aware of, rather than just to be Inq)Inged upoit. I am obviously in no 
position to discuss evolutionary neurology, and can only assume that consciousness 
evolved together with the central nervous system, that any organism with a central 
nervous system has the capacity for consciousness; and that consciousness varies in 
degree and nature according to the different central nervous systems of different spccies. 11 
18 For example, wbat are conccptualiscd as things by humans may be rcSardcd very diffiermfly by, 
say, dogs. 
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More controversially, I make the following claims about the rclation between 
consciousness and the linguistic. What Chomsky or Carruthers calls "natural languages" 
(or what Burton-Robcrts calls systems of physical M-representations) are not a 
prerequisite for consciousness. However, I argue that having coitcepts -- IN THE FORM 
OF VEHICLE-LESS, SYNTACTICO-SEMANTIC I-LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS 
AND LOT FORMULAE -- is both necessary and sufficient for an organism to be 
conscious. Thus not only am I arguing that 
(8) To be minimally conscious is to (involuntarily, naturally) have concepts, 
lk - 
but also that 
(9) Any organism with a central nervous system is in possession of some form of 
the linguistic (and thereby capable of conceptualising, and of being conscious). 
What I have written above on the topic of consciousness is obvously far too sketchy 
and speculative to serve as anything other than an indication of some of tile wider issues 
and questions raised by the representational conjecture (RC). These issues and questions 
require far more investigation than I am presently capable of My purpose here is only to 
point out that there are such issues and questions, and that they have to do with what I 
perceive to be the conceptual (and probably empirical) overlapping of the linguistic, the 
LOT, thought and consciousness. 
I have suggested that minimal consciousness in an organism is equivalent to the 
simplest, most fundamental form of thought, the sort of thinking which is as essential and 
involuntary as the workings of the alimentary canal or the circulatory system. This 
fundamental and involuntary sort of thought is (I argue) the starting point of all other, 
more complex and deliberate sorts of thought (including those involving the conscious use 
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of M-representations of linguistic expressions). It is also what all these other sorts of 
thought can be reduced to. Most importantly, it arises from cognitive processes which I 
are 
(at least partly) constituted by vehicle-less, syntactico-semantic linguistic expressions and 
LOT formulae. It follows from this that the possession of the linguistic -- the natural, 
unique, austere and completely I-cognitive Language of Burton-Roberts' naturalist view -- 
is crucial to the conscious state, and to the fundamental sort of thought which the 
conscious state entails. The conscious state, in turn, is the crucial element of the cognitive 
processes which effect the use of E-physical phenomena to M-represent linguistic 
expressions, as well as the internalisation and internal use of the M-representations. 
Note that the phrase "conscious thought" is rendered ambiguous (or rather, M- 
representationally vague) by my distinction between the fundamental, vehicle-less sort of 
thought, and the sort of thought which involves the conscious use of M-representations. If 
"thought" refers to the former, i. e. the involuntary mental activity which constitutes 
consciousness, then "conscious thought" would not only be a tautology, but would also 
n 
refer to a process which is actually inaccessible to consciours. On the other hand, 
"thought" may be described as "conscious" in virtue of being the sort of thought which is 
(partly and indirectly) accessible to consciousness -- i. e. the sort of thought which 
inWves the conscious use of E-physical M-representations of linguistic expressions. 
Once again, a comparison with Carruthers 1996 may serve to highlight some of my 
own points. My argument is that the linguistic is an integral part of conscious thought (in 
both senses), but not in the way Carruthers thinks it is. For Carruthers, "conscious 
thought" is constituted by the "natural language sentences" (NLSs) which are accessed, 
selected and manipulated by the "central executive". 1, on the other hand, claim that the 
sort of NLS-involving conscious thought which Carruthers refers to is constituted, not by 
the NLSs, but by the "central executive"'s accessing, selecting and manipulating of the 
NLSs. According to the RC, Carruthers' NLSs are in fact neither natural nor linguistic. 
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Instead, they are mental (M-)representations of non-linguistic, E-physical M- 
representations of I-linguistic expressions. 
Where the truly linguistic comes in, I argue, is at the level of the "central executive": 
together with the rest of the LOT, it at least partly constitutes the central cognitive 
processes which drive all forms of thought. In other words: whereas Fodorean 
representations are detachable from the computations which compute over them, the 
linguistic and the LOT are much more closely related (and probably inextricably linked) to 
the central processes. There are no intervening vehicles: linguistic expressions and LOT 
formulae consist only of what the vehicles are supposed to carry (or what Fodorean 
representations are supposed to be Fodorean representations oo, and are therefore purely 
conceptual (or syntactico-semantic). As I have suggested, it is the capacity to have 
concepts which appears to distinguish the conscious state, and all thought could be said to 
be the result of cognitive processes that incorporate (rather than compute over) vehicle- 
less, purely conceptual linguistic expressions and LOT formulae. 
I stress once again that thought need not -- though it may -- involve E-instantiable 
vehicles. At its most basic, it appears to consist in the consciousness of things in the 
external world as things (and as particular kinds of things), the capacity to have the 
concept thing, and the capacity simply to have concepts. If the linguistic is regarded as at 
least partly constituting these concepts, then there can be no distinction between BI; Vs 
notions of "significance" and "linguistic sense" (i. e. linguistic semantics): 
A wide variety of phenomena have significance (red skies at night, 
smoke in the engine room, the lack of phone calls during the past week, 
the boss's silent exit from the room, (my placing) V at the end of an 
essay) without being meaningful (sense bearing) in the favoured 
(linguistic) sense. The letter t (e. g. its occurrence in the) is significant, 
but in no sense meaningful or sense-bearing. (1994: 208 fn 7) 
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Smoke in the engine room is, of course, an E-phenomenon with a natural relation to the 
E-phenomenon of a fire in the engine room. The same goes for the lack of phone calls 
during the past week and its relation to, say, one's friend having departed for Australia. 
The significance of smoke in the engine room as an indication of a fire in the engine 
room, on the other hand, is an I-phenomenon. In other words, smoke in the engine room 
can only be said to have significance in the context of being thought about. My argument 
is that this "significance" of smoke in the engine room IS IN FACT "LINGUISTIC 
SENSE". Or rather, it is the CONCEPT of smoke in the engine room arisingfrom afire 
in the engine room, as constituted by the relevant vehicle-less linguistic expression. In my 
view, even being conscious of (as opposed to having unconscious nervous reactions to) 
smoke in the engine room -- as nothing more than smoke in the engine room -- involves 
the vehicle-less linguistic expression smoke in the engine room. 
The sort of thinking which constitutes consciousness is in turn the basis of the 
conscious use of E-instantiable vehicles/ M-representations. Furthermore, the more 
complex sort of thought which has to do with the accessing, selecting and manipulating of 
M-representations of linguistic expressions could be regarded as an enrichment of the 
fundamental kind of thought. In the case of humans, the apparently highest level of 
consciousness which they have reached is a matter, not just of (unconsciously) having 
concepts, but also of having some sort of (conscious) idea of the concept of concept, and 
some (conscious) idea that one has concepts (including the concept concept). 
As I claimed above, the process of consciousness-creating conceptualisation is itself 
an unconscious process. The consciousness of having the concept of concept (and the 
consciousness of having the concept that one has concepts) appears to be facilitated by 
the acquisition of conscious, reflexive cognitive access -- via the (conscious) use of E- 
physical M-representations -- to some of the conceptual constituents of the cognitive 
processes which underlie thought and consciousness. I agree with Carruther's point (1996, 
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section 8.2) about the "contents... of operations" of the "central executive"19 -- which, 
within the naturalist and RC framework, include the linguistic and the LOT -- being in 
themselves non-conscious. But I would add that humans seem to have the unique ability 
to intentionally use E-physical objects to M-represent, and therefore consciously access, 
some of the "contents" of the "central executive". This access, however, is only M- 
representational, and therefore far from complete. So in a sense the "highest" level of 
consciousness is a somewhat compromised development -- reflexivity at the M- 
representational expense of transparency. 
19 What Carruthers actually says is that the contents and the mode of the operations of the "central 
executive" are unconscious. On the assumption that it is equivalent to my "vehicle", I reject the 
notion of central processes having a "mode". 
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6 
The use of M-representations of linguistic expressions: some 
explanations, examples and questions 
6 M-representation and the distinction between "semantics" and 
"pragmatics" 
In this section I return to some of my arguments in 5.2.1 and 5.3: 
(i) Linguistic expressions generated by the unique, natural I-language are 
constituted solely by their structured semantics (LF). 
(ii) Linguistic expressions, as syntactico-semantic objects, are numbered (as it 
were) among the syntactico-semantic formulae of the LOT. 
(iii) Linguistic semantics is not -- as suggested in Chomsky 1992a (: 113-6), and 
Carston 1998 (: 64-5) -- inherited from, but is at least a part of, "real" semantics. 
All this obviously has implications for the analysis of what is expressed during 
communication, and especially for the question of how exactly the linguistic is involved in 
communication. The general idea is that the speaker or writer produces an "utterance of a 
linguistic expression", and that this utterance tends to have "pragmatic content" and a 
"linguistic semantics". According to the representational conjecture (RC), however, the 
"utterance of a linguistic expression" is an intrinsically meaningless E-physical object, 
produced in aid of M-representing some linguistic expression. What the arguments of 
5.2.1 add to this RC account of utterances is that any linguistic semantics involved is 
neither the "semantics of the (intrinsically meaningless) utterance, nor even the 
"semantics o? fl the M-represented linguistic expression, but is in fact constitutive of the M- 
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represented linguistic expression. As a syntactico-semantic object, this linguistic 
expression is also as much a part of the LOT as any "pragmatic content" conveyed by the 
utterance. In other words, the M-represented linguistic expression and the LOT formula 
which constitutes the "pragmatic content" are at least ontologically identical. 
My RC-based arguments also undermine the view that the distinction between 
"linguistic semantics" and "pragmatic content" is a derivational distinction. The general 
idea is that only the "linguistic semantics" is carried by the utterance, an E-physical 
"linguistic" vehicle, and that the E-perception of this "linguistic" vehicle will somehow 
lead the perceiver directly to the "linguistic semantics". For Sperber and Wilson (1986a/ 
95), the process of recovering the "linguistic semantics" consists of the "automatic 
decoding" of the utterance (ibid: 177), while the "pragmatic content" is recovered via a 
"non-demonstrative inference process with free access to conceptual memory" (ibid: 65). 
I, on the other hand, argue that the E-physical vehicle (i. e. the M-representation of a 
linguistic expression) and the vehicle-meaning (M-representationab relation are non- 
linguistic and non-natural. I also maintain that the "automatic" recovery of the "linguistic 
semantics" is only-! automatic" insofar as it is conditioned, and, what is more, conditioned 
bý non-lingu cultural) circumstances andfactors. On the RC, an 
individual's "automatic decoding" of an utterance is in fact his recovery of the M- 
representaturn of the utterance, governed in part by the particular Conventional System of 
Physical (M-)Representation (CSPR) which he has been conditioned to adhere to by his 
immediate social environment. 
As Burton-Roberts and Carr (1999: 398-9) point out, the M-representation of 
linguistic expressions is such a fundamental and necessary human activity that the (M. 
representational) skills involved tend to be taken for granted. As a result of the necessity, 
and the "incessant practice" (BR and Carr 1999: 399) called for by the necessity, the M- 
representation of linguistic expressions (and the recovery of I-linguistic M-representata) 
might seem like an "automatic" process. Burton-Roberts and Carr observe: 
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Were it as necessary for humans to play tennis as it is to externally M- 
rep[resent] the linguistic, we would find universal incessant early tennis 
practice and Wimbledon standard (or better) would be taken for 
granted. It might even seem mandatory and reflex-like. It is the explicit 
purpose of naval training in escape from submerged helicopters to make 
the required behaviour reflex-like. But this is true of anything we 
practise a lot (eg driving, touch-typing). It is the necessity that is 
interesting. (1999: 399 fn 16) 
Note that the recovery of linguistic M-representata (or the production of E-physical 
objects for the purpose of M-representing linguistic expressions) only seems "mandatory 
and reflex-like", and seems so only if it is conditioned by "incessant practice". More 
importantly, the CSPR which an individual has been conditioned to use is not necessarily 
the CSPR he actually uses, or the CSPR used by the people he communicates with, on a 
particular occasion. It is in the nature of M-representation that what linguistic expressions 
are M-represented, and how they are M-represented in other words, what CSPR is used 
on a particular occasion by a particular individual is primarily a matter of intention. 
Consequently, there is nothing truly mandatory or "automatic" about the M-representation 
of linguistic expressions. The recovery of I-linguistic M-representata, in particular, is 
based on the assumption of (M-representational) intention, and is therefore chiefly a 
matter of fallible inference. 
So my argument is this: it follows from the RC that there is simply no natural 
distinction, ontological or derivational, between "linguistic semantics" and "pragmatic 
content". With the E-physical vehicle (phonetic form) shifted to the domain of the (non- 
linguistic) M-representational, the remaining "linguistic semantics" has nothing to 
distinguish it from the LOT from which it is supposed to be derived. Furthermore, if the 
E-physical vehicle is in fact non-naturallyM-represetilatiotiaI of the linguistic expression 
constituted by the "linguistic semantics", then the so-called "linguistic decoding" of E- 
physical utterance phenomena (i. e. the recovery of linguistic M-representata) must be an 
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intentional, non-natural, M-representational process, and therefore neither linguistic nor 
automatic. 
In this and the following sections I discuss various characteristics and strategies of 
the M-representation of linguistic expressions, and also use these M-representational 
characteristics and strategies to provide an alternative account of the non-natural 
distinction between "semantics" and "pragmatics", the equally non-natural distinction 
between literal and non-literal meaning, and communication in general. In Figure 1,1 set 




governed by antecedent not governed by antecedent 
rules rules 
CONVENTIONAL-(2) UNCONVENTIONAL NON-ICONIC ICONIC 
generally agreed not generally calculable E-perceivable 
upon agreed upon I 
Fig. 1: Types of M-representation 
M-representation, by definition non-natural and intentional, may or may not be 
constrained by. antecedent rules. So far I have been using the term "CONVENTIONAL" 
to describe rule-governed M-representation. Thus an M-representational rule is 
necessarily conventional, simply in virtue of being a rule or convention. However, rules 
may also be conventional in the sense of being generally agreed upon and publically 
sanctioned. Henceforth I shall distinguish between "conventional" in the rule-governed 
sense and "conventional" in the agreed upon sense by labelling the first "conventional" 
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with (1), and the second "conventional" with (2). Note that only CONVENTIONAL-M 
M-representation can be CONVENTIONAL-(2) - i. e. that only rule-governed M- 
representation has the rules for people to agree upon. Thus "conventional-(2)" entails 
'"conventional-(1)", but not vice versa. An example of M-representation which is 
conventional-(I) but not conventional-(2) is the M-representation of arrangement by Mrs 
Malaprop's (derangement). 
The opposite of conventional-(I) M-representation is NON-CONVENTIONAL M- 
representation. The non-conventional M-representation ofy by x is intended (or assumed 
to be intended) to be noticed, arrived at, rather than specified by some rule. Non- 
conventional M-representation may be ICONIC or NON-ICONIC. As mentioned in 5.1, if 
X iconically M-represents y, it does so, not according to some rule or convention, but in 
virtue of being intended to share certain E-physical properties with y. The example I gave 
was of Magritte's painting of a pipe, which Magritte intended to share mainly visual 
properties with the pipe. Thus one can perceive the E-physical resemblance between x and 
y, and thereby discover what the iconic M-representaturn y is. A non-iconic non- 
conventional M-representational relation between x and y, on the other hand, is one that is 
intended (or assumed to be intended), not to be perceived, but to be calculated or 
inferred. 
The opposite of conventional-(2) M-representation is UNCONVENTIONAL M- 
representation. it is only the agreed upon aspect of conventional-(2) M-representation 
which falls within the scope of the prefix "un-". This means that, whereas an M- 
representational relation is either conventional-(I) or non-conventional, or perhaps partly 
conventional-(I) and partly non-conventional, the distinction between conventional-(2) 
and unconventional M-representation is a matter of degree. That is, one M- 
representational rule or system may be regarded as conventional-(2) -- or more 
conventional-(2), or less unconventional - in virtue of having more adherents than 
another M-representational rule system. Alternatively, it may be regarded as 
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unconventional - or more unconventional, or less conventional-(2) -- in virtue of having 
fewer adherents than another M-representational rule or system. Mrs Malaprop's 
(derangement) is conventional-(I) but not conventional-(2) - it is therefore an example of 
unconventional M-representation. 
It follows from the sortal difference between (non-linguistic) M-representans and 
(linguistic) M-representatum that the E-physical M-representation of 1-cognitive linguistic 
expressions may be conventional-(I) (i. e. conventional-(2) or unconventional), or non- 
iconically non-conventional -- but never iconic. That is, I assume the 1-cognitive is never 
resembled by the E-physical (and the linguistic is never resembled by the non-linguistic). 
6.1 focuses on the conventional-(2) and unconventional M-representation of linguistic 
expression, and 6.2, on the non-iconic non-conventional M-representation of linguistic 
expressions. In 6.3 1 discuss "linguistic codes" and "literal meaning" in terms of the 
various types of M-representation described in 6.1 and 6.2.6.4 and 6.4.1 are concerned 
with issues which I have so far not mentioned. 6.4 has to do with the (intentional) NON- 
M-REPRESENTATION of linguistic expressions, and its implications for the relation 
and/ or distinction between the linguistic and the LOT. 6.4.1 contains a brief M- 
representational account of REFERENCE, given in connection with a general discussion 
about how my radically internalist view of linguistic expressions and LOT formulae bears 
upon the perceptual/ cognitive interaction of humans with the external world. 
6.1 Conventional-(2) and unconventional M-representation of linguistic 
exPressions 
The most conspicuous and recognisable sort of conventional-(2) M-representation is that 
which is constrained by the kind of CSPRs (conventional systems of physical 
representation) which constitute Burton-Roberts' "particular languages" (e. g. English, 
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Swahili). These CSPRs are "extralinguistic, culturally differentiated, conventional [Le. 
conventional-(2)]" (BR and Carr 1999: 404). Dummett's 1986 "languages", it seems to 
me, are obviously conventional-(2) CSPRs. As CSPRs which are generally agreed upon 
and publically sanctioned, Dummett's "languages" would indeed be what he claims they 
are: sets of rules or conventions of social practices. And if the ideal Durnmettian 
"language" is simply a particular set of M-representational conventions, endorsed by 
authority figures and publicly established, then it would follow that each member of a 
particular "language" community not only has an "imperfect" (Dummett 1986: 475), 
"partial, and partly erroneous" (ibid: 468) grasp of it, but deliberately deviates from it 
from time to time. ' 
That "particular languages" are extralinguistic, culturally differentiated, conventional- 
(2) CSPRs is further borne out by the CSPR-SPECIFIC phenomena which I shall call 
SECOND-ORDER and THIRD-ORDER (henceforth 2-o and 3-o) M- 
REPRESENTATION. Conventional-(2) first-order M-representation is simply a 
particular E-physical object conventionally-(2) M-representing a particular linguistic 
expression, and (as I argued in the previous section) thereby providing conscious (but 
incomplete) cognitive access to the LOT formula which that linguistic expression is. In 
contrast, conventional-(2) 2-o or 3-o M-representation involves the conscious accessing 
of an LOT formula (call it LOTF2 or LOTF3), not through an M-representation alone, 
but by way of an M-representation's conventional-(2) (first-order) M-representing of 
another LOT formula (LOTFI). In that way, the M-representation can be regarded as 
conventionally-(2) M-representational of LOTF2 or LOTF3 in addition to -- and it? virtue 
of - conventionally-(2) M-representing LOTFI. And the CSPR to which the M- 
representation belongs would specify that the M-representation is a conventional-(2) M- 
representation of LOTFI as well as of LOTF2 or LOTF3. In other words, the CSPR 
1 Thus the RC manages to reconcile a Dummetian account of "languages" with a Chomskian 
account of "Language" by stating the nature of the relation between them. 
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would include a 2-o or 3-o M-representational convention which mentions the 
corresponding first-order M-representational convention. 2 
To illustrate what I mean by conventional-(2) 2-o M-representation, consider English 
(take). In the case of conventional-(2) 2-o M-representation, LOTFI and LOTF2 are 
logically, conceptually related. What {take) primarily M-represents, according to the 
CSPR commonly known as English, appears to be the linguistic expression (i. e. LOITI) 
of. 3 constituted by something like take hold1possession . 
(10)(a) She took the rolling pin and hit him with it. 
(b) Someone has taken my pen. 
But in certain other (M-representational) contexts, (take) in English appears to M- 
represent other concepts, like dol experience - 
(11) She wants to take a bath/ nap/ holiday. 
-- and bring -- 
2 Higher-order M-representation is by definition conventional-(I) (i. e. rule-governed). So 2-o and 
3-o M-representational rules may feature in unconventional as well as conventional-Q) CSPRs- 31 am assuming that the first-order M-representatum of English (take) is take hoWpossession 
of, partly on the basis of my own beliefs about (or, in Dummetfs words, my "partial, and partly 
erroneous" grasp of) the CSPR English, and partly because the entry for (take) in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary is headed by the definitions "lay hold of' and "acquire, get possession of'. 
However, it seems to me that each "English-speaking" individual has his own personal CSPR or 
CSPRs. Ilese CSPRs are imperfectly derived from the public CSPR constructed by authority 
figures (e. g. the compilers of the COD), with the effect that they have rules in common with, but 
strictly speaking are absolutely distinct from, the publically established CSP& Thus a particular 
individual's first-order and higher-order M-representational rules for (take) are not necessarily the 
same as those of, say, English as specified by the COD. 
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(12) She took the chfldren home. 4 
Furthermore - whereas the CSPR English appears to specify the first-order M- 
representation of take holdl possession of, and the 2-o M-representation of dol 
ex perience and bring, by the same M-representation (take) -- the CSPR known as Italian 
has separate M-representations for those concepts: 
(10) prendere una penna 
to take a pen 
(11) fare un bagno 
to do a bath 
(12) portare a casa 
to bring to home 
Conversely, the Italian (fare) M-represents do -- as in (11) and 
(13) fare i compiti 
to do the homework 
- as well as make: 
(14) fare rumore 
to make noise 
4 In fact these are not the only 2-o conventional-(2) M-representata of (take). What linguistic 
expressions, for example, does (take) conventionally-(2) M-represent in (take a bus), (take some 
pills), (take it that you agree with me), etc? 
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As indicated, English deploys different M-representations -- (do) and (make) - for the 
concepts M-represented by Italian (fare) in (13)-(14). A CSPR which does have the same 
M-representation for what in English is M-represented by f do) and {make) is Putonghua: 
(15) zuo gongke 
to do homework 
(16) zuo zhifu 
to make a uniform, or uniforms 
However, according to the CSPR Putonghua, (zuo) only M-represents do and make in 
certain M-representational contexts. Unlike the Italian (fare), it cannot be used with the 
M-representation of noise or a bath. 
A more obvious form of conventional-(2) CSPR-specific 2-o M-representation has to 
do with M-representational constructions like (17)(a)-(d): 
(17)(a) (to laugh in someone's face) 
(b) (the man in the street) 
(c) (a poor relation) 
(d) (special pleading) 
A person may know what the conventional-(2) first-order M-representata of (17)(a)-(d) 
are - respectively (and approximately) (I 8)(a)-(b): 
(I 8)(a) to direct one's laughter straight towards someone'sface 
(b) some man who is situated in some street 
(c) a relation which is poor 
(d) pleading which is in some way special 
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But if he does not also know the 2-o M-representational conventions of the CSPR 
English, he will not be aware that (17)(a)-(4) also have (conventional-(2), CSPR- 
detennined) 2-o M-representata in the fonn of (respectively) (I 9)(a)-(d): 
(I 9)(a) to openly show scornfor someone 
(b) the ordinary or average man 
(c) an inferior member of afamily or some group (ofpeople or things) 
(d) afallacious andl or unfair argument - e. g. one which takes into account 
irrelevant details - in support of someone or someone's point of view 
Corning now to 3-o M-representation: like 2-o M-representation, 3-o M- 
representation is CSPR-specific. For example, it is only in respect of the CSPR English 
that the M-representation (kick the bucket) is CONVENTIONALLY-(2) used to express 
die as well as strike the bucket with one'sfoot. The linguistic expression die is what I call 
the conventional-(2) 3-o M-representatum of (kick the bucket). What distinguishes 3-o 
M-representation from 2-o M-representation is this. First-order and 2-o M-representata 
are, as I have pointed out, logically and conceptually related. To choose a man in the 
street is to choose arbitraffly, and hence to pick out someone who is representative of the 
community as a whole. Similarly, to guffaw at someone with whom one is face to face is a 
Way Of openly expressing scom for him. In the case of 3-o M-representation, the first. 
order and 3-o M-representata are, semantically, totally distinct from one another -- as the 
(kick the bucket) example obviously demonstrates. 
Falling somewhere between conventional-(2) 2-o and 3-o M-representation are 
examples such as (busman's holiday). On the one hand, (busman's holiday) is not an 
example of 3-o M-representation, because the concept leisure time spent doing what one 
usually does to earn a living is semantically related to the idea of a busman spending his 
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holiday on a coach. On the other hand, this semantic relation may be missed by those for 
whom a busman going on holiday is not necessarily -- is in fact far from necessarily -- 
going on a coach trip. 
Cases such as (busman's holiday) suggest that it is not always easy to decide 
whether a higher-order M-representation fulfils the criteria for 2-o or 3-o status. This has 
a great deal to do with how the M-representation is viewed by its users in connection with 
its first-order M-representatum. I stated that the distinction between 2-o and 3-o M- 
representation is that the first-order and 2-o M-representata of an M-representation are 
semantically or conceptually related, while the first-order and 3-o M-representata are not. 
However, it is clearly not the case that the 3-o M-representatum of, say, (pay through the 
nose) just happens, arbitrarily, to be pay exorbitantly. Thus a more accurate description 
of the distinction between 2-o and 3-o M-representation would be that the semantic 
relation between the first-order and 2-o M-representata of an M-representation is quite 
obvious, while that between the first-order and 3-o M-representata is no longer apparent. 
The accessing of 2-o or 3-o M-representatum via a particular first-order M-representation 
is a previously non-conventional custom which has been conventionalised, usually 
through familiarity and/ or frequent and widespread use. But whereas the semantic 
relation between first-order and 2-o M-representata is not obscured by the conventional 
relation, the rationale for the 3-o custom becomes opaque as the custom is 
conventionalised. 
More importantly, whether or not the semantic relation is apparent (or at least 
immediately deducible) - whether or not the rationale is transparent -- is an entirely non- 
linguistic, historical, sociocultural matter. In other words, the relative opacity or 
transparency of the relation between first-order and higher-order M-representata is 
determined by historical and sociocultural factors. For example, the connection between 
the conventional-(2) 3-o M-representatum. (pay exorbitantly) and first-order M- 
representatuni (which includes the concept nose) of the M-representation (pay through 
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the nose) has to do with Danes in the 9th century slitting the noses of people who refused 
to pay their taxes. This connection is no longer obvious because it is tied to a 
sociocultural/ historical circumstance -- i. e. having one's nose slit for not paying one's 
taxes -- which is not only very specific, but also no longer in existence. Much more 
general and persistent is the idea of a street being where someone representative of a 
community may be arbitrarily picked out. Consequently, the semantic relation between the 
conventional-(2) first-order and 2-o M-representata of (the man in the street) is still 
discernible. There may come a time, of course, when people do not walk in streets, or 
when streets have become obsolete. Such a situation could result in a shift from 2-o to 3- 
0 status for the higher-order M-representaturn of (the man in the street) - 
Returning to (busman's holiday), the reason why it is difficult to categorise may be 
that the rationale for using its first-order M-representatum to access the concept leisure 
time spent doing what one usually does to earn a living involves an association between 
holidays and coach trips which at present is not completely obscure, but in the past twenty 
years or so has become more and more tenuous. Let me stress once again that this is NOT 
a matter of "linguistic/ semantic change", but of historical changes in sociocultural 
environments (and in how sociocultural environments are perceived). 
Note that conventional-(2) M-representata -- including conventional-(2) higher-order 
M-representata - tend to be regarded as the "LITERAL IýEANINGS" of their respective 
M-representations. Take hold1possession of, dol experience and bring are all accepted as 
the "literal meanings" of English {take). The individual, simple (M-representational) 
constituents of a complex M-representation like {the man in the street) (i. e. {the), 
fman}, (in), etc) are generally seen as having "literal meanings"/ first-order M- 
representata that do not add up to the conventional-(2) higher-order M-representatum the 
ordinary or average man. But as far as the complex M-representation is concerned, the 
high-order M-representatum has as strong a claim on "literal" status as the first-order M- 
representatum. The conventional-(2) M-representans of a complex 3-o M-representation 
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like f pay through the nose), in particular, is almost always used (or assumed to have been 
used) in its higher-order capacity, and almost never used to M-represent the conventional- 
(2) first-order M-representatum. 
Furthermore, what constitutes the "literal meaning" of a conventional-(2) M- 
representation is by definition specified by the corresponding (first-order or higher-order) 
M-representational convention. A particular set of such conventional-(2) M- 
representational conventions - i. e. a particular conventional-(2) CSPR - constitutes a 
"particular language" like English or Italian. To "speak English", for example, is to grasp 
and use a particular set of conventional-(2) M-representational rules, including those 
which specify the respective first-order and higher-order M-representata of (take), (the 
man in the street) and {pay through the nose). Thus "particular languages" -- and the 
"literal meanings" of the "expressions" of "particular languages" -- are intentional, non- 
natural, extra-linguistic and socioculturally determined M-representational phenomena. 
It has to be pointed out that, before they were conventionalised, the "literal 
meanings" constituted by conventional-(2) higher-order M-representata were regarded as 
"metaphorical (or at least non-literal) meanings". As mentioned above, the use of a first- 
order M-representation to access its higher-order M-representatum was formerly not 
specified by the corresponding conventional-(2) CSPR. Instead, it was a non- 
conventional process. That is to say, both higher-order M-representatum and its semantic 
relation with the first-order M-representatum were not learrit/ known (or assumed to be 
learnt/ known) together with the rest of the conventional-(2) CSPR, but intended to be 
inferred. 
For example, the use of {pay through the nose) and its first-order M-representatum 
to access the concept pay exorbitantly appears to have been regarded as metaphorical in 
the mid-19th century. However, under some historical, sociocultural circumstance, the 
relation between (pay through the nose) and pay exorbitantly was conventionalised, and 
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incorporated into the relevant conventional-(2) CSPR. The result is that pay exorbilantlY 
is now generally regarded as the "literal meaning" of {pay through the nose). 
In my view, the preceding discussion of conventional-(2) higher-order M- 
representation constitutes an M-representational account of what Davidson calls "dead 
metaphors" (1979: 35). According to Davidson, an example of a "dead metaphor" is 
(mouth) in the context of (the mouth of a river) or {the mouth of a bottle): 
Once upon a time, I suppose, rivers and bottles did not, as they do now, 
literally have mouths... when "mouth" applied only metaphorically to 
bottles, the application made the hearer notice a likeness between 
animal and bottle openings... Once one has the present use of the word, 
with literal application to bottles, there is nothing left to notice. (ibid) 
On the representational conjecture (RC), (mouth) in these M-representational contexts is 
a conventionalised 2-o M-representation (like (take) in (take it that you agree with me)), 
whose formerly non-conventional "metaphorical meanings" place where a river enters the 
sea and the opening of a bottle have become its conventional-(2) higher-order "literal 
meanings". 5 
I also claim that the problem of idioms -- a particular class of "dead metaphors" -- 
becomes trivially resolveable under my M-representational account of "dead metaphors". 
The problem is that idioms such as (kick the bucket) and (pay through the nose) are 
peculiar, not only to certain sociocultural contexts or groups, but also to certain 
"particular languages". ' So the use of (kick the bucket) to express die, for example, 
appears to be governed by conventions that are "language"-specific, i. e. specific to the 
5 See Quine 1979 (: 159) on the creating and "killing" of metaphors "at the growing edges of 
science and philosophy". See also Boyd 1979/ 93. 6 Chomsky (1992a, 1995a) claims that English, Swahili, ctc are not "Manguages", but non- 
linguistic "community norms". However, the same problem (i. e. the problem of the grammar of a 
"language" being unable to account for a construction specific to that "language") ariscs at the 
level of his "Manguages". For example, the use of (kick the bucket) to express die is specific to 
certain "Wanguages" (Jones', Chomskys) but not to others (e. g. Boris'). 
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"particular language" English. Yet it is precisely the grammar of that "particular language" 
English which states that the "linguistic expressions" {kick) and {the bucket) respectively 
mean strike with one'sfoot and the bucket, and which cannot account for the particular 
"linguistic" construction (kick the bucket) also conventionally-(2) meaning die. 
On the RC, however, (kick the bucket) is a conventional-(2) 3-o M-representation. 
In other words, it is simply not a linguistic expression with a semantics, but an E-physical 
object whose significance is merely M-representational. This significance, being M- 
representational, does not reside in the E-physical object, but in the mind of the individual 
who uses the E-physical object to M-represent the linguistic expression die on one 
occasion, and strike the bucket with one'sfoot on another. It does NOT follow from this, 
I stress, that either (kick the bucket), or whatever (kick the bucket) M-represents, is 
ambiguous. The M-representation (kick the bucket) cannot be ambiguous, for it has no 
semantics. The M-representata die and strike the bucket with one'sfoot respectively and 
unequivocally constitute the semantics of -- and in fact individuate -- two distinct 
linguistic expressions. 
Before I move on to unconventional M-representation, note that so far I have only 
discussed examples of complex M-representations whose conventional-(2) "literal 
meanings" are more often than not assumed to be their higher-order M-representata rather 
than their first-order M-representata. In the case of (beg the question), however, it is 
debatable whether its "literal meaning" is its conventional-(2) higher-order M- 
representatum presuppose the truth of an argument without arguing it, or its apparently 
equally conventional-(2) first-order M-representatum raisel invite the question. On the 
one hand, there are those for whom the "literal meaning" of {beg the question) is its 
higher-order M-representaturn, in the same way that the higher-order M-representatum 
Pay exorhitantly is regarded as the "literal meaning" of (pay through the nose). On the 
other hand, there are those who seem to have no knowledge of the higher-order M- 
representational convention, and use {beg the question) "literally" to express its first- 
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order M-representatum raisel invite the question. The important point is that the 
distinction between the first and second groups of people is not a linguistic distinction, but 
a matter of sociocultural M-representational variation. Thus the increasing number of 
people who use (beg the question) "literally" to express its first-order M-representatum 
seems to have something to do with a general tendency to acquire and use the less 
arbitrary and opaque M-representational conventions. Furthermore, the M-representatum 
specified by the less arbitrary first-order convention also happens to be a concept (raisel 
invite the question) which is probably more frequently accessed/ expressed than the 
higher-order M-representatum (presuppose the truth of an argument without arguing it). 
In contrast, the first-order M-representatum of, say, {pay through the nose) involves a 
relation between the concepts pay and nose which may have been relevant to the 9th 
century nose-slitting Danes and their victims, but seems incongruous in this day and age. 
Not surprisingly, it is the higher-order rather than the first-order M-representatum of (pay 
through the nose) - i. e. pay exorbitantly - which at present is usually taken to be its 
"literal meaning". 
The first-order M-representation of die by (die), the 2-o M-representation of the 
ordinary or average man by [the man in the street) and the 3-o M-representation of die 
by (kick the bucket) are all specified by English, a CSPR which is generally regarded as 
conventional-M. But in fact the conventionality-(2) or unconventionality of any M_ 
representational system used by two or more people is relative, and gradable. An M. 
representational system (intended or believed to be) used by just one individual is by 
definition unconventional. As far as I know, no one but myself uses (conventional-(I)) 
and (conventional-(2)) to M-represent, respectively, rule-governed and agreed upon. 
However, these M-representations are not as unconventional as those belonging to a 
private code/ CSPR used by someone who has no intention of sharing it with anyone else, 
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since I intend my M-representations (conventional-(I)) and (conventional-(2)) to be 
used by my reader, at least while he/ she is reading this chapter. Less straightforward is 
the use of the M-representation (M-representation). For linguists in general, not to 
mention the community of people who use the CSPR known as English, (M- 
representation) is clearly an unconventional M-representation. For those who subscribe to 
Burton-Roberts' representational conjecture (RC), however, it is the most conventional- 
(2) way of M-representing the concept of M-representation. 
Similarly, the particular uses of what Chomsky calls "terms of naturalistic inquiry" 
(1992a, 1995a) are conventional-(2) within the scientific community, but unconventional 
within wider contexts. In the first place, it follows from the RC that an "expressiolf' like 
"acid" is - in accordance with my own notational conventions -- more accurately 
presented as (acid). Thus I reject Chomsky's assertion (ibid) that the individual's "I- 
linguistic sense" of facid) is natural, while the chemist's "expert sense" of (acid) is not. 
As M-REPRESENTATIONS, both instances of (acid) are equally non-natural. But the 
so-called "Minguistic sense!: -of f acid} could be said to be more conventional-(2) than the 
ndl Gdexpert sense', simply in virtue of the fact that the use of acid to M- epresent sour a 
or corrosive substance is far more common and widespread than the "expere' use of 
acid) to M-represent, _say, proton-donating atom or compound. 
The case of Mrs Malaprop presents another kind of complication. When another 
individual tries to recover the linguistic M-representata of Mrs Malaprop's utterances, that 
individual would have to adopt at least some of the M-representational conventions which 
Mrs Malaprop abides by. This is generally so in all cases of utterance interpretation. But 
before or after anyone has any verbal contact with her, Mrs Malaprop is clearly the only 
person who uses the M-representations which she uses. Such M-representations -- e. g. 
(epitaph) for epigram - are therefore thoroughly unconventional. But whereas chemists 
(or at least most chemists) are aware of the relative unconventionality of their use of 
(acid), Mrs Malaprop believes that her use of {epitaph) is usual, conventional-(2) and 
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generally agreed upon within the social group to which she belongs. Furthermore, Mrs 
Malaprop's unconventional M-representations, and Mrs Malaprop's belief that her 
unconventional M-representations are conventional-(2), are both rooted - in the 
conventional-(2). According to the conventional-(2) CSPR of Mrs Malaprop's social 
group, {epitaph) is an M-representans (though not of epigram). (Epitaph) also shares 
certain E-physical properties with the conventional-(2) M-representans of epigram, 
{epigram). According to the graphological CSPR, they begin with the same three symbols 
fe-p-i}; phonetically, they have two syllables in common. This is one of the reasons why 
Mrs Malaprop's M-representations, though unconventional, are not wholly unintelligible 
to those individuals who know only the conventional-(2) CSPR(sý 
6.2 Non-iconic non-conventional M-representation of linguistic expressions 
I have stated that conventional-(2) and unconventional CSPRs (conventional systems of 
physical representation) are by definition antecedent to any act of M-representation. 
However, as in the case of Mrs Malaprop's hearer/ reader, there is always the possibility 
of someone recovering what is (for him) unconventionally M-represented -- not just from 
the E-physical resemblance between the unconventional and the conventional, but also 
from other, more general contextual factors. For example, it is obvious from the two E- 
physical objects following Mrs Malaprop's {pineapple) -- (of) and {perfection) - that 
Mrs Malaprop has used {pineapple) to (unconventionally) M-represent plimacle. What 
distinguishes this from NON-ICONIC NON-CONVENTIONAL M-representation is that 
Mrs Malaprop did not intend the M-representatum phyiacle to be calculable. Instead, she 
assumed that it would be recovered on the sole basis of knowledge of a particular - and, 
for her, conventional-(2) - CSPR. The recovery of non-iconic non-conventional M- 
representata, on the other hand, is intended to be a reasoned process constrained by 
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contextual information and probably some general principle of communication and 
cognition like Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory. So what is non-iconically and non- 
conventionally M-represented is by definition never agreed upon in advance. 
A fairly obvious case of non-iconic non-conventional M-representation has to do with 
the sort of utterances whose interpretation is supposed by Grice to involve the "Be 
orderly" submaxim of his Manner maxim -- e. g. 
(20) Max got up and had breakfast. 
For Carston (1998: 309), the hearer of (20) enriches the linguistically encoded logical 
form by adding a conceptual constituent: that of the temporal order of the two events (i. e. 
Max getting up and Max having breakfast). Carston claims that the additional conceptual 
constituent becomes part of the explicit content of the utterance. However, according to 
Sperber and Wilson (1986a/ 95), the proposition containing the concept of the temporal 
relation would be less explicitly communicated by (20) then it would be by 
(2 1) Max got up and then had breakfast. 
Sperber and Wilson define an "explicature" as 
... a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually 
inferred 
conceptual features. (1986a/ 95: 182) 
and state that 
The smaller the relative contribution of the contextual features, the 
more explicit the explicature will be, and inversely. (ibid) 
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(20) and (21) explicitly communicate the same proposition -- the proposition containing 
the concept of the temporal relation. But whereas (20) implies the concept of the 
temporal relation, (21) encodes it. Thus Sperber and Wilson would consider the 
explicature of (2 1) to be more explicit than that of (20). 
On the basis of the representational conjecture (RC), a different account may be 
given of (20) and (21). 1 suggest that (20) and (21) "press Max 901 V and then had 
hreakVast with equal explicitness, because it could be argued that both (20) and (21) M- 
REPRESENT the linguistic expression constituted by the concept Max got up and then 
. 
fast. It is by conventional-(2) means, in accord with the CSPR English, that the had hreak 
linguistic expression is M-represented by (2 1) - and, in particular, that the concept of the 
temporal order of the events is M-represented by (then) in (21). In (20), however, the 
concept of temporal order seems to be M-represented -- non-iconically and non. 
conventionally -- b be-E-, -(2) M-representations physical or der of the conventional 
(Max got up) and ([Max] had breakfast). 
Here is how the E-physical order of the conventional-(2) M-representations in (20) 
might (non-iconically and non-conventionally) M-represent the concept of the temporal 
relation. (Max got up) conventionally-(2) M-represents the linguistic expression which 
conceptually corresponds to the event of Max getting up, while (Max had breakfast) 
conventionally-(2) M-represents the linguistic expression which conceptually corresponds 
to the event of Max having breakfast. In (20), these two conventional-(2) M- 
representations are (intentionally) given a spatial order which resembles - and can 
therefore iconically M-represent - the temporal order of the events. Thus it would 
appear that the spatial order of the conventional-(2) M-representations non-iconically and 
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non-conventionallyM-represents the CONCEPT of the events' temporal order, by way of 
iconically M-representing the temporal order of the events themselves. 7 
Let me stress that only the E-physical in this case -- the M-representans, the events 
(Max getting up and Max having breakfast) -- can be ordered, and thus iconically M- 
represent one another. The linguistic M-representatum, being I-cognitive, can have 
nothing to do with this E-physical order. What has to be borne in mind is the sortal 
difference between the I-cognitive and the E-physical, and the impossibility of there being 
any sort of resemblance between the two. It follows from this that the spatial order of the 
E-Physical conventional-(2) M-representations may iconically M-represent the temporal 
order of the E-physical events, but does not - and cannot -- iconically M-represent the I- 
cognitive CONCEPT of the temporal order. Rather, it M-represents the concept by non. 
iconic, non-conventional means -- namely, by iconically M-representing what the concept 
is the concept of 
The same principle -- of non-iconically M-representing a linguistic expression via the 
iconic M-representation of what the linguistic expression is the concept of -- appears to be 
central to the phenomenon and process of onomatopoeia. Take (mew), as in 
(22) The cat mewed. 
In my view, f mew) non-iconically M-represents the I-cognifive concept of the sound 
which cats make, by physically resembling and thereby iconically M-representing the 
actual E-Physical sound which cats make. There is, however, a difference between 
f mew) in (22) and the spatial ord er of the M-representations in (20). The M-representata 
of both are calculable - can be worked out from the resemblance between E-physical M- 
7 Note that the spatial order in (20) is of graphological M-rcprcscntations. In die case of (20)'s 
phonetic counterpart, there would be an even closer iconic resemblance between the temporal order 
of the events and the temporal order of the phonetic M-rcprcscntations produced by the spcak-cr. 
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representans and the E-physical phenomenon which the M-representaturn is the concept 
of But whereas the utterer of (20) expects the hearer/ reader to work it out, to perform 
the calculations, the person who uses (mew) in the context of (22) most probably 
believes that the M-representation of sound made by cats by (mew) is specified by the 
conventional-(2) CSPR English. In other words, what (mew) M-represents is calculable 
but no longer (intended to be) calculated, because there has been a superimposition of 
convention over calculation. So (mew) may once have been a non-iconic non- 
conventional M-representation of sound made by cats, but is now part of the 
conventional-(2) system of M-representation known as English. 
I have been arguing that "external/ natural languages" like relevance-theoretic 
"linguistic codes" are in fact non-natural, conventional-(2) systems of E-physical M- 
representation -- that what is "linguistically encoded' is, on the RC, conventionally-(2) 
M-represented. From examples such as (20) it would appear that what relevance theorists 
regard as pragmatially implied -- in the case of (20), the concept of the temporal order of 
the events -- may also be M-represented (albeit non-conventionally). Indeed, since M- 
representations are by their (E-physical) nature linearly ordered, I am suggesting that the 
basis upon which the speaker selects the order of the M-representations which she utters - 
- e. g. (Max got up and had breakfast) rather than (Max had breakfast and got up) - is in 
fact M-representational. The point is this: what is seen by relevance theorists as 
"linguistically encoded" is actually M-represented, but what is M-represented may be 
more than what is "linguistically encoded". Or rather, the distinction between what is M. 
represented and what is not M-represented may, but -- crucially -- need not necessarily, 
correspond to the relevance-theoretic distinction between what is "linguistically encoded/ 
decoded" and what is pragmatically implied/ inferred. 
So it is not just the "linguistically encoded" concepts which are M-represented, but 
also some of the concepts which are assumed by Carston (1998) to result from pragmatic 
enrichment or loosening - especially those which, according to Carston (ibid), contribute 
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to the explicit content of utterances. One of Carston's examples of enrichment (ibid: 309) 
is 
(23) He wears rabbit. 
Carston (ibid: 309) claims that (rabbit) in (23) "linguistically encodes" something like 
rabbit stuff. This concept rabbit stuff is enriched via strengthening by the hearer to rabbit 
skin1jur. In response to this, it could be pointed out that there is no real conceptual 
necessity to suppose that (rabbit) "encodes" (i. e. conventionally-(2) M-represents) rabbit 
stuff. The notion that {rabbit) encodes something as general, uninformative and 
"uninteresting" as rabbit stuff is of course consistent with Sperber and Wilsolvs (1986a/ 
95) argument (supported and developed in Carston 1998) that, because coded 
Communication is subservient to inferential communication, "linguistic codes" need not 
and do not encode a good deal of what humans are interested in communicating. (See also 
my section 3.1.1. ) But this means that the nature of Sperber and Wilson's "linguistic 
codes" is (at least partly) determined by the non-linguistic matter of what can be 
inferentially communicated. Another way of putting this is that relevance-theoretic 
"linguistic codes" seem designed to anticipate inferential processes. Furthermore, if 
"linguistic codes" are for coded communication, and subservient to inferential 
communication, then all the non-linguistic (and especially sociocultural) factors which 
bear on human communication in general must also bear on those so-called "linguistic 
codes". Within the relevance framework, it is on non-linguistic grounds -- i. e. the fact that 
anything more informative than rabbit stuff can be implied/ inferred - that (rabbit) is 
assumed to "encode" the very uninformative rabbit stuff. What, then, is there to prevent 
(rabbit) from "encoding" the more informative rabbit animal for the similarly non- 
linguistic reason that someone simply intends (rabbit) to encode rabbit animal, in 
preference to having to imply/ infer it? 
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In fact it is rabbit animal, rather than rabbit stuff, which appears to be what the 
hearer/ reader of 
(24) The rabbit ate the carrot. 
would "automatically" recover from {rabbit). So, if to "linguistically encode" is to 
"conventionally-(2) M-represent" in RC terms, I would argue that {rabbit) in (24) 
"linguistically encodes"/ conventionally-(2) M-represents rabbit animal. And I would 
argue that (rabbit) in (23) M-represents rabbit skin/fir -- possibly non-iconically and 
non-conventionally, in the sense that the person who uttered (23) intended his hearer/ 
reader to calculate (i. e. pragmatically infer) rabbit skin/fur from the conventional-(2) M- 
representatum rabbit animal. 
However, it is possible that {rabbit) in (23) in fact "linguistically encodes" - i. e. 
conventionally-(2) M-represents -- rabbit furl skin. One argument for this is that the 
hearer who hears/ reads (rabbit) immediately after (wears) seems more likely to 
automatically" recover rabbit skin1fur. There is also an independent reason for assuming 
that (23)'s frabbit) "linguistically encodes"/ conventionally-(2) M-represents rabbitfUrl 
skin. Whereas the English (rabbit) can be used to refer to both animal and skin, the 
German and Putonghua equivalents can only be used to refer to the animal. This suggests 
that the relation between the English f rabbit) and the linguistic expression rabbitfurl skin 
is conventional-(2), CSPR-specific. 
Much of what I have just written about (23) also applies to some of Carston's 
examples of loosening (1998: 311). According to Carston, (heart) in 
(25) Have you eaten my chocolate heart? 
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encodes something Eke an anatomical heart, from whose encyclopaedic entry the hearer 
picks out the properties which go with chocolate. An RC account of (25) goes like this. 
(Heart) does M-represent an anatomical heart in 
(26) He has a weak heart. 
but there is nothing to prevent it from M-representing (conventionally-(2) or otherwise) 
something like heart-shaped thing or heart-like ohject in (25). In fact, it seems more 
plausible for the second M-representation in constructions like (chocolate heart) - e. g. 
{toy train), f plastic elephant) -- to conventionally-(2) M-represent trainl elephantlX-like 
thing, than for the hearer/ reader to have to loosen the relevant noun in each case. 8 
Similarly, it is possible that (bald) in Carston's example 
(27) 1 love bald men. 
conventionally-(2) M-represents a gradable concept rather than totally hairless -- contrary 
to Carstotfs claim that totally hairless is linguistically encoded, and the gradable almost 
totally hairless, the result of pragmatic loosening. The use of (bald) to M-represent 
almost totally hairless is certainly more common and usual than the use of (bald) to M- 
represent totally hairless. As Carston herself points out (1998: 327), a lexical concept like 
totally hairless is virtually never used "literally". Moreover, the general gradability of 
adjectives seems to be a convention specified by the conventional-(2) CSPR English - 
hence M-representational constructions like {very bald) and (quite bald). 
8 Iliere is an alternative RC account of examples like (chocolate heart). (Chocolate heart) may 
be the elliptical form of the M-rcpresentation (chocolate M-rcpresentation of a heart), in the same 
way that the M-representation (That is T. S. Eliot), produced in reference to the painting by 
Wyndham Lewis, is the elliptical form of (That is an M-rcprescntation of T. S. Eliot). See Burton- 
Roberts 1994: 209-10 fn 18. 
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6.3 More on "linguistic codes" and "literal meaning" 
Before I proceed, here once again is the main argument of 5.3: that linguistic expressions, 
in the form of syntactico-semantic objects or structured concepts, ARE LOT formulae. As 
I pointed out at the start of this chapter (in section 6), this obviously has implications for 
(i) the notion of E-physical U "linguistically encoding" M; and 
(ii) the notion of M being (taken to be) the "literal meaning" of E-physical vehicle 
U 
On the representational conjecture (RC), U is an intrinsically meaningless E-physical 
object. And it follows from my 5.3 argument that M is constitutive of some linguistic 
expression. Thus I maintain that what an individual considers to be the "literal meaning" 
M of some E-instantiable phenomenon U is in fact constituted by the structured concept - 
- the linguistic expression constituted by that structured concept - M-represented by U. 
More precisely, the "literal meaning" of the E-instantiable phenomenon is the sum of (i) 
the cognitive value of the E-instantiable phenomenon's (intended and/ or assumed) M- 
representation of some structured concept, and (ii) the cognitive value constituted by as 
much of the M-represented concept as can be consciously accessed. I also maintain that a 
"natural language" or "linguistic code" like English is actually a non-natural, 
conventional-(2) CSPR. It follows from this that what is "linguistically encoded" by U is 
in fact what is non-linguistically M-represented by U-i. e. M, a structured concept 
constitutive of some linguistic expression. 
The aim of this section is to use the different types of M-representation to account 
for certain aspects of the relevance-theoretic notions of "linguistic codes" and "literal 
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meaning". To begin with, I have claimed that "natural/ external/ particular languages" or 
"linguistic codes" are really non-natural, extralinguistic, socioculturally differentiated, 
conventional-(2) CSPRs. Such a CSPR is not only generally agreed upon by the members 
of the social group which it distinguishes, but is also something which the members of that 
community are constantly exposed to, and thereby conditioned to use. Thus an individual 
would be able to "automatically" recover what is "linguistically encoded" -- i. e. the 
linguistic expressions whose M-representation is constrained by the conventional-(2) 
CSPR specific to his community. 
This conventional-(2) CSPR may include 2-o and 3-o M-representations. For 
example, the individual who has been conditioned to use the conventional-(2) CSPR 
English would "automatically" recover die from utterances of (die) as well as of (kick the 
bucket), and the ordinary or average man from (the man in the street). He might also (as 
I suggested in the previous section) "automatically" recover either rabbit animal or rabbit 
skin/fir from utterances of (rabbit), depending on the M-representational context. In 
other words, (rabbit) may conventionally-(2) M-represent two distinct linguistic 
expressions, as do so-called "ambiguous expressions" such as {flying planes) and (port). 
That (rabbit) or (flying planes) M-represents more than one linguistic expression is a 
matter of conventionally sanctioned M-representational indeterminacy. See Burton- 
Roberts 1994 and 1999b, and my section 5.1. 
The main advantage of my non-natural, non-linguistic RC account of "linguistic 
codes" is that it is able to provide explanations for the more problematic -- because 
obviously non-linguistic and contextually determined -- features of the so-called 
"linguistic code". I have more than once pointed out that "linguistic decoding" only seems 
"automatic", insofar as the "decoding" individual is conditioned - by external, mainly 
sociocultural factors and circumstances -- to use a particular "code" (i. e. CSPR). 
Furthermore, what is "linguistically encoded" is far from invariable. Carston mentions 
"disparate encodings" (1998: 82 fn 2) -- for example, (livid) "linguistically encodes" 
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flushed for some and pale for others. Most users of the CSPR English follow the rule 
which states that (derangement) "encodes" derangement. For Mrs Malaprop, however, 
(derangement) "encodes" arrangement. Non-fictional examples include (beg the 
question) (discussed in 6.1), and (disinterested), which appears to "encode" uninterested 
for some and disinterested for others. My point is that "disparate encodings" can be used 
in different contexts by different individuals, or even by the same individual. This means 
that the recovery of "linguistically encoded logical forms" may be "automatic" in some 
cases, but may necessitate the less than "automatic" process of inference in those cases 
where different, unfamiliar or unknown "linguistic codes" are being used. 
That the "linguistic code" is neither linguistic nor a code, but a non-linguistic 
sociocultural conventional-(2) CSPR, would be far more consistent with the fact that 
there are disparate "encodings" and "codes", and that some are more conventional-(2) or 
unconventional than others. It would also explain why "linguistic decoding/ encoding" is 
not as "automatic", and not as absolutely distinct from pragmatic inference/ implication, as 
Sperber and Wilson think it is. In fact, being non-natural and non-linguistic, so-called 
"linguistic decoding/ encoding" is as much a matter of what Chomsky (1995a: 30) calls 
"human interests, intentions, goals and actions" as pragmatic inference/ implication. The 
only significant difference between what is "linguistically encoded" and what is 
Pragmatically implied is that the former is (assumed to be) agreed upon or known in 
advance, while the latter is not. 
The "literal meaning" of an utterance is regarded by Chomsky and Sperber and 
Wilson as somehow based on, yet distinct from, the "linguistic semantics". Whereas the 
"linguistic semantice' of the utterance is seen as belonging exclusively to the "Manguage" 
or "linguistic code", the expressing and recovery of "literal meaning" is supposed to 
involve both the "I-language/ linguistic code' and the performance/ central systems. 
Sperber and Wilson's (1986a/ 95) way of ensuring that the "linguistic semantics" of an 
utterance is distinct from the "real semantice' of the "literal meaning" is to claim that the 
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derivation of "literal meaning" involves the central inferential processes. For example, the 
"literal meaning" of the utterance of 
(20) Max got up and had breakfast. 
is not just the logical form "linguistically encoded" by the utterance, but also includes 
pragmatically inferred material -- namely, the concept of the temporal relation. 
In my view, this relevance-theoretic notion of "literal meaning" is an attempt to 
combine certain pre-theoretical assumptions with a particular theory of what constitutes 
the linguistic. On the one hand, the classing of the pragmatically inferred concept as 
"literal" content appears to be based on the instinct (of audience as well as producer of the 
utterance) that the utterance of (20) has conveyed the concept of the temporal relation in 
some undeniable, explicit way. On the other hand, the relevance-theoretic distinction 
between the pragmatically inferred concept and the "linguistically encoded" content of 
(20) appears to be based on the notion that the concept of the temporal relation does not 
correspond to -- is not "encoded by", or the "meaning of' -- any E-physical property that 
is generally considered to be "linguistic". In the case of (21), however, the concept of the 
temporal relation is assumed by the relevance-theorists to be "linguistically encoded", 
apparently on the grounds that it corresponds to the E-instantiable "linguistic expression" 
(then). 
How Sperber and Wilson's (1986a/ 95) relevance theory takes all of the above into 
account appears to be as follows. Sperber and Wilson define the explicit content of an 
utterance as an inferential development of the logical form "linguistically encoded" by the 
utterance (ibid: 182). They claim that the explicature of an utterance of (20) contains both 
the "linguistically encoded" logical form and the pragmatically inferred concept. So, on 
the one hand, Sperber and Wilson acknowledge that the concept has to be inferred in 
virtue of not being encoded by some E-physical "linguistic" property. On the other hand, 
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they also relate the concept to the E-physical "linguistic" properties by incorporating the 
concept with the logical form which does correspond to -- in virtue of being "linguistically 
encoded" by -- the E-physical "linguistic" properties. 
In the previous section I suggested that the concept of the temporal relation does in 
fact correspond to (and is M-represented by) some E-physical property - the E-physical 
order of the conventional-(2) M-representations (Max got up) and ([Max] had breakfast) 
- and is thereby explicitly conveyed. In the case of 
(23) He wears rabbit 
the explicit nature of the supposedly inferentially derived concept rabbit ski? zlfur is more 
obvious. Rabbit skinIfir could be regarded as more obviously explicit -- in virtue of 
having a more conspicuous E-physical vehicle/ representans, [rabbit) -- than the concept 
which is M-represented less conspicuously by the E-physical order of the M- 
representations in (20). 
To posit an M-representational relation between an E-instantiable object and its 
"literal meaning" is a way of explaining the fact that "literal meaning" is explicitly 
conveyed, yet is sometimes also intended to be calculable/ calculated. Note that, while 
"linguistic codes" like English are conventional-(2) CSPRs, the M-representational 
relation between "literal meaning" and their E-physical vehicles may be of any possible 
sort -- conventional-(2), unconventional, or non-iconically non-conventional. Thus the 
"literal meaning" of some E-physical vehicle may be generally agreed upon -- a 
conventionally-(2) M-represented linguistic expression, like die being M-represented by 
f die) or {kick the bucket) according to the conventional-(2) CSPR English. It may not be 
generally agreed upon, as in the case of the "literal meaning" of (M-representation) or 
Mrs Malaprop's fderangement), but nevertheless intended. And it may have to be 
inferred, if it is constrained by an unfamiliar CSPR, and especially if it is non-iconically 
260 
and non-conventionally M-represented. This fact that "literal meaning" is explicit yet 
possibly intended to be inferred is particularly obvious in the case of non-iconic non- 
conventional M-representation. Take (Max got up and had breakfast). On the one hand, 
the recovery of what is non-iconically and non-conventionally M-represented (i. e. the 
concept of the temporal order of the events) is intended to involve calculation. On the 
other hand, the non-conventional M-representatum has as concrete an E-physical M- 
representans (i. e. the spatial or temporal order of the E-physical M-representations) as 
any conventional-(I) M-representatum, and can therefore be regarded as specifically 
corresponding to, even "encoded" by, that particular E-physical property. 
I shall end this section with some general remarks on how unconventional and non- 
iconic non-conventional M-representation bears upon "linguistic codes"/ conventional-(2) 
CSPRs. Unconventional or non-iconic non-conventional M-representation may be entirely 
ad hoc, e. g. when an individual deviates ftom his conventional-(2) CSPR English for the 
particular occasion and purpose of conversing with Mrs Malaprop, or uttering (Max got 
up and had breakfast) with the intention of non-conventionally M-representing Max got 
UP and then had hreakfast. However, even a single ad hoc instance of unconventional or 
non-conventional M-representation, occurring within the framework of a conventional-(2) 
system of M-representation, would entail a conversion from the conventional-(2) system 
to a different M-representational system, in the way that a single malaprop would convert 
a Davidsonian prior theory into a passing theory (see Davidson 1986: 443, and my section 
4.4). In other words, the individual who engages in unconventional or non-conventional 
M-representation in effect creates another system of M-representation, even if that system 
is used only on a single, particular and possibly very brief occasion. 
Note also that both unconventional and non-conventional M-representations may - 
in time, and under certain circumstances -- be conventionalised. As I argued in 6.1, most 
conventional-(2) higher-order M-representations (e. g. (the man in the street), (pay 
through the nose)) are formerly non-conventional M-representations which have become 
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part of some conventional-(2) CSPR. Similarly, M-representations such as (internet), 
(crack [cocaine]) and (quango) have become conventional-(2) in recent years, their 
initial unconventionality diminishing as they began to be used more widely and frequently. 
Conversely, conventional-(2) M-representations may become less conventional-(2) - the 
M-representation offine orfastidious by English {nice) being a case in point. It follows 
from all this that so-called "linguistic/ semantic change" is neither linguistic nor semantic, 
but has to do with changes in sociocultural M-representational attitudes and behaviour - 
i. e. with people using different E-physical objects (or the same E-physical object, e. g. 
English (nice)) to M-represent different concepts at different points in time. Furthermore, 
the "particular languages"/ "linguistic codes"/ conventional-(2) CSPRs themselves cannot 
actually be said to change. Strictly speaking, they can only be replaced by other CSPRs. 
As I pointed out above, the smallest deviation from a particular CSPR constitutes the use 
of some other system of M-representation -- one which is slightly but nevertheless 
absolutely distinct from the first CSPR. Thus I argue that the name of a "particular 
language" -- "English", "Italian", "Swahili" -- does not refer to a single conventional-(2) 
CSPR, but is used as a label for a series of conventional-(2) CSPRs, each being replaced 
by the next with every addition or loss of some M-representational convention. 
6.4 The non-M-representation of linguistic expressions and the relation 
between the linguistic and the language of thought 
If the "literal meanings" of E-physical utterances are structured concepts which are 
(intended to be) M-represented by those utterances, then the "non-fileral mealling" of an 
utterance could be regarded as consisting of a concept which is not M-rcpresented by that 
utterance, but intended to be accessed through it. Note that this RC account is of "non- 
literal meanings" as concepts intended to be not M-represented, rather than not Intended 
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to be M-represented. I take it that the use of an M-representation to access a concept 
which it does not M-represent is as non-natural and intentional as the use of an M- 
representation to access a concept which it does M-represent (conventionally or 
otherwise). In fact, I am suggesting that the deliberate non-M-representation of the 
linguistic expression which one intends one's interlocutor to access is as much of an - 
albeit non-conventional -- M-representational strategy as the M-representation of a 
linguistic expression. 
In the context of this thesis, the main significance of the phenomenon of non-M- 
representation is that it raises a question about the relation/ distinction between the 
linguistic and the LOT. For me, the logical conclusion of the representational conjecture 
a (RC) is that linguistic expressions and LOT formule are ontologically identical, and in no A 
way distinguishable from one another. There are others who subscribe to the RC, but 
remain convinced that there is a natural distinction between the linguistic and the LOT. 
For these individuals, non-M-represented linguistic expressions (especially those which 
are highly complex) would appear to be the obvious candidates for LOTformulae which 
are not linguistic. 
The obvious examples of non-conventional non-M-representation have to do with 
what Sperber and Wilson (1986a/ 95) regard as implicatures. Take Sperber and Wilson's 
"strong implicatures" -- i. e. the implicatures 
... which must actually be supplied if the 
interpretation is to be 
consistent with the principle of relevance, and for which the speaker 
takes full responsibility. (I 986a/ 95: 199) 
There is no doubt that the linguistic expression which B's utterance is intended to M- 
represent does not constitute all the concepts which B intends to convey. 
(28) A: Do you ever speak to Charles? 
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B: I never speak to plagiarists. 
The main propositional significance of B's utterance is, presumably, the sum of the M- 
represented linguistic expression (I never speak to plaglarists), the strong implicature 
(2 9) Charles is a plagiarist. 
and the deduction from the M-represented linguistic expression and implicature, namely 
(3 0) 1 never speak to Charles. 
The point is that neither (29) nor (30) are M-represented, although both are accessed via 
B's M-representation of I never speak to plagiarists. 
This non-conventional strategy of accessing linguistic expressions, not through their 
M-representation, but through the M-representation of other linguistic expressions, also 
appears to underlie at least some of what Sperber and Wilson call "weak implicatures". In 
the case of a relatively simple metaphor like 
(3 1) Bill is a bulldozer. 
the weak implicatures are mainly constructed from linguistic expressions conceptually 
corresponding to something like an aggressive and domineering person. These linguistic 
expressions are derived from the conventional-(2) M-representatum (a tractor for 
clearing ground) of the M-representation (bulldozer), and from the hearees/ reader's 
encyclopaedic entry for the M-represented linguistic expression. 
9 For Sperber and Wilson, both (29) and (30) are "strong implicaturcs". 
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All these implicatures are structured concepts which are intended/ assumed to be 
conveyed but not M-represented. For example, 
(29) Charles is a plagiarist. 
may not be M-represented or truth-conditionally related to what is M-represented, but in 
itself is (I argue) nevertheless a perfectly truth-conditional linguistic syntactico-semantic 
object. 
However, there are weaker implicatures -- such as those conveyed by Virginia 
Woolf's definition of a highbrow as 
(32) 11 ... a man or woman of thoroughbred intelligence who rides 
his mind at a 
gallop across country in pursuit of an idea" (cited in Davidson 1979) 
-- which some may regard as too complex and private to be linguistic expressions. 
There is also BR! s 1999b account of quotational mention, which appears to provide 
an example of an LOT formula which is not linguistic. Very briefly, he argues that the M- 
representation (the boss) in 
(33) "The boss" is a noun phrase. 
is used to identify the linguistic expression which is being mentioned, i. e. the hossý rather 
than to express the concept which the linguistic expression constitutes. In other words, 
the linguistic expression the boss is M-represented separately from - and is not 
linguistically, syntactico-semantically related to -- the linguistic expression Is a nowi 
phrase. So, although (the boss) M-represents the linguistic expression the boss, and (is a 
noun phrase) M-represents the linguistic expression is a nowt phrase, (33) as a whole is 
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not an M-representation of a linguistic expression. The proposition conveyed by the use 
of (33), therefore, appears to be a NON-LINGUISTIC LOT FORMULA which is NOT 
M-REPRESENTED BY (33) 
But the non-M-representation and apparent un-M-representability of certain concepts 
does not constitute an argument for non-linguistic LOT formulae, simply because the fact 
of M-representation or non-M-representation has no bearing on the nature of what is or 
isn't M-represented (and vice versa). There are obviously LOT formulae which certain 
individuals choose not to M-represent, e. g. (29). There are definitely LOT formulae which 
have never been (and may never be) accessed, consciously or unconsciously -- including 
some infinitely complex LOT formulae. There are, presumably, LOT formulae to which 
certain CSPRs do not assign M-representations. It is possible that (33) is used to access a 
concept which has no conventional means of being M-represented. But it is in the nature 
of M-representation that anything can be M-represented by anything else. Thus, in 
principle, all LOT formulae are M-representable. 
In My view, that some LOT formulae are M-represented while others are not (or 
never) M-represented does not follow from the nature of M-representation or the nature 
of LOT formulae, but from why and how humans M-represent LOTformulae. It has to 
remembered that LOT formulae are not just the I-cognitive M-representata of the E- 
Physical M-representations, but also consciously accessed through those M. 
representations. The M-representation of the inherently I-cognitive is obviously different 
from, say, the use of a drawing of a square to M-represent a building on a map, or the use 
of the letter "a" to M-represent the sound [a]. In each of the latter cases, the person who 
sets up the M-representational relation has prior access to both E-physical M-representans 
and E-physical M-representatum. On the other hand, if LOT formulae are what I believe 
they are -- (at least partly) constitutive of, and therefore inaccessible to, the central 
processes which give rise to consciousness -- then a person would be unable to 
intentionally pick out a particular LOT formula, or to reflect upon a particular LOT 
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formula, without the mediation of M-representations. Prior to the acquisition of some 
CSPR, his access to LOT formulae would be both unconscious and non-volitional. 
That E-physical M-representations are used to provide conscious access to what they 
M-represent appears to be one of the reasons why many of the M-representations used by 
humans tend not to be wholly arbitrary. Rather, an M-representans tends to be chosen for 
some property or characteristic which can serve as an indication, an M-representational 
"clue", as to the nature of the M-representatum. For example, the "clue" may consist in a 
resemblance to - and hence the iconic M-representation of -- the E-physical phenomenon 
which the M-representatum is the concept of This appears to be the case for 
onomatopoeic expressions, some hieroglyphs and an M-representation such as (Max got 
up and had breakfast). 
ALIternatively, an M-representans may hint at the M-represented linguistic expression 
or LOT formula -- call it Ll - in virtue of also being the conventional M-representation 
of another linguistic expression or LOT formula L2 which is conceptually related to Ll. 
What I mean is that the accessing of Ll, though possibly "automatic", would in a sense be 
reinforced by prior knowledge of, or access to, the other M-representatum L2. In 6.1 1 
referred to this phenomenon as second-order M-representation (e. g. (to laugh in 
someone's face), its first-order M-representatum to direct one's laughter straight towards 
someone's face, and its second-order M-representatum to openly show scon? for 
someone). 
But the most obvious example of the non-arbitrariness of M-representation is 
Complex M-representation. Complex M-representations are constructed from simple M- 
representations which "[represent] what [they represent] without (and not in virtue of) 
representing any of its properties" (Burton-Roberts 1994: 198). 10 While there is the sort 
10 For those who subscribe to the notion of "particular languages". this distinction bctivccn simple 
and complex M-reprcsentations would be a distinction between "lexical items" (or cvcn 
" morphological units") and "phrases/ sentences". 
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of M-representational convention which applies to single, simple M-representations 
(specifying, for example, the arbitrary M-representation of dog by (dog)), there is also 
the more general sort which determines the construction of complex M-representations 
from simple M-representations (e. g. the convention which states that (The dog chased the 
cat) M-represents Yhe dog chased the cat, (The cat chased the dog) M-represents Yhe 
cat chased the dog, and so on). These complex M-representations are more perspicuous 
than simple M-representations because they M-represent some aspects of the M- 
representata's composition. 
Leaving aside the LOT formula expressed by the use of (33), the main characteristic 
of a supposedly non-linguistic LOT formula which is un-M-represented but intended to be 
expressed/ accessed is its highly complex, infinitely ramified nature. Take, for example, 
the LOT formula which was intended to be expressed, but probably not M-represented 
by, 
(34) The worlds revolve like ancient women 
Gathering fuel in vacant lots. 
(from T. S. Eliot's Preludes) 
Its full significance is never completely grasped, possibly not even by Eliot himself 
Different readers in different contexts may access only parts of it, and different parts at 
that. Perhaps they may discover previously unaccessed parts. (They may, of course, also 
arrive at something which was not intended to be accessed. ) But I suggest that, no matter 
how variable and vague it seems to be, this LOT formula is nevertheless constituted by a 
particular, perfectly precise, albeit infinitely complex concept. Furthermore, if such a 
concept is not M-represented, it is not because it is in itself un-M-representable, but 
because someone (in the case of (34), Eliot) has chosen not to M-represent it. On the one 
hand, a non-arbitrary conventional-(2) M-representation of an infinitely complex and 
ramified LOT formula would be humanly impossible to produce/ perceive, in virtue of its 
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correspondingly infHte E-physical dimensions. On the other hand, a non-conventional or 
unconventional M-representation which is E-physically manageable would be too 
arbitrary, and not perspicuous enough, in respect of the M-representatutws composition. 
So instead of M-representing the LOT formula -- i. e. accessing it through its M- 
representation -- one may choose to access it through the M-representation of another 
LOTjbi7nula. 
So my argument is this: it does not follow from their being un-M-represented that 
certain LOT formulae are "non-linguistic LOTformulae" as opposed to "linguistic LOT 
fonnulae" or "linguistic expressions" -- simply because it does not follow from their being 
un-M-represented that they are un-M-representable. In my view, any LOT formula is M- 
representable, conventionally or otherwise, although whether or not it is actually M- 
represented depends on whether or not an individual chooses to M-represent it -- which, 
in turn, depends on the individual's intentions, abilities (cognitive, perceptual and motor), 
beliefs about his audience's cognitive and perceptual abilities (if an audience is involved), 
and general knowledge of the possibilities and limits of M-representation as a means of 
accessing LOT formulae. Furthermore, while LOT formulae tend to be un-M-represented 
(and accessed via M-representations of other LOT formulae) in virtue of being infinitely 
complex, that does not necessarily mean that they are therefore less accessible or 
"graspable" than LOT formulae which are regarded as "linguistic expressions" in virtue of 
being (conventionally-(2)) M-represented. As I have pointed out more than once, 
conscious access to concepts via M-representation is by definition indirect and 
incomplete. It follows from this that the M-representata of conventional-(2) M. 
representations - especially of the simple, arbitrary, less perspicuous M-representations - 
may not be any more accessible than, say, the LOT formula which is intended to be 
accessed via (but not M-represented by) (34). Take English (beauty), (city), or even 
(thing). It is possible that humans have as little (conscious) idea of the true nature and 
conceptual extent of the M-representatum of (thing), as they have of Eliot's un-M- 
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represented LOT formula. Or rather, it is possible that humans have as much conscious 
access to the true nature and conceptual extent of the un-M-represented LOT formula as 
they have of the LOT fonnula thing. 
Thus I conclude, not only that all linguistic expressions are LOT formulae (as I 
claimed in 5.3), but also that all LOT formulae are linguistic (as I have defined 
"linguistic"). There may be a sort of distinction between "linguistic expressions" and 
"LOT formulae" in (M-representational) practice. An RC account of this distinction 
would be that the LOT formulae which humans use the E-physical to M-represent tend to 
be regarded as "linguistic expressions", while the LOT formulae which humans cannot or 
will not M-represent (conventionally or otherwise) tend to be regarded as "LOT formulae 
which are not linguistic expressions". 
6.4.1 M-representation and reference 
In 5.3 1 argued that: 
(i) To be conscious at the most basic level is to have an unconscious, innate, non- 
volitional, unmediated -- and therefore direct and complete -- access to the 
structured concepts which constitute the central processes. 
So, in order to be conscious - i. e. to register, rather than to simply be impinged upon by, 
the E-physical world -- an organism has to have (the capacity to have) LOT formulae in 
the forin of structured concepts. I also argued that 
To be conscious of being conscious (i. e. to be conscious of having concepts) is 
to have a conscious, acquired, volitional, M-representational -- and therefore 
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indirect and incomplete -- access to (some oo the structured concepts which 
constitute the central processes. 
By this, I mean that the capacity to use the E-physical to M-represent the I-cognitive 
affords a sort of consciousness different from -- and apparently higher than - the 
fundamental, non-volitional, unmediated (vehicleless) form of consciousness described in 
(i). It has to be pointed out that the capacity for M-representation, as I conceive of it, is 
part of the central processes. Thus, on my definition of the central processes as being at 
least partly constituted by LOT formulae, the capacity for the M-representation of LOT 
formulae is itself constituted by LOT formulae. 
In fact I would go as far as to claim that LOT formulae in the form of structured 
concepts are constitutive of all the thoughts, meanings, intentions, beliefs, desires, etc 
which the individual/ agent could be said to have -- whether the LOT formulae are non- 
volitionally and directly accessed, or volitionally and M-representationally accessed. 
Furthermore, I am of the opinion that these LOT formulae are innate, and purely 
internalist in nature. The question is, how does this bear upon, or account for, the 
individual's encounters with objects, situations and properties of the external world? 
My views on thought and semantics are probably precisely what Putnam and his 
fellow "semantic externalists" would disapprove of, on the grounds that they are based on 
an erroneous tendency to " treat cognition as a purely individual matter", and to "ignore 
the social dimension of cognition" and "the contribution of the environment" (Putnam 
1975a: 271). "Causal theories of meaning" such as Kripke's (1972) account of proper 
names and Putnam's (1975a/ b) account of natural-kind and physical-magnitude terms, on 
the other hand, proceed from the idea that 
To have linguistic competence in connection vvith a term... one 
must... be in the right sort of relationship to certain distinguished 
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situations (normally, though not necessarily, situations in which the 
referent of the term is present). (Putnam 1975b: 199) 
The "distinguished situation" for the "expression" {electricity), " for example, consists in 
an "introducing event" during which "a description of electricity is given, and generally a 
causal description" (ibid: 200). A "causal description" is 
... one which singles out electricity as the physical magnitude 
responsible for certain effects in a certain way. (ibid) 
The individual who knows how to use the "expression" {electricity) is linked by a "causal 
chain" to other users of the "expression", and ultimately to the "introducing event". 
Putnam concurs (ibid: 203) with Kripke's (1972) claim that a particular member of the 
lfcollective" linked by a causal chain need not have had "contact" with the referent, or 
even have "any good idea" of it. What is important is that this individual is linked by the 
causal chain to someone who has had "contact" with the referent. 0 
Thus it is the EXTENSION -- the actual object, situation or property of the external 
world, to which an "expression" refers to - which for Putnam and Kripke is the primary 
element of the "meaning" of the "expression" (or the primary element of the content of a 
thought). However, as Bilgrami (1992: 236) puts it, Putnam "bifurcates the intentional 
aspect of the mind into two" by claiming that an "expression" also has an DITENSION. 
Putnam (1975b: 200-1) concedes that the individual who uses an "expression" to refer to, 
say, electricity, would also have an intensional concept of electricity. This includes what is 
"linguistically associated" with the "expression". In the case of (electricity), Putnam 
suggests that this may be no more than the concept of electricity as a physical magnitude, 
and capable of flow or motion. The intension of the "expression" (electricity) may also 
11 On the RC, any E-instantiable "expression" or "tcrin" is an M-rcpresentation - hcnce the braces around (electricity). 
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include ever-changing concepts associated with "causal descriptions" of the extension of 
the "expression" - from Franklin's, to the most recent accounts involving electrons etc. 
Putnam also concedes (1975a: 246) that the intension of an "expression" does have a 
role in the use of the "expression". Unlike Kripke, who argues that a person does not need 
to have true belief; about X to use a proper name to refer to X, Putnam argues that the 
person has to have some beliefs about the bearer of the name which are "true or 
approximately true" (1975b: 203). For example, someone who uses the name "Quine" to 
refer to the logician must have the right "linguistic ideas" -- that "Quine" is not a name 
which is restricted to females, for a start (1975b: 201). However, the "semantic 
externalism" of Putnam's approach is such that the intension of an "expression" does not 
have as crucial a role in the use of the "expression" as the extension does. As Putnam 
claims (ibid: 196-7), different individuals may use the "expression" to refer to the same 
thing, and yet have different intensional concepts of that thing. 
Putnam criticises internalist theories of thought and semantics for failing to take into 
account the social and deictic aspects of meaning (e. g. in 1975a: 245-6,271). Conversely, 
internalist theorists could criticise the externalists for ignoring the sortal difference 
between extension and meaning. If the extension or referent of an "expression" is what 
Putnam claims it is, an objectl situation/ property of the external world, then there is 
obviously a problem of how exactly the extension of an "expression" contributes to the 
"meaning" of the "expression", whether the "meaning" is regarded as a mental object or an 
abstract entity. In my view, since it is the "meaning" which is the subject of the theory or 
investigation, it must be the extension which has to be, as it were, adapted to the form of 
the "meaning" and not vice versa. The extension in itself, being E-physical, cannot be 
directly involved in, or constitute a part of, the abstract or I-cognitive "meaning" of an 
"expression". Thus I argue that it can only be the mental (internal) effects of an 
individual's perception/ cognition of 
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(i) the E-physical extension, 




(iii) the non-natural relation between extension and "expression" inaugurated 
during what Putnam calls the "introducing event" 
that constitute the part played by the extension in the "meaning" of the "expression". 
In other words: when a referent is said to be assigned to an "expression", what is 
contributed to the "meaning" of the "expression" is not (cannot be) the E-physical 
extension or referent itself, but certain perceptual and cognitive effects which the user of 
the expression conceptualises in the same way that the so-called intension of the 
"expression" is conceptualised. Putnam objects (1975a: 271) to the intemalist tendency to 
"ignore the world, insofar as it consists of more than the individual's 'observations' ". My 
point is that it is precisely the individual's "observations", and his concepts of those 
"observations", which constitute the only form of interaction which the individual is able 
to have with the "world". 
Putnam seems to distinguish sharply between concepts and extensions, on the 
grounds that one's concept of, say, fish (e. g. aquatic organism with gills) is not a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the use of the "expression" (fish) to refer (or not to 
refer) to something (e. g. an aquatic organism without gills). But under my RC account of 
utterances and literal meanings, the "expression" (fish) is an E-physical construction 
which may be used to M-REPRESENT the concept aquatic organism with gills, the 
concept aquatic organism without gills, or even the concept which a particular individual 
has of a particular organism. 
Similarly, (he) is (I argue) simply an E-physical object which is used to M-represent 
the concept third person, male, or a particular concept which the user of the M- 
representation has of a particular male person (say, Bill). The latter is what I consider to 
274 
be the result of "reference assignment". It has to be stressed that I regard the second 
concept to be as much of an I-cognitive concept (LOT formula) as thirdperson, male. 
Conversely, Ihirdperson, male is as much of an LOT formula, with as real a semantics, as 
the concept which arose from reference assignment. Note also that it does not follow 
from the use of the same M-representation (e. g. (Bill)) by different individuals to refer to 
the same person, that all those individuals are accessing or expressing the same concept of 
the referent. Just because the same object is perceived/ cognised by different individuals 
does not mean that they end up perceiving/ cognising it in the same way. For example, an 
individual A who only knows Bill by sight may conceive of Bill solely in terms of some of 
Bill's physical features, whereas the concept which Bill's close friend B has of Bill would 
probably involve much more than that. 
Furthermore, neither of the LOT formulae which constitute Ns and B's respective 
concepts of Bill is identical to the LOT formula which (Bill) M-represents in accordance 
with the conventional-(2) CSPR which A and B have been conditioned to use. The 
conventional-(2) M-representatum of (Bill) seems to be something like person hearing 
the name of (Bill). A and B are socioculturally conditioned to recover the latter from 
occurrences of (Bill), but through that conventional-(2) representatum are also able to 
access their individual (and probably more complex) concepts of the particular individual 
Bill. 
A more complex case involves an M-representation like (the man on the beach), 
which appears to be the conventional-(2) M-representation of the relatively simple 
concept some man situated on some beach. However, consider the following examples: 
(35)(a) The man on the beach is insane. 
(b) The man on the beach needs help. 
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Let's say that there is a man on the beach who happens to be Bill, Max's acquaintance. In 
the case of (35)(a), Max uses (the man on the beach) to refer to the man on the beach, 
who he thinks is behaving oddly, without knowing that the man is Bill. In the case of 
(35)(b), Max uses (the man on the beach) to refer specifically to Bill, indicating to a 
passer-by that Bill is, say, having a heart attack. My account of these examples is that, in 
both cases, Max would be socioculturally conditioned to use (the man on the beach) to 
access the concept some man situated on some beach. Through this conventional-(2) M- 
representaturn, however, he would also be able to access his own particular concept of the 
man he has observed behaving oddly on the beach (in the case of (35)(a)), or his own 
particular concept of his acquaintance Bill (in the case of (35)(b)). The (35)(a) concept 
could be regarded as a non-conventional second-order M-representatum of (the man of 
the beach), if it happens to be logically related to (e. g. if it happens to entail) the 
conventional-(2) first-order M-representatum some man situated on some beach. But the 
concept accessed by Max in the case of (35)(b) may bear no relation whatsoever to the 
first-order M-representatum. Such a concept could be regarded either as an 
unconventional or non-conventional third-order M-representatum of (the man on the 
beach), or as a concept which is accessed via, but not M-represented by, (the man on the 
beach}. 
Returning to Putnam's criticism of the failure of intemalist theories of "meaning" to 
take into account the "social dimension of cognition" and the "contribution of the 
environment", my response is this. Firstly, I argue that any social aspects of thought and 
"meaning" have to do with the use of non-linguistic M-representations and M- 
representational conventions to access LOT formulae. Furthermore, the fact that the 
social conventions are M-representational implies that they are not as social as they might 
appear to be - it follows from the opacity of M-representation that there is no way of 
telling whether two or more people associate exactly the same LOT formula with a 
particular M-representation. Secondly, I suggest that it is not the external world which 
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has a bearing on concepts/ LOT formulae, but the latter which are necessary for an 
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